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Abstract 
An abstract of the thesis of Sylvia Hendel for the Master of Sociology presented 
May 8, 1997. 
Title: Wealth for Everybody-
Semantics and Structure of the Capitalist Metanarrative 
In 1979 Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard defined postmodemism as "incredulity toward 
metanarratives." One of six narratives Lyotard saw in decline was the capitalist one, 
which promised wealth for everybody. According to Lyotard this narrative was refuted 
by recurrent economic crises in the 20th century. 
This thesis examines Lyotard's statement about the decline of the capitalist 
metanarrative by taking the approach of the sociology of knowledge, a branch of 
sociology that attempts to relate ideas to the socio-historical settings in which they are 
produced and received. 
The idea of general abundance, or the semantics, is described in othodox 
economic theory. Four distinct, successive phases marked major shifts regarding the 
idea of wealth for everybody in economics from the late 18th century onward. Two 
British structures and their relationship to the idea of general abundance are examined: 
the general economic development of the country and the economic situation of the 
people, and the social and economic policies in relation to the idea of general 
2 
abundance. How did the development of the economic structure impact on the 
development of the idea? How did the statement of the idea influence the policies? 
The findings support Lyotard's thesis claiming the decline of the capitalist meta-
narrative. While wealth for everybody was explicitly promised at the beginning of 
modem economic thought, nowadays such statements cannot be found. The 
examination of British economic development and policies suggests that the decline of 
the idea is closely related to the structural developments. Despite constant economic 
growth and severe efforts of the state to eliminate poverty by redistributing income and 
wealth, the poverty levels could never be changed significantly, hence, the promise of 
wealth for everybody could never be fulfilled. Therefore, the economic crises that 
Lyotard identified as cause for the decline of the metanarrative were periods when 
economic and political trends became accelerated and led to a break with, until then, 
prevalent policies in regard to general abundance. 
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The history of economics has become a nearly moribund subject 
in the United States, and has not failed to decline elsewhere. 
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In 1979 with the publication of Le condition postmoderne Jean-Fran9ois Lyo-
tard started a discourse on postmodernity in philosophy and the social sciences. 1 What 
makes this book special among all postmodern literature, and probably one of the most 
read books about postmodernity is that the philosophical "diagnosis received an inter-
disciplinary confirmation" (Connor 1989:6). Lyotard's definition of postmodern as 
"incredulity toward metanarratives" (Lyotard l 993a:XXIV) declares the postmodern 
condition as a generic social condition. 
In Le condition postmoderne and a collection of essays, published in 1988, Le 
Postmoderne explique aux en/ants, Lyotard refers to four meta- or grand narratives 
that have marked modernity2: German idealism's philosophical, speculative narrative of 
the unity of all knowledge that produces cumulative understandings of man, nature, and 
society; the Enlightenment narrative of the gradual emancipation of humanity, embod-
ied in the ideals of the French revolution; the Marxist narrative of the emancipation of 
humanity due to the socialization of labor; and the capitalist narrative of the enrichment 
l As Welsch (1987, 1988) shows, and in contrast to common understanding, the contemporary 
discourse about postmodernism did not start in architecture but in a literature debate in the U.S. in the 
1950s, before the discussions spilled over to architecture in the 1970s. Nowadays, there seems to be no 
discipline in the liberal arts and sciences that does not discuss postmodernism; it even leaves traces in 
disciplines like zoology, biology, forestry, geography, and medicine. 
2 Lyotard gives two more examples of metanarratives: the "hermeneutics of meaning" (Lyotard 
l 993a:XXIII) and "the salvation of creatures through the conversion of souls to the Christian narrative 
of martyred love" (Lyotard 1993c:l8). However, he never elaborates on these and, therefore, seems to 
see them as subordinate to the others. 
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of all humanity through techno-industrial development (Lyotard 1993a:XXIII; Lyotard 
1993c: 17-18, 25).3 
The function of these narratives-which cannot be fulfilled any more m 
advanced capitalist societies-is to 
legitimate social and political institutions and practices, forms of legisla-
tion, ethics, modes of thought, and symbolics. . . . they ground this 
legitimacy ... in a future to be brought about, that is, in an Idea to real-
ize. This Idea (of freedom, "enlightenment", socialism, general prosper-
ity) has legitimating value because it is universal. It gives modernity its 
characteristic mode: the project, that is, the will directed toward a goal. 
(Lyotard 1993c:50) 
Nowadays there is hardly any book or article on postmodernism and postmod-
ernity that does not refer to Lyotard's statements about the incredulity toward grand 
narratives. His theses are taken for granted and are viewed as proven, even though 
Lyotard gives only a few confuting events to verify his statements. Auschwitz, "the 
crime opening postmodernity" (Lyotard l 993a: 19), refuted the Hegelian speculative 
narrative of rationality; May 1968 in Paris refuted the Enlightenment ideas of freedom, 
embodied in parliamentary democracy; Stalin and his gulags, Berlin 1953, Budapest 
1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, and Poland 1980 refuted the emancipatory Marxist ideal; 
the recurrent crises in capitalist societies, e.g. in 1929, 197 4-79, refute the capitalist 
narrative and its promise of wealth for everybody (Lyotard 1993c, 28-29). 
3 Welsch (1990) argues that postmodernism has an implicit, new metanarrative-plurality. Its aim is 
to recognize and defend autonomous, heterogeneous ways oflife. Morel (1995:275) sees this as well 
and reproaches Lyotard for creating just another totalizing norm. 
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Stimulated by Habermas's intervention in 1980, which became "a focal point of 
the debate" (Huyssen 1986:30), there was, and still is, a detailed discussion going on 
about the German idealism and the Enlightenment metanarrative. 4 The Marxist narra-
tive is hardly needed or employed any more since the decline of the USSR and Eastern 
European socialist countries in 1989. In the Western hemisphere this breakdown was 
interpreted and rejoiced at as a complete victory of capitalism. Some voices could even 
be heard claiming the end of history. What the capitalist societies in the United States, 
Canada, and Western Europe encounter nowadays is partly a consequence of these 
major changes, which left the Left without a sense of direction and unfit for political 
battles: The established social security and welfare systems are under serious conser-
vative attack. The capitalist systems indeed seem to have withdrawn from the promise 
of wealth for everybody, and stress two other capitalist objectives-personal freedom 
of choice, and recognition and reward on the basis of merit. 5 
These current developments make Lyotard's thesis on the decline of the capital-
ist narrative the most intriguing metanarrative to me. Lyotard never elaborates on the 
capitalist metanarrative and he gives just a few reasons for its decline: "the 'crises of 
1911 and 1929' refute the doctrine of economic liberalism, and the 'crisis of 197 4-79' 
refutes the post-Keynesian modification of that doctrine" (Lyotard l 993c:29). This 
leads to many unanswered questions. Why did the idea of general abundance emerge at 
4 In September 1980, when he was awarded the Theodor W. Adorno prize in the city of Frankfurt, 
Habermas gave a lecture, Modernity-An Incomplete Project, that led to a harsh but fruitful 
controversy with French poststructuralists. For an overview of this dispute see Lyotard (1993c), Jay 
(1991), Rorty (1991), and Huyssen (1986). 
5 Preston (1967:42-46) analyzes the three most important and widely held objectives of capitalism. 
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all? How did it change over time? How did it influence policies and the economy, and 
vice versa? Is it justified to talk about a decline of the capitalist metanarrative at all? 
In this thesis I want to examine Lyotard's thesis and the emerging questions. 
This inquiry will take place within the context of the sociology of knowledge, a branch 
of sociology that studies the relations between thought and society. It attempts to 
relate the ideas it studies to the socio-historical settings in which they are produced and 
received. 
The two most different perspectives on this relationship between ideas and a 
social base were given by Hegel and Marx. Hegel's idealist, dialectic philosophy of 
history gave the evolution of ideas a primary independent role in historical change, 
whereas Marx, in reaction to Hegel, emphasized the materialistic conditions oflife: 
In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to 
earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not 
set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as nar-
rated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the 
flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real 
life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes 
and echoes of this life-process. . . . Morality, religion, metaphysics, all 
the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, 
thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. . . . Life is not 
determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. (Marx and 
Engels 1961 [ 1846]) 
The tension between these two views cannot be resolved; only a close look at 
concrete historical examples reveals possible answers to the question how ideas are 
related to social structures. With this thesis I want to take such a close look by 
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examining how the emergence and the development of the idea of general abundance is 
related to the socio-historical setting in which it was created, developed, and perceived. 
Or following Luhmann (1992) and stating it in more sociological terms, how is the 
"semantics" of the idea of general abundance related to its "structure." I will do this by 
examining the descriptions of the idea of general abundance in economic theory. For 
the structural side I will look at two fields-policies and the economy. My focus here 
will be, first, on how the economic structure influences the development of the idea, 
and second, on how the idea impacts on policies. Given that the vast majority of 
orthodox economists examined in regard to the idea-side of this thesis are British, the 
examination of the structural side will also look at British settings. 
There can be no doubt that economic events have an influence on economic 
thought. Stigler (1965: 17) aptly remarks: "To be sane, one must recognize at least a 
portion of the physical and social world in which he lives; so the sane economic theo-
ries have always had at least a possible connection with the world in which they were 
written." The question is to what extent such an influence exists. I will try to answer 
this by looking at the general development of the British economy, and the economic 
situation of the people. 
Economists themselves seem to be very confident about their influence on poli-
c1es. Robbins (1963:5) says: "There can be no doubt that throughout history econo-
mists of all schools have conceived their work as having the most intimate bearing on 
politics, both in the sense of the theory of political action and of the actual practice of 
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affairs." An often quoted statement that supports this view is given by the economist 
John Maynard Keynes (1959[1933]:383): 
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are 
right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly 
understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who 
believe themselves to be quite exempt from any influences, are usually 
the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear 
voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler 
of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is 
vastly exaggerated, compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. 
I will examine the relationship of the idea of general abundance and the eco-
nomic and social policies by investigating if, and if so, how the British government 
intervened in the economy. Were economic and social policies influenced by policy 
recommendations of economists? Or did policy-makers not listen to the academic 
writers? 
According to Preston (1967:56-74), there are five forms of state intervention: 
First, the government is called by competitors in economic struggles to give them an 
advantage or to counter an advantage by their opponents. Intervention of this kind 
include, for example, tariffs, bounties, patent laws, land grants, subsidies, and postal 
rates. Of special interest for this thesis will be labor legislation, which potentially can 
raise the bargaining power of labor and so "permit workers to share more widely in the 
growing prosperity of the nation through higher wages" (Preston 1967:59). The sec-
ond type of intervention is aimed at giving capitalism a necessary legal framework. " 
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an economic system cannot function without a structure of law to support it. The law 
establishes the rights of ownership, the enforceability of contracts, and the standing of 
parties to deal with one another" (Preston 1967:59). This form of state intervention is 
of minor importance in regard to the theme of this thesis. The third type consists of 
intervention "to correct and supplement the effects of the market in meting out rewards 
and allocating power" (Preston 1967), and will be of major concern in this thesis. 
Besides assistance for agricultural and mixed government-private enterprises (e.g. in 
the fields of nuclear power and aerospace) this type of intervention includes the whole 
public sector that provides postal service, roads, national parks, etc., and, more impor-
tant, public education, social welfare, and social insurances in cases of unemployment, 
retirement, accidents, and sickness. State intervention of the fourth type intend to 
counter the ups and especially the downs of business cyles by managing the supply and 
the demand of the economy with fiscal and monetary policies. This kind of state inter-
vention became important from the 1930s onwards and will be a focus of this thesis as 
well. Finally, the state can intervene in the economy so as to supplant and control the 
market with a wide variety of regulations such as zoning laws, licensing procedures, 
and measures that protect the environment. Of importance for this paper will be the 
regulation of working conditions, for example, via the implementation of a minimum 
wage and maximum hour laws. 
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As I will show, there are four distinct, successive periods that mark major shifts 
regarding the idea of wealth for everybody in orthodox economics. 6 The idea emerged 
in Britain during the 18th century within the discipline of classical political economy. 
In the 1870s a new economic paradigm emerged that led to the neo-classical school, 
which dominated economics until the 1930s. At this time Keynesianism became the 
new orthodox view and kept this status until the mid- l 960s, when two further 
schools-monetarism and new classical macroeconomics-emerged and became domi-
nant. However, this hegemony lasted for a few years only. In the early 1980s Keynes-
ian economics was revitalized within yet another school of economic thought, called 
new Keynesianism. This latest development in orthodox economics led to a situation 
were two competing paradigms have been existing-new classical and new Keynes-
ian-, neither of them able to gain dominant status. 
The development of the idea of general abundance in these four periods of eco-
nomic thought will give the framework for the examination of the economic develop-
ment and the policy-analysis. For the first three phases-classical political economy, 
neo-classical economics, and Keynesianism-I will describe in depth how these schools 
viewed the possiblity of general prosperity, and which policies they recommended in 
order to achieve this state. These descriptions will be focused on Adam Smith, David 
Ricardo, Alfred Marshall, and John Maynard Keynes, the outstanding and most 
influential representatives of their school of economic thought. 
6 I consciously exclude economic schools that contradicted orthodox economics, such as Marxism and 
the Austrian Historicist school from this analysis. As these were not the mainstream schools, their 
influence on policies is negligible, at least in Britain. 
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The analysis of the fourth period will be somewhat different than the examina-
tion of the first three periods. For one, the last period is characterized by a multitude 
of competing economic paradigms which merely resurrect ideas of former develop-
ments in economics, without adding crucial notions in regard to the idea of wealth for 
everybody. Monetarism and new classical macroeconomics heavily draw upon the 
classical and neo-classical school while new Keynesianism revitalizes old Keynesian 
economic thought. Furthermore, with exception of Milton Friedman who was the most 
influential economist of the monetarist school, this last phase is not dominated by one 
or two economists. For these reasons I will keep the descriptions of the idea-side in 
this last period shorter, and focus more on the economic development and the policies. 
I will argue that Lyotard is right by claiming a decline of the idea of general 
abundance. While wealth for everybody was explicitly promised by Adam Smith, the 
first classical economist that stated this idea, nowadays such statements cannot be 
found in economic theory. The examination of the economic and political structure 
suggests that the decline of the idea is closely related to these structural developments. 
We will see that throughout the last 200 years economists were influenced by socio-
historical settings, especially the economic structure. However, as O'Brien (1975:22) 
states, "there is often very little that the historian of theory ( ... ) can point to as specific 
examples of the operation of such influences." Nonetheless, for two theorists, David 
Ricardo and John Maynard Keynes, this will be possible. In regard to the relationship 
between the idea of general abundance and the political structure, I will show that it is 
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not possible to make generalizations about how the economic theories impact on poli-
cies. There are cases showing that policy descriptions of economists on the basis of the 
idea of general abundance seriously influence policy-makers, and there are cases that 
demonstrate exactly the contrary, that government did not adhere to these recommen-
dations. 
II. The Making, the Development, and the 
Realization of the Idea of General Abundance 
1. The De-Moralization of Acquisitiveness 
11 
To send the promise of, and belief in, wealth for everybody, and capitalism on 
its way, society's view of acquisitive behavior had to change drastically (Heilbroner 
1985, Preston 1967, Deane 1965). In precapitalist societies wealth was a use value and 
an end in itself It appeared as luxury consumption in forms of goods and services, as 
maintenance and deployment of armed forces, and as religious edifices. Idealized by 
the noblesse, and strongly engaged by the Catholic church, any excessive profitmaking 
and usury was widely disapproved of in traditional European societies. People did not 
strive for gain and profit (but for honor and glory), working and trading for reward was 
condemned, acquisitiveness was regarded as inappropriate. 
This attitude is still reflected in Adam Smith's writings in the 18th century, when 
the British society had already encountered the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution. 
Smith regarded acquisitiveness as "contemptible and trifling" (Smith 1976[1759]:183), 
"most vulgar" (Smith 1976[1776]:342), and saw acquisitive societies in moral decline. 
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While perceiving some advantages in the rise of commerce and industry, such as pro-
bity and punctuality, he emphasized damaging effects of the drive to amass wealth7: 
These are the dissadvantages [sic] of a commercial spirit. The minds of 
men are contracted, and rendered incapable of elevation. Education is 
despised, or at least neglected, and the heroic spirit is almost utterly 
extinguished. To remedy these defects would be an object worthy of 
serious attention. (Smith 1976(1766]:541) 
As Heilbroner (1985:33-38, 53-60; 1972(1953]:16-39) and Preston (1967:17-
20) show, in order to be able to transform from a pre- to a capitalist society, a generali-
zation of wealth as capital was necessary. The morals in regard to acquisitive behavior 
had to vanish as "the single most important element in capitalism . . . is the driving need 
to extract wealth from the productive activities of society in the form of capital" 
(Heilbroner 1985:33). In capitalism, wealth or capital is a means for gathering more 
wealth, not an end in itself as in pre-capitalist societies. 8 This means that the low esti-
mation of acquisitiveness in pre-capitalist societies had to tum into a "spirit of capital-
ism," to use Weber's famous term. "Wealth instead of being used for hospitality, osten-
tation, and worship, would need to be loaned or offered at its price-interest-or 
employed for profit, and the religious strictures against usury ( ... ) would need to dis-
appear" (Preston 1967:20). 
7 Nevertheless, Smith promoted acquisitive behavior because he regarded it as useful for the economic 
development and material progress of society, which he valued more than morals. (See below in the 
chapter on classical political economy (2.2) and Adam Smith (2.3).) 
8 On a more psychological level, Heilbroner (1985:44-53) describes two reasons for the drive to amass 
wealth in capitalist societies. First, being wealthy is a prestige, "with its freight of unconscious sexual 
and emotional needs." Second, wealth is an expression of power in the sense of having control over 
the access to goods. 
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How was such an attitude change possible? How did money-making pursuits 
become honorable "after having stood condemned or despised as greed, love of lucre, 
and avarice for centuries past" (Hirschman 1977:9)? Hirschman (1977) argues that 
there was a movement in the broad area of social thought that appraised the conse-
quences of acquisitive behavior and so created an "acceptable belief system" 
(Heilbroner 1985:110) around capital-extracting activities. This movement reinter-
preted the love of lucre, regarded in precapitalist societies as a disruptive passion, as a 
harmonious interest. 
. . . the case for giving free rein and encouragement to private acquisitive 
pursuits was both the outcome of a long train of Western thought and 
an important ingredient of the intellectual climate of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. (Hirschman 1977:69) 
Based on Machiavellian ideas, a wide range of thinkers gave birth to the new 
view of acquisitive behavior-Montesquieu, James Steuart, John Millar, Blaise Pascal, 
Giambattista Vico, Georg W. F. Hegel, Bernard Mandeville, David Hume, Francis 
Bacon, Fram;ois Quesnay, Adam Smith, etc. These men were concerned about how a 
stable order can be reached, when changes arising out of sustained economic growth in 
agriculture, trade, and manufacturing started to threaten the traditional, static societal 
structure.9 They solved this question by utilizing men's passions in a constructive way. 
The passion to amass wealth was interpreted as having a calming influence and civiliz-
9 Besides these economic changes the Reformation, the beginning of democratization, and scientific 
progress had a severe impact on the social thought at this time. 
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ing effects on society and its members by working toward the general welfare of soci-
ety and a viable social order. Men pursuing their self-interest, i.e. acquisitive behavior, 
were believed to serve themselves and society as well. Avarice became the civil pas-
sion that opposed other harmful passions such as ambition, lust for power, love of 
pleasure, and sexual lust. Thus, acquisitiveness was reinterpreted as a virtue and a 
legitimate interest for people. 
In the numerous treatises on the passions that appeared in the seven-
teenth century, no change whatever can be found in the assessment of 
avarice as the 'foulest of them all' or in its position as the Deadly Sin that 
it had come to occupy toward the end of the Middle Ages. But once 
money-making wore the label of 'interests' and reentered in this disguise 
the competition with the other passions, it was suddenly acclaimed and 
even given the task of holding back those passions that had long been 
thought to be much less reprehensible. (Hirschman 1977 :41-42) 
The emerging discipline of political economy-various of its proponents helped 
reshape the attitudes toward the acquisitive drive-symbolized the reinterpretation of a 
harmful passion into a useful interest. 
The very possibility of such a science itself implies that acquisitive 
behavior has lost its connection with the unruly passions and has come 
to be regarded as a steady principle of human 'motion,' capable of 
measurement and restraint. (Heilbroner 1985: 111) 
As I will show, the early classical economists justified unlimited acquisitiveness 
by arguing that according to natural laws production in an unregulated market econ-
15 
omy would steadily increase and benefits would spread wider and wider, bringing gen-
eral abundance to individuals and the nation. 
2. Classical Political Economy (J 776-1870s) 
2.1 The First Industrial Revolution 
Capitalism was not invented, but evolved in the process by which man-
kind emerged from its historic dependence upon an agriculturally-based 
economy. It is not somebody's theory put into practice, but practice 
that many have tried to explain in theory. (Preston 1967:37) 
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In the 18th century the first Industrial Revolution spontaneously, and without 
governmental support, started in Great Britain and gave way to a quick and disruptive 
transition from mercantilist to capitalist states in Europe and North America. As Deane 
(1965:2-3) shows, the actual starting-point of the Industrial Revolution is controversial 
among historians. Some trace it back to the mid-sixteenth century, others see its take-
off in the 1760s, but most scholars agree to date it in the 1780s, "when the statistics of 
British international trade show a significant upward movement" (Deane 1965:3). 
In the middle of the eighteenth century Britain was still a pre-industrial country. 
It had all the characteristics that stand for a pre-industrial and pre-capitalist economy 
and society (Deane 1965: 5-17): the country and the vast majority of its people were 
poor, though there was some economic surplus; the standard of living and the level of 
productivity were essentially stagnant, as well as the social structure; agriculture was 
the main economic activity, but commerce and the textile industry were becoming 
important sectors; the labor force was still quite unspecialized. Despite these pre-
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capitalist characteristics the process of industrialization had already begun: 11 ••• the 
trend in population, prices, output and incomes was already turning upwards by 1750" 
(Deane 1965: 19). 
Deane (1965) and Deane and Cole (1967) describe in detail the beginnings of 
British industrialization. The following summary of the most important threads is 
based on these two books. 
The volume of trade rose enormously; British imports which were valued at 
£39.6 million in 1796 had risen to £103 million by 1853, with domestic exports increas-
ing from £30.1 million to £71.4 million. This involved a great broadening of the range 
of commodities traded as the British economy expanded and diversified. 
Closely bound up with the developments in trade was a fundamental change in 
the balance of the British economy. Agriculture, which accounted for 40 to 45 per cent 
of national income in the years 1700-76, had declined to only 26 per cent by 1821 and 
to 14 per cent by 1871. Between 1801 and 1871 its share of the labor force fell from 
36 per cent (1.7 million) to 15 per cent (1.8 million). During the same period, thanks 
to technological innovations, the agricultural output rose from £75.5 million to £130.4 
million. 
The rise of the manufacturing sector to predominance was impressive. 
Accounting for 24 per cent (£30.3 million) of gross national product (GNP) in 1770 it 
accounted for 38 per cent (£348.9 million) by 1871. The great staple industries 
(textile, mining, iron, transport) grew up in this period. The output of the cotton 
18 
industry rose from £0. 6 million in 17 60 to £ 104. 9 million in 18 71. In 1826 there were 
only 70 miles ofrailway open, by 1864 there were nearly 11,000 miles in use. 
The population expansion began in the 1740s and reached a growth rate of 3. 5 
per cent per decade by 1751-61.1° By 1810-20 the staggering figure was 16. 9 per cent. 
The population of England and Wales which had been less than 6 million in 1700 had 
reached 22.7 million by 1871. As a sign of the economic changes that were going on, 
more and more parts of the population lived in urban areas. While in 1760 only 21 per 
cent of the population were urban, this number rapidly increased to 33.9 per cent in 
1800, and to 48.3 per cent in 1840 (Crafts 1994:44). 
At the beginning of the eighteenth century national income was probably less 
than £50 million. By 1871 it had risen nearly forty times to £916.6 million. Despite the 
population increase, the GNP per capita increased at greater than 1 per cent per annum 
in the years 1801 to 1871. Yet it is doubtful that there was any significant rise in real 
wages up to about 1820. 
. . . for the most part the rise in money wages lagged behind the increase 
in prices, poverty became an acute problem, food riots were common 
and it is very difficult to justify the view that standards of living of the 
mass of population were rising over the period 1780-1815. Moreover, 
in so far as industrialization led to urbanization it may have tended to 
worsen the environment of many people and to push up the death rate 
.... (Deane 1965:31) 
10 These figures are "estimates based largely on records of baptisms, burials and marriages" (Deane 
1965:23). The first census took place in 1801. See also the discussion of the population issue in 2.4. 
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Despite the fact that real wages increased from the 1820s onwards, the 1830s 
and 1840s were "periods of widespread social and economic distress" (Deane 
1965:142). Lindert (1994:373) reports that about 10 per cent of the work force at that 
time was unemployed. However, "it can hardly be doubted that by the middle of the 
nineteenth century the majority of the population were beginning to experience, though 
not yet to expect, a slow rise in their ordinary standard of living" (Deane 1965:223). 
This was partly due to social policies (see 2.5), and partly because of Britain's outstand-
ing economic success in the 19th century. 
Deane (1965: 142-143) reports estimates of the purchasing power of building-
craftsmen wages. In the 1780s they were 15 per cent above the figure 100 years ear-
lier, by the 1820s it was again 12 per cent above the level of the 1780s, and again it 
went up nearly 20 per cent by the 1830s. Also, Deane (1965:143) gives some figures 
regarding the state expenditures on poor relief-while in 1688 £622, 000 ( 1. 5 per cent 
of the national income) were spent for poor families, by 1800 2 per cent of the national 
income were spent to "support a much more liberal relief policy," called the Speenham-
land system (see 2.5), which was introduced in 1796 nationwide and amended in 1834. 
However, this relief system did not have widespread effects. According to Southall 
( 1991) only about 5 per cent of the population received relief, and most of this money 
went not to able-bodied, unemployed adults, but to poor children. 
There can be no doubt that poverty was still the predominant economic status 
of the vast majority of people, despite some improvements in the standard of living 
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from 1820 onwards. In 1867 the top five per cent of British households shared about 
41 per cent of the national income-a figure that shows that the British "were 
outstandingly unequal in income and wealth at that time" (Lindert 1994:379). Lindert 
(1994:379-380) reports that the wealth and income gap between rich and poor widened 
from the 1780s onwards until the middle of the 19th century when it came to its peak in 
the 1860s. 
2.2 The Emergence of the Classical School 
The changes in the economic structure were accompanied by the gradual <level-
opment of economic theory into a modem science, called Political Economy by its 
founders. 11 
It was not until the eighteenth-century philosophers-primarily the 
physiocrats and Adam Smith-began systematically, and not merely 
incidentally, to apply to economic phenomena their theories of the 
natural order underlying the real world that economic theory began to 
develop into a unified system of explanation, a definitive technique of 
analysis. (Deane 1978:4-5) 
Classical economists tried to explain and analyze the unprecedented economic 
growth and its consequences, such as the rise of the nation state and the development 
of a bourgeois society. There can be no doubt that these structural developments 
11 There are four distinct epochs of western economic thought: classical Greek, Mediaeval scholastic, 
mercantilist, and modem (Deane 1978: 1-5). 
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exercised a strong influence on the thinking of the classical economists. As shown 
above, the idea of general abundance served as justification for a reinterpretation of 
acquisitive behavior as harmonious interest. The classical school was the first to state 
this idea within the emerging economic science. 
The first stage of the new science of political economy was dominated by sev-
eral British economists. They constituted the school of classical economic thought 
which became the basis for the development of economics for a century. It is usual to 
date the classical period from 1776-the year of the publication of Adam Smith's 
Wealth of Nations-to the 1870s, when the marginal revolution led to the second era in 
economic thinking: neo-classical economics.12 
The classical economists shared a system of theories, concepts and analytical 
techniques and so formed a paradigm in Thomas Kuhn's (1996(1962]) sense, and con-
stituted an influential scientific community. One specific characteristic of the classical 
writers is that they were not merely academics, but men with diverse educational and 
professional backgrounds. 13 
. . . economics was not the exclusive preserve of a group of academic 
theorists and empirical research workers (amateur or professional) but 
the active concern of a heterogeneous collection of journalists, bankers, 
civil servants, politicians and others ... whose attempts at the objective 
explanation and/or prediction of economic behavior gave them as much 
claim to form part of the intellectual community of economists as the 
academics. (Deane 1978:94) 
12 About differing views on how to date the classical period see O'Brien (1975:1-2). 
13 O'Brien (1975:8-11) gives a briefoverview of the education and professions of some of the classical 
economists. 
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These men were strongly affected by the developments in the natural sciences. 
"The advances of mathematics and celestial mechanics held out the hope that laws of 
motion might be discovered for men's action, just as for falling bodies and planets" 
(Hirschman 1977:13). Following natural-law philosophers such as Hugo Grotius, 
Samuel Pufendorf, and Francis Hutcheson (who was Adam Smith's teacher), the early 
political economists aimed at describing the economy "in terms of the operation of 
natural laws of human behavior" (Preston 1967:37). As O'Brien (1975:22) points out, 
a natural-law system involves the following four main propositions: 
. . . that there is an underlying order in material phenomena; that this 
underlying order is discoverable either by reasoning from observed 
phenomena or from innate moral sense; that discovery of the underlying 
order leads to the formulation of natural laws which, if followed, lead to 
the best possible situation; and that positive legislation should reflect 
these natural laws. 
Some theorists-Adam Smith did, David Ricardo did only partially-added the 
following further propositions: 
. . . that natural laws are productive of immutable forces which man can-
not defect or impede-this will be called determinism; that if freedom is 
accorded then society will progress harmoniously to a better state-this 
will be called harmony theory; and that therefore the operation of natu-
ral laws requires a great degree of freedom to achieve their ends-this 
will be called the natural liberty doctrine. 
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In the classical economists' version the natural laws were viewed as desirable 
moral laws which, if followed by society, would promote material progress. "The 
natural order was the best possible one; once it was understood, all would see that the 
divergence of existing political and social institutions from it was the major obstacle to 
their welfare and would sweep them aside" (Burtt 1972:5). 
As the term "Political Economy" symbolizes, a distinction between economic 
theory and policy descriptions was not made at that time; "scientific" conclusions and 
value judgments in accordance with the natural laws were used to support or disap-
prove governmental policies. 14 The early economists' works were characterized by a 
strong ideological bias toward economic policies advocating economic individualism 
and laissez-faire. Only the free market, it was argued, would lead to a broad distribu-
tion of wealth. Laissez-faire policies were seen as reforms of existing mercantilist 
social and political institutions in the interests of greater individual freedom. Collectiv-
ism and state intervention were regarded as harmful for the enrichment of the nation 
and its people. 
14 This attitude is illustrated by several economists of the classical period who personally did not 
separate science and politics: Adam Smith was Commissioner of Customs and Prime Minister in 
Scotland, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill were Members of the British Parliament. 
Starting with the marginal revolution in economics in the 1870s, value-judgments as part of 
scientific analysis became discredited. At the beginning of the 20th century Max Weber and Vilfredo 
Pareto declared value-judgments as unscientific, and expected social scientists to separate science and 
politics. The subsequent struggle for a value-free science of political economy is discussed by Burtt 
(1972:4-7), Blaug (1968:676-678), Maloney (1985: 186-202), and Pribram (1983:228-230). In 
general it seems that-despite an acceptance among economists to make only neutral 
generalisations-"the focus of economics on politics ... has remained very intimate" (Robbins 
1978[1952]:6-7). 
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However, the classical economists did not see the natural order as flawless, and, 
hence, never intended a government that could not interfere at all with the economic 
domain. They assigned the political institutions important tasks: the defense of the 
country, taxation, and judicial administration. In this respect, they somewhat deviated 
from the natural-law principles. Viner (1958:249) says: "The classical economists did 
espouse laissez-faire, but a laissez-faire avowedly subject to qualification and requiring 
specific justification in each case of potential applications." While the classical writers 
were the earliest to fully appreciate the allocative mechanism of the market and the 
power and efficiency of this mechanism, they were perfectly clear that it could only 
operate within a framework of restrictions. Besides the mentioned governmental tasks, 
they recognized religious, moral, and conventional restrictions which were designed to 
ensure the coincidence of self and community interest. The exact framework required 
was to be revealed by experience, as defects in the operation of the system were dis-
covered. 
The classical period was dominated by Adam Smith (1723-90) and David 
Ricardo (1772-1823). "These two writers were without doubt the two major figures of 
Classical economics in terms of the influence they exercised . . . both with respect to ... 
theories and to the conclusions of policy drawn from them ... " (O'Brien 1975:4). The 
following analysis shall, therefore, be focused on these two theorists. 15 
15 Ofless, but still great importance for the classical period are the following British economists: 
Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834), James Mill (1773-1836) and his son John Stuart Mill (1806-73), 
John Ramsay McCulloch (1789-1864), Nassau Senior (1790-1864), Robert Torrens (1780-1864), 
Thomas Tooke (1774-1858), J.E. Caimes (1823-75), and Henry Fawcett (1833-84). There was only 
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2.3 Adam Smith (1723-90) 
Adam Smith, an academic by profession, is regarded as the founder of modem 
economics. 16 His Wealth of Nations (1976[1776]), which originated in a set of lectures 
held between 1767 to 1776, became of very important for the discipline: 
. . . he is the author to whom all orthodox nineteenth-century classical 
economists (on the continent of Europe as well as in Britain) con-
sciously traced back the science they professed. The Wealth of Nations 
was an immediate best-seller. By 1800 the book had gone through nine 
English editions and had been published in the USA, Ireland and Swit-
zerland. By the end of the first decade of the nineteenth century it had 
been published in the Danish, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Spanish 
and Russian languages. It was the undisputed, internationally accepted, 
bible of the new science of political economy .... (Deane 1978:6) 
Why did Smith's economic theory, "the first fully systematic quasi-natural-law 
treatment of economics" (O'Brien 1975:29), have such a powerful and tenacious 
impact? According to Deane (1987:13-17), three accounts can be made for its success. 
First, Smith formulated the new discipline in philosophical rather than logical or 
mathematical terms and so gave it an intellectual status and appeal. Second, Smith's 
maJor concern was 
one French among the classical economists-Jean-Baptiste Say (1767-1832). For further, more 
specialized, classical economists see O'Brien (1975:5-7). 
16 Besides Adam Smith the French physiocrats, especially Francrois Quesnay, are regarded as founders 
of modem economics. In contrast to Smith they exercised only a minor influence on the discipline. 
to explain economic development and 'the nature and causes of the 
wealth of nations'. His analytical method was to describe the 'natural' 
economic order by abstracting from the conflicts and imperfections 
which hindered its beneficent operations in the real world and by deduc-
ing logically its propensity to maximise economic welfare. (Deane 
1978:14) 
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With his emphasis on growth and the distribution of wealth he addressed the 
primary economic problems at a time when the industrialization just started to take off 
The most important issue then was how order would be possible during, and after, the 
transformation from a traditional, pre-industrial society into a modem, capitalist soci-
ety. Of course, none of the contemporaries in the late 18th century was able to actually 
foresee the scope of this transformation that would drastically change everybody's life, 
and the whole society. However, they surely anticipated some of the disruptions that 
were to come. 17 
In accordance with his contemporaries that reinterpreted acquisitive behavior as 
virtuous (see 2.1 ), Smith argued that individuals who are pursuing their self-interest 
would not undermine, but promote, society's interests and the common good as well. 18 
17 Smith himself wrote the Wealth of Nations in a pre-industrial context. It was first published in 
1776 and revised in 1784. At this time the inventions that revolutionized the British textile industry 
and started the Industrial Revolution had already been made: the spinning jenny ( 1764 ), the spinning 
frame (1769), and the spinning mule (1779). Also, in 1784 the steam engine was considerably 
improved by John Watt. Smith did not anticipate the relevance of these technical improvements and 
the tremendous changes in the economy, and subsequently, the whole social and political structure that 
occurred only a couple of years after the publishing of the Wealth of Nations. "It is only in the late 
1780's that almost every statistical series of production in Britain begins to show a sharp trend" (Blaug 
1968:40). 
18 Dumont (1986) argues that emphasizing a natural harmonious order was a necessity for the 
classical economists, for the new emerging science tried to separate the economy from the political 
order. Smith in the Wealth of Nations made the point that an independent economic domain will be 
beneficial to society and so lay the ground for the books success, says Dumont. 
27 
Consequently, he stated the idea of general abundance for the first time in the history of 
political economy. 
Finally, Smith's harmonious view of society implied policy prescriptions against 
governmental restrictions on trade and the movement of capital and labor, as these 
state interventions impeded economic progress, according to Smith. This laissez-faire 
policy bias appealed to the bourgeois mercantile and manufacturing classes "which pro-
duced his most enthusiastic supporters" (Deane 1978:11). 19 The wealth of nations 
expressed the spirit of the Enlightenment with its optimism, belief in 
progress, and appeal to the common man. . . . With markets free of 
government controls, Smith argued that savings promoted capital 
investment, and capital investment led to an increased division of labor, 
greater productivity, and rising real incomes. (Burtt 1972: 41-42) 
2.3.1 Theory of Society 
Smith provided his discipline with its first generally accepted paradigm. How-
ever, he was not an economist in the current understanding of the term, but a philoso-
pher who saw political economy as one area of his moral philosophy. The Wealth of 
Nations is based on his first major book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(1976[1759]), where he laid out his theory of society. 
19 In fact, Smith's work is directed against the merchants and manufacturers that he blamed for the 
mercantilist system which, in his view, hindered economic progress and general abundance. 
In his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith develops his system of ethics 
on the basis of a doctrine of a harmonious order in nature guided by 
God, and in an incidental manner applies his general doctrine with strict 
consistency to the economic order. In his later work, the Wealth of 
Nations, Smith devoted himself to a specialized inquiry into the nature 
of the economic order. (Viner 1958:215-216) 
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Adam Smith viewed society as a sublime machine which, left to itself, would 
tend to maximize social welfare. "Human society, when we contemplate it in a certain 
abstract and philosophical light appears like a great, an immense machine, whose regu-
lar and harmonious movements produce a thousand agreeable effects" (Smith 
1976[1759]:316). 
The architect of this machine-a benevolent deity variously called by him 
"invisible hand," "the great Director of the universe," "the Author of nature," "the great 
Judge of hearts," "Providence," "the final cause," "the divine Being," or simply 
"God"-designed society according to a divine plan, which operates so as to maximize 
everybody's happiness and prosperity. "The happiness of mankind, as well as of all 
other rational creatures, seems to have been the original purpose intended by the 
Author of nature, when he brought them into existence" (Smith 1976[ 1759]: 166). An 
unequal distribution of wealth was part of society's design. 
When Providence divided the earth among a few lordly masters, it nei-
ther forgot nor abandoned those who seemed to have been left out in 
the partition. These last too enjoy their share of all that it produces. In 
what constitutes the real happiness of human life, they are in no respect 
inferior to those who would seem so much above them. In ease of body 
and peace of mind, all the different ranks of life are nearly upon a level, 
and the beggar, who suns himself by the side of the highway, possesses 
that security which kings are fighting for. (Smith 1976[1759]: 185) 
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Hence, poverty was more a state of mind than a real problem in Smith's view. 
He saw material equality not as an absolute goal or an end in itself, just as he regarded 
wealth not as a prerequisite to act virtuous. Besides this Smith believed in the natural 
order and its egalitarian effects: 
The rich only select from the heap what is most precious and agreeable. 
. . . they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. 
They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of 
the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been 
divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without 
intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society .... 
(Smith 1976[1759]: 184-185) 
What is behind this automatism? "Nature, when she formed man for society, 
endowed him with an original desire to please, and an original aversion to offend his 
brethren" (Smith 1979[1759]:116). Moral sentiments ensure that men by responding to 
their natural feelings, original passions, and personal ambitions, i.e., material self-inter-
est, will fulfill the divine plan. ". . . by acting according to the dictates of our moral 
faculties, we necessarily pursue the most effectual means for promoting the happiness 
of mankind" (Smith 1759[1979]:166). These moral sentiments or faculties that direct 
the conduct of life and produce the most agreeable effects are beneficence (including 
sympathy, generosity, kindness, and friendship), justice, and prudence (including 
industry and frugality) (Smith 1976[1759]:262-264). Smith especially emphasized jus-
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tice as a superior virtue in arguing that beneficence is just an "ornament" of society, 
justice however, "the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice," so that if justice was 
removed, the "immense fabric of human society . . . must in a moment crumble into 
atoms" (Smith 1776[1759]:86). 
2.3.2 The "Wealth of Nations" 
The theory of society is the background for Smith's economic writings. "In the 
Wealth of Nations the basic framework of this theory of society is taken for granted 
and Adam Smith goes on to work out a special case of its application-the economic 
case" (Deane 1978:9). 
Smith saw men driven entirely by the desire of bettering their condition. Behind 
this desire is a longing for honor, respect, dignity, and recognition: 
. . . it is chiefly from regard to the sentiments of mankind, that we pursue 
riches and avoid poverty. For to what purpose is all the toil and bustle 
of this world? what [sic] is the end of avarice and ambition, of the pur-
suit of wealth, of power, and preeminence? . . . From whence, then, 
arises the emulation which runs through all the different ranks of men, 
and what are the advantages which we propose by that great purpose of 
human life which we will call bettering our condition? To be observed, 
to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, 
and approbation, are all the advantages which we can propose to derive 
from it. It is the vanity, not the ease, or the pleasure, which interests us. 
(Smith 1976[1759]:50) 
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Individuals, equipped with their instinctive moral virtues of beneficence, justice, 
and prudence, are impelled to amass their own fortunes in ways that tend to maximize 
the total income of the community or the nation as well as their own, so thought Smith. 
In this way they unconsciously harness their acquisitive passion and self-interest. 
Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most 
advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is 
his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in 
view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessar-
ily leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to 
the society .... (Smith 1976(1776]:454) 
As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as he can both to 
employ his capital in the support of domestick industry, and so to direct 
that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every indi-
vidual necessarily labours to render ·the annual revenue of society as 
great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the 
publick interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. . . . he intends 
only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as 
its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, 
and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to 
promote an end which was no part of his intention . . . By pursuing his 
own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually 
than when he really intends to promote it. (Smith 1976(1776]:456) 
Smith subjected the economic system to an empirical test of his theory of soci-
ety; the Wealth of Nations is focused on the behavior-patterns of real people within the 
constraints of existing institutions. He applied "facts gathered by personal observation 
at home and abroad, by conversation and correspondence with many keen and intelli-
gent observers of the current scene, by wide reading in a miscellany of sources ... " 
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(Viner 1958:230). The economic realities led Smith to draw a picture of a less perfect 
and universal harmonious order than outlined in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. In 
the Wealth of Nations 
this harmony is represented as not extending to all elements of the eco-
nomic order, and often as partial and imperfect where it does extend. 
Where harmony does prevail, it is as a rule a sort of average or statisti-
cal harmony, revealing itself only in the general mass of phenomena and 
leaving scope for the possibility that natural processes whose general 
effect is beneficial may work disadvantageously in individual cases or at 
particular moments of time. As a rule, though not invariably, Smith 
qualifies his assertions of harmony by such phrases as 'in most cases', 
'the majority', 'in general', 'frequently'. (Viner 1958:222) 
Throughout the Wealth of Nations Smith gives instances for defects in the 
natural harmonious order. Masters and workmen have a conflict of interest with 
respect to wages, and the weakness in bargaining power of the latter ordinarily gives 
advantage in any dispute to the former (Smith l 976[1776]:83-85). Masters, traders, 
and apprentices, on the one hand, and the public on the other, have divergent interests 
with respect to apprenticeship rules (Smith 1976[1776]:139-140, 151). The interest of 
merchants and manufacturers is in high profits, which are disadvantageous to the public 
(Smith 1976[1776]: 128, 628-630). Merchants and manufacturers have interests 
opposed to those ofthe farmers and landlords (Smith 1976[1776]:144-145). 
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the publick, 
or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent 
such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be 
consistent with liberty and justice. (Smith 1976[1776]: 145) 
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Furthermore, Smith argued, men commonly over-estimate their chances of sue-
cess in risky ventures with the consequence that too great a share of the nation's capital 
goes into such ventures (Smith 1976[1776]:124-128). 
One would think that in light of these defects Smith would advocate govern-
ment intervention that would promote general welfare. However, based on his experi-
ence of incompetent and corrupt British govemment20, Smith rejected such regulations. 
Convinced that considerable economic progress is possible without the support of the 
government, he strongly advocated laissez-faire: 
. . . every man is continually making [efforts] to better his own condition, 
[this] is a principle of preservation capable of preventing and correcting, 
in many respects, the bad effects of a political reconomy, in some 
degree, both partial and oppressive. Such a political reconomy, though 
it retards more or less, is not always capable of stopping altogether the 
natural progress of a nation towards wealth and prosperity, and still less 
of making it go backwards. . . . the wisdom of nature has fortunately 
made ample provisions for remedying many of the bad effects of the 
folly and injustice of man .... (Smith 1976[1776]:674) 
The natural effort of every individual to better his own condition, when 
suffered to exert itself with freedom and security, is so powerful a prin-
20 "The standards of honesty and competence of the governments of his day with which Smith was 
acquainted with were unbelievable low ... Smith had encountered few instances in which government 
was rendering intelligent and efficient service to the public welfare at the fields of protection and 
justice. The English government of his day was in the hands of an aristocratic clique, the place-
jobbing, corrupt, cynical, and class-biased flower of the British gentry, who clung to the traditional 
mercantilism not so much because of a strong faith that it met the problems of a growing trade 
struggling to burst its fetters, but because they did not know anything else to do." (Viner 1958:234-
235) 
ciple, that it is alone, and without any assistance, not only capable of 
carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting a 
hundred impertinent obstructions with which the folly of human laws 
too often encumbers its operations .... (Smith 1976[1776] :540) 
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Moreover, analyzing the defects in the natural order, Smith attacked govern-
ment restrictions and regulations that he regarded as the major cause of the defects, as 
they channeled investments in different canals than the natural order would, and 
undermined competition on a free market. Only free competition, he thought, would 
result in the most agreeable effect for society, as it would prevent landlords, manufac-
turers, merchants, and farmers from only serving their self-interest. "All systems either 
of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus completely taken away, the obvious 
and simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its own accord" (Smith 
1976[ 1776] :687). This led Smith to call for an extensive program of reforms designed 
to bring the economic system closer to the system of natural order. 
Adam Smith still had a clear view of the 'natural order' to which the eco-
nomic system ought to approximate but was prepared to admit to cer-
tain flaws in its operation in the real world. The 'great architect' needed 
some cooperation from the economic policy makers to allow his 
machine to work in the most effective way. (Deane 1978: 10) 
He advocated four main reforms that would abolish existing restrictions and 
regulations that he believed hindered the attainment of a free competitive market. 
Free choice of occupations is to be established through the abolition of 
the apprenticeship regulations and settlement laws; free trade in land, 
through the repeal laws establishing entails, primogenitures, and other 
restrictions on the free transfer of land by gift, devise, or sale; internal 
free trade, where such does not already prevail, by the abolition of local 
customs taxes; the most important of all, free trade in foreign com-
merce, through the abolition of the duties, bounties, and prohibitions of 
the mercantilist regime and the trading monopolies of the chartered 
companies. (Viner 1958:227). 
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Smith did not have much hope that the rise of commerce and industry would 
create a better government. "The violence and injustice of the rulers of mankind is an 
ancient evil, for which, I am afraid, the nature of human affairs can scarce admit of a 
remedy" (Smith 1976[1776]:493). Consequently, he restricted governmental activities 
to three distinct spheres: 
According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three 
duties to attend to; three duties of great importance, indeed, but plain 
and intelligible to common understandings; first, the duty of protecting 
the society from the violence and invasion of other independent socie-
ties; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member 
of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of 
it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and, 
thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain publick works and 
certain publick institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any 
individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain 
(Smith 1976[1776]:687-688) 
With the third function Smith assigned to the government some duties of pro-
moting general welfare, if the individuals did not have the means to do so. Public 
works and institutions were "chiefly those for facilitating the commerce of society, and 
those for promoting the instruction of the people" (Smith 1976[1776]:723). As public 
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works he mentioned highways, bridges, canals, and harbors (Viner 1958:724). Gov-
ernment institutions that he approved were the post-office, patents and copyrights, and 
public education (Smith 1976[1776]:724, 754, 758-788). The latter he viewed as a 
necessity for the whole society, as he believed that educated people were better work-
ers, soldiers, and citizens. 
2.4 David Ricardo 
By the first decade of the 19th century, when the first courses on political econ-
omy were taught and the first professors of political economy were appointed in Brit-
ain, this new discipline was acknowledged as a science, however, its academic status 
was still pretty low. The academic changes were encompassed by the emergence of "a 
self-conscious intellectual community" in Western Europe, whose members' "common 
ground lay in the fact that, having read the Wealth of Nations, they were concerned 
both to apply its analysis to current economic problems and to develop, criticize and 
extend its basic theory wherever necessary" (Deane 1978:71). These men were con-
vinced that political economy was able to analyze economic policy problems and based 
on this could provide policy prescriptions. 21 David Ricardo, a very successful broker at 
the London stock exchange, "the first working-class theorist" (Milgate and Stimson 
21 McCulloch, a Scottish journalist, became professor for political economy at the London University 
in 1827. His lectures attracted an audience of up to 800 people, among them bankers, merchants, and 
Members of the British Parliament. (Deane 1978:71-72) 
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1991:9), self-educated to a considerable extent, was one of the members of this group. 
A disciple of Smith, he replaced his teacher as the authority in economic theory. 
Smith's reliance on the natural harmonious order, created by a benevolent deity, 
resulted in a denial of him as founder of the discipline. This went so far that the 19th 
century neo-classical economists regarded Smith's economic theories as unscientific. 
It is possible to quote his [Smith's] authority in support of many errors 
. . . For instance he had not quite got rid of the confusion prevalent in his 
time between the laws of economic science and the ethical precept of 
conformity of nature. 'Natural' with him sometimes means that which 
the existing forces actually produce or tend to produce, sometimes that 
which his own human nature makes him wish that they should produce. 
(Marshall 1890[ 1961 ]:227) 
In contrast, Ricardo "ignored any reference to metaphysical forces operating 
behind the scenes of the economic world" (Pribram 1983:143). He did not have a 
moral philosophical background for his economic thoughts and so took Smith's place. 
He became the first specialist economist and developed a new technique of economic 
analysis, free from philosophical axioms and historical generalizations (Fitzgibbons 
1995:89). 
Ricardo's characteristic approach to the urgent economic issues of his 
day was thus to begin by trying to formulate the laws underlying the 
relevant categories of economic behavior, to develop a theory based on 
a few precisely stated assumptions and to illustrate it by reference to the 
facts of the contemporary world. From this essentially abstract rea-
soning process he deduced practical policy conclusions. (Deane 
1978:76-77) 
38 
Hence, his methodology was mathematical rather than philosophical or histori-
cal, deductive rather than inductive. However, it cannot be denied that Ricardo was 
heavily influenced by the economic development and the policies during his time. 
Two issues dominated political discussions and struggles in the early 19th cen-
tury: the growth of the population and the Corn Laws.22 Adam Smith had argued that 
a growing population is a sign of wealth. However, during the last decades of the 18th 
century, based on "amateur statisticians" (Heilbroner 1972[1953]:73), the British 
believed that their population is in decline. 23 In the first quarter of the 19th century 
several censuses were held that might have relieved the British anxieties as the returns 
showed that the British population was growing at an accelerating rate (Blaug 
1968:69). There was not a lot of time for enthusiasm though, as Thomas Robert 
Malthus, an influential economist of the classical school, draw a quite pessimistic pie-
ture about the effects of such growth (see 2.4.1). 
The Corn Laws were an indirect result of the growing population. Due to this 
growth the demand for grain exceeded the supply and England was forced to import 
foodstuffs. The price for corn rose dramatically at the beginning of the 19th century-
Heilbroner (1972[1953]:78) reports a quadrupled price-and in turn the rents, i.e. 
profits of the landlords. Heilbroner (1972[1953]:78) gives an example of a medium-
sized farm that enlarged its profits from £88 in 1790, to £121 in 1803, up to £160 in 
1813. The increasing agricultural profits attracted merchants to buy cheap corn 
22 For an overview of the Com Law debate see Deane (1965:186-201). 
23 Heilbroner (1972[1953):73-76) discusses the historical situation of British fears about their 
declining population until the first census took place in 1801. 
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abroad, which they sold in England at the high price-level. The landlords that domi-
nated the Parliament at that time knew how to stop this. They passed the Com Laws 
which protected the British agriculture by imposing tariffs on imported grain (Deane 
1978:60). The merchants and manufacturers opposed these laws as they were inter-
ested in low prices for com, for the price of food largely determined the wages at that 
time, which barely covered the subsistence level. The Com Laws initiated a bitter 
conflict between the landed gentry and the rising bourgeoisie, and raised questions 
about the distribution of wealth between rents, profits, and wages. The Com Law dis-
pute symbolically stands for the struggle for political and economic power (Deane 
1978:78-80). 
2.4. l The "Principles" 
In this historical context Ricardo started to systematically study the principles of 
political economy. In 1815 his Essay on the Influence of a Low Price of Corn on the 
Profits of Stock was published, followed in 1817 (re-edited in 1819 and 1821) by his 
major economic work, the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. In the intro-
duction to the Principles he clearly stated what his intention was-to develop a law 
that would show the distribution of the national income among three classes: capitalists 
that earned profit, landowners that earned rent, and workers that earned wages. 
To determine the laws which regulate this distribution, is the principal 
problem in Political Economy: much as the science has been improved 
by the writings of Turgot, Stuart, Smith, Say, Sismondi, and others, 
they afford very little satisfactory information respecting the natural 
course of rent, profit, and wages. (Ricardo 1951 [ 1817]: 5) 
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Ricardo's economic theory had three distinct elements in regard to the idea of 
general abundance-the theory of rent, the impact of a growing population on the rate 
of profit, and the subsistence theory of wages. Before I will introduce his theories, I 
will tum to a close friend of Ricardo-T. R. Malthus. He developed a law of popula-
tion which is a key component of Ricardo's theory. " ... the Malthusian theory lent 
support to the subsistence theory of wages and prepared the way for the Riccardian 
preoccupation with the land-using bias of economic progress" (Blaug 1968:68). 
Malthus introduced his ideas on population growth in a 1 798 published treatise 
entitled An Essay on the Principle of Population as It Affects the Future Improvement 
of Society. As Heilbroner (1971 [1953]:76) aptly remarks, 
with it perished at one blow all the fond hopes of a harmonious uni-
verse. In a few pages young Malthus pulled the carpet from under the 
feet of the complacent thinkers of the times, and what he offered them in 
place of progress was a prospect meager, dreary, and chilling. 
Why? "Malthus saw the fruits of economic development inevitably eaten up by 
an ever-expanding population" (Preston 1967:38). He believed that the population 
tended to increase at a geometrical ratio, whereas the food supply only grew at an 
arithmetic ratio: 
Talcing the population of the world at any number, a thousand millions, 
for instance, the human species would increase in the ratio of-1, 2, 4, 
8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, &c. and subsistence as-
l,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10, &c. In two centuries and a quarter, the population 
would be to the means of subsistence as 512 to 10: in three centuries as 
4096 to 13, and in two thousand years the difference would be almost 
incalculable .... (Malthus 1960[1798]: 13) 
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As people "are all impelled by a powerful instinct to the increase of their spe-
cies, and this instinct is interrupted by no reasoning of doubts about providing for their 
offspring" (Malthus 1960[1798]: 14), he saw the population growing beyond the means 
of subsistence. Therefore, he argued, the poor were condemned to a wretched 
subsistence, as they destroyed their own well-being by producing too many children. 
With this analysis Malthus disproved "that the unequal distribution of private property 
was responsible for the poverty of the large masses of population" (Pribram 1983: 15 3). 
He saw only two checks that can stop population from growing so fast (Malthus 
1960[ 1798]: 158-165). Positive checks-i. e. "all unwholesome occupations, severe 
labor and exposure to the seasons, extreme poverty, bad nursing of children, great 
towns, excesses of all kinds, the whole train of common diseases and epidemics, wars, 
plague, and famine" (Malthus 1960[ 1798]: 160)-that raise deaths and hold the popu-
lation at levels the world can support. And preventive checks that lower the birth rates 
in the form of moral restraint and prudence-i.e. late marriage and fewer children. 
Only the latter checks, Malthus believed, could bring any long-term betterment to the 
condition of the poor. 
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Ricardo integrated Malthus's principle on population and developed it further. 
In his theory of rent he explained rent differentials in agriculture as a result of Malthus's 
argument. Rent is defined by Ricardo as the "portion of the produce of the earth, 
which is paid to the landlord for the use of the original and indestructible powers of the 
soil", the surplus above the cost of production (Ricardo 1951[1817]:67). Ricardo saw 
rent as being determined by price: "Com is not high because a rent is paid, but a rent is 
paid because com is high" (Ricardo 1951[1817]:74). His model started with the 
assumption that land is specialized and in fixed supply, but that not all land is in use. 
Ricardo, drawing upon Malthus's population theory, argued that new, but less accessi-
ble and/or less fertile land is cultivated as the population grows and with it the demand 
for food; "... in the progress of population, land of an inferior quality, or less advanta-
geous situated, is called into cultivation" (Ricardo 1951[1817]:70). He analyzed that 
the cost of production of com varied with the fertility of the soil and its situation in 
relation to the market. What determined the market price of com, so Ricardo, were the 
capital and labor inputs in the least productive piece of land. Therefore, argued 
Ricardo, the price of com was always high enough to cover the cost of production on 
the least productive land in use. Differential rents were the result of this principle. On 
the marginal land he saw no rent at all-only the production costs were covered. On 
the best land, a high surplus was achieved that the owner of the land accumulated. 
"With every step in the progress of populations, which shall oblige a country to have 
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recourse to land of a worse quality, to enable it to raise its supply of food, rent, on all 
the more fertile land, will rise" (Ricardo 1951 [1817]:70). 
Second, Ricardo connected the theory of rent with the rate of profit. Economic 
growth, he argued, leads first of all to a certain accumulation of profits on the side of 
the capitalists, which they will invest. This leads to an increase in the demand for 
workers and a rise in the rate of wages. Drawing upon Malthus, Ricardo argued that 
each rise in wages gives a "continued stimulus to an increase in people" (Ricardo 
1951 [ 1817]:95). As shown above, this growing population required the cultivation of 
more and more and poorer and poorer land at increasing costs, thus raising food prices 
and the wages needed to provide workers with the subsistence level (see below). "If, 
as is absolutely certain, wages should rise with the rise of com, then profits would nee-
essarily fall" (Ricardo 1951[1817]:111). Therefore, so Ricardo, the capitalists that 
invest their profits and so are the major force behind economic progress, are struggling 
in vain against a rising tide of wages and rents. He predicted that their profits would 
get squeezed out by the growing population. The only beneficaries in this scenario 
were the owners of good land: they were growing food at low costs, and sold it on a 
market whose price was being determined by the costs of producing food on the least 
productive land in use. "All classes, therefore, except the landlords, will be injured by 
the increase in the price of com" (Ricardo 1951[1817]:336). 
Ricardo's third element of his economic theory is the subsistence theory of 
wages, that in short stated that wages are determined by the supply of labor, however 
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tended toward the subsistence level. He viewed this level as the natural price of labor 
"necessary to enable the labourers one with another, to subsist and to perpetuate their 
race" (Ricardo 1951[1817]:93). The natural price depended on "the quantity of food, 
necessaries and conveniences required for the support of the labourer and his family" 
(Ricardo 1951[1817]:93). In contrast, the market price of labor was "the price really 
paid for it" (Ricardo 1951[1817]:94). As shown above, Ricardo argued that an indus-
trializing society encountered an increase in capital that stimulated a growth of the 
population, followed by higher food prices and even higher wages. He believed that, 
finally, capitalists would not invest their diminishing profits any more and hence the 
demand for labor would decline. The wages would fall back to the natural price, 
namely the subsistence level. This in turn stopped the steady growth of the population, 
however, only until the circle would start again. 
According to Ricardo a "stationary state" was the result of economic growth 
and progress -"a gloomy state where the worker just barely subsisted, where the 
capitalist was cheated of his efforts, and where the landlord gloated over his unearned 
and constantly growing spoil" (Heilbroner 1972[1953]:100). 
Ricardo gave economics and capitalism "a curiously inhumane touch" (Preston 
1976:38). His economic theory was "devastating to the pleasant premises of the age of 
Adam Smith" (Heilbroner 1972[1953]:77). Growth did not lead to general abundance 
but was a process in the direction toward a "stationary state." 
. . . what Ricardo foresaw was the end of a theory of society in which 
everyone moved together up the escalator of progress sketched out by 
Smith. On the contrary, Ricardo saw that the escalator worked with 
different effects on different classes, that some rode triumphantly to the 
top, while others were carried up a few steps and then were kicked back 
down to the bottom. Worse yet, those who kept the escalator moving 
were not those who rose with its motion, and those who got the full 
benefit of the ride did nothing to earn their reward. And to carry to 
metaphor one step further, if you looked carefully at those who were 
ascending to the top, you could see that all was not well here either; 
there was a furious struggle going on for a secure place on the stairs. 
(Heilbroner 1972[1953]:77) 
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With Ricardo's theory the idea of general abundance is in decline as early as the 
beginning of the 19th century. Moreover, Ricardo and also Malthus provided the 
ruling class with a justification for their laissez-faire policies in regard to poverty: 
The tendency of these theories was to suggest that the poverty and 
misery visible everywhere in the early stages of industrialization were 
neither preventable, nor the fault of those in command of the economic 
order. . .. the fatalism of these early theories ... forestalled serious con-
sideration in capitalist economic theory of alleviating the condition of 
the poor. What for society did for them was useless, if not actually 
harmful .... (Preston 1967:38) 
To relieve poverty directly by state subsidies or private charity, Ricardo and 
Malthus argued, was to remove directly the principal check against an increase in 
population, i.e., the necessity for poor people to fend for themselves and to bear the full 
burden of their own improvidence. 
It is a truth which admits no doubt, that the comforts and well-being of 
the poor cannot be permanently secured without some regard on their 
part, or some effort on the part of the legislature, to regulate the 
increase of their numbers, and to render less frequent among them early 
and improvident marriages. The operation of the system of poor laws 
has been directly contrary to this. They have rendered restraint super-
fluous, and have invited imprudence, by offering it a portion of the 
wages of prudence and industry. (Ricardo 1951(1817]:107) 
46 
Consequently both theorists urged the gradual abolition of the poor relief sys-
tern, that was inaugurated by the Berkshire magistrates at Speenhamland in 1795 and 
ratified by the British Parliament in the following year (see 2.5). Furthermore, Malthus 
opposed housing projects for the working class, and Ricardo's theory about the ten-
dency of wages to fall back to the natural price gave capitalists a justification for not 
paying workers wages beyond the subsistence level. 
2. 5 The Revolution of Government 
English economics was throughout the nineteenth century intimately 
bound up with English politics, and throughout the century English 
economists had, probably without any important exceptions, political 
affiliations or preferences which influenced and were influenced by their 
economic doctrines. It is possible to ascertain with some degree of 
assurance the political affiliations of the earlier economists from their 
economic writings. (Viner 1958:247) 
As shown, Smith and Ricardo advocated laissez-faire policies based on their 
economic analysis. The question is, if British governments followed their recommen-
dations. 
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There were three issues that kept British economists and politicians busy 
throughout the nineteenth century: foreign trade policy, the economic role of the state, 
and the relief for the poor (Viner 1958:247). 
Deane (1965: 202-219) analyzes these issues during the classical period, asking 
how far it was true that the classical economists' doctrine of laissez-faire triumphed. 
First, one has to acknowledge "that between 1760 and 1850 a mass of governmental 
rules and restrictions on economic activity, many of them dating from medieval times, 
were swept out of the statute book" (Deane 1965:203).24 For instance, the classical 
period saw a revolution in policy toward trade. The most important reforms in this 
field were starting in 1842, when a review of British tariffs began and culminated first, 
in the budget of 1845, which saw duties on over 400 items removed, and second, in the 
repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. Also, policy of labor relations followed the trend of 
liberalization after the Napoleonic Wars. In 1825 a Combination Act was passed that 
legalized worker's associations, i.e. unions, for purposes of collective negotiations of 
wages and working conditions (Deane 1965 :210). These examples can be interpreted 
as policies following Smith's, Ricardo's, and other classical economists' advice. How-
ever, a closer look at the reasons for the repealing of the regulations and at the substi-
tutions for them shows that such an interpretation is only partly right. 
One main reason for the dismantling of restrictions of economic activity was 
that they "were more tiresome than effective" (Deane 1965:207). Policy-makers real-
24 The period of the Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815) turned this general trend upside down and "it is 
reasonable to suppose that the heavy burden of Protectionism in post-war Britain hindered the recovery 
of British industry and intensified the social distress involved in economic change" (Deane 1965:208). 
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ized that they would meet their ends rather by imposing "mild regulation effectively 
enforced" than "over-repressive measures" that nobody followed, as the government 
did not have the financial and organizational capacity to enforce the regulations (Deane 
1965: 211). In other words, if governments wanted to conduct economic affairs they 
had to realize their limitations, but also their opportunities. And that is exactly what 
British governments did from the late 18th century onwards. 
. . . as industrialization proceeded the state was intervening more deeply 
and more effectively in the economy than it had ever done before. 
There was indeed a revolution in the technique and philosophy of gov-
ernment . . . a revolution in organization and behavior and in the person-
nel taking the effective policy decisions . . . a revolution in government 
which represented the beginnings of collectivism and of the modem 
welfare state .... (Deane 1965:214) 
Even though much state regulation was swept away, the classical period 
encountered a revolutionary growth of effective state power, that reached the "point of 
no return" already in the 1830s (Deane 1965:215). This is reflected in the rise in state 
spending from £14 million in 1776 to nearly £70 million in 1870, and the introduction 
of an income tax in 1798. 
As I have shown Smith did not consider any kind of poor relief. Smith, writing 
at a time when the industrialization just started and poverty was not an public issue yet, 
saw poor relief immanent in an economico-political order that followed the natural laws 
and hereby would enhance general abundance automatically. Ricardo argued, that the 
poor masses prevented themselves from gaining profit from industrial progress, as they 
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were growing too fast. Poverty, therefore, he saw as a way to put a strain on men's 
sexual desire. Consequently, Ricardo overtly opposed any kind of poor relief 
British politics did not support the radical views of the two economists in this 
regard, however, their influence can still be traced back in the details of and attitudes 
toward social policies. 
By the late 1830's there was opposition only from one wing of the 
Tories and from the extreme radicals to the principle of confining relief 
to the able-bodied poor on the basis of 'less eligibility'; that is, of grant-
ing it only in such unattractive form that the incentives to industry, 
thrift, and prudential control of the birth-rate should not be undermined. 
(Viner 1958:247-248) 
No matter which authority we consult on the English Poor Laws in the 
nineteenth century, the same conclusions emerge: the Old Poor Law 
[1795-1834] demoralized the working class, promoted population 
growth, lowered wages, reduced rents, destroyed yeomanry, and com-
pounded the burden on ratepayers; the more the Old Poor Law relieved 
poverty, the more it encouraged the poverty which it relieved. (Blaug 
1963:151) 
Blaug (1963, 1963) examined this widespread belief, nourished by Malthusian-
Ricardian economics, and concluded that there were no empirical evidences for it. 
As mentioned above, in 1795, for the first time in British history25, the magis-
trate at Speenhamland introduced a poor relief system for its needy workers, which was 
subsequently accepted by the Parliament for the whole island in 1796. This old Poor 
25 Dietz (1949:275-277) shows that already in the 16th and the 17th century some forms of relief for 
the poor on a local basis existed. In contrast to the Speenharnland system the concrete measures were 
not based on a law and so were rather dependent on the goodwill of the more wealthy inhabitants of 
the town or cities. 
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Law, which "constituted a 'welfare state in miniature"' (Blaug 1964:229), was amended 
in 1834 (New Poor Law). The amendment was characterized by "a revolution in Brit-
ish social administration, but it left the structure of relief policy unchanged" (Blaug 
1964:229).26 
The reasons for the introduction of the Speenhamland system are quite obvious. 
In accordance with the classical theorists' laissez-faire doctrine, industrial wages at that 
time were determined by two factors only: the state of trade (demand) and the supply 
of labor. Consequently, trade depressions and harvest crises were encompassed by 
rising prices, a higher unemployment rate, and lower wages. So the law of 1795/96 
became a necessity: 
Given that both kinds of unforeseen disaster were frequent in the cli-
matically unfavourable and wartom years of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, it is difficult to see how the country could 
have avoided social and political upheaval without a fairly liberal poor-
relief. (Deane 1965: 143) 
How did the Old Poor Law work? It authorized outdoor poor relief (in con-
trast to workhouses) by all parishes and consisted of three components: allowance 
payments for children, unemployment compensations, and compensations for workers 
who received substandard wages (Hollander 1979:541). The children allowances were 
"generally paid for a third, fourth, or fifth child, and this amount was related in each 
parish to the local employment opportunities for children" (Blaug 1964:232). Unem-
26 For a description and evaluation of the Speenhamland system see two articles ofBlaug (1963, 
1964). 
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ployment compensation and the supplementation of wages were based on the price of 
bread and the number of dependents; it constituted a first kind of minimum standard of 
living. 
There were further governmental interventions in the economy on humanitarian 
grounds (Crouzet 1982: 105-112). In 1788 the Hanway Act protected the chimney-
sweeps from exploitation; in 1802 an act passed Parliament that controlled the working 
conditions of children; the Passenger Act of 1803 protected poor emigrants. Later in 
the 1830s legislation started to include effective inspections and enforcements of the 
laws that improved the conditions of work. According to Dietz (1949:429) the first 
factory act in 1833 included the setup of four inspectors which had to enforce the pro-
visions of the new law. The same act excluded children under nine from work in fac-
tories and it set maximum work hours for the older children. In 1847 the ten-hour-day 
was introduced, in the 1840s attempts were made to organize an effective national 
health service. In 1842 an act forbade women and small children to work underground 
in coalmines, and in 1844 women work in factories was limited to twelve hours a day. 
Furthermore, local governments, especially in urban regions started legislative protec-
tion of the poor. For example, it was "at the local level that government first began to 
regulate the activities of landlords and speculative builders, who were turning the cen-
tres of the great industrial cities into insanitary slums" (Deane 1965:219). 
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In one of the few instances for which Smith and Ricardo recommended govern-
mental action in order to improve the situation of the poor, the education of the people, 
the British government did not follow the theorists view and stayed inactive. 
Jealousies among those who wanted to manage the education of the 
people together with traditions that mass education was not really nec-
essary and might even prove undesirable, if it led people to read radical 
literature, prevented the inauguration of any state system of popular 
education until 1870. (Dietz 1949: 430) 
The reasons for the gradual shift in social policy from laissez-faire to the begin-
ning of collective welfare at the end of the 18th century are aptly described by Viner 
(1958:249): 
The growing information about working and living conditions in the fac-
tory towns, the steadily increasing political power of the working classes 
even under the restricted suffiage of the Reform Act of 1832, and the 
widespread humanitarian reaction against the doctrine of governmental 
impotence to remedy unmerited distress, made supports of governmen-
tal inaction as a policy increasingly dangerous politically to any party 
which committed itself too strongly to it. 
It was "evident that industrialization brought with it acute social distress which 
it was government's responsibility to alleviate" (Deane 1965 :313). The pressure of the 
social question, i.e., the economic reality of a majority of society forced a social policy 
that supported the poorest of the poor. "The fact is that economic growth was not a 
process of steady improvement in standards of living for the mass of population" 
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(Deane 1965:223). The industrial revolution did not lead to general abundance but the 
enrichment of a few, and the fast growing population, i.e. men's unrestricted desire and 
its fulfillment, was by far not the only reason for the poor condition of the workers. 
Instead of listening to the academic scribblers, politicians consequently followed the 
pressures of economic and political reality. 
3. Neo-classical Economics (1890s-1930s) 
3.1 The Victorian Boom 
. . . it is easy to realize the changes in the English intellectual climate 
which occurred after the Ricardian theory was formulated. The issue of 
unearned increments as connected with the agricultural rent had faded 
into the background. The rapid development of the mechanized indus-
tries, the incessant expansion of world trade, and the creation of an 
international capital market which was organized by English banks had 
greatly modified the structure of the English economy and had placed 
the manufacturing classes into the centre of economic interest. The 
relationship between employer and worker, especially in large-scale 
industries, had assumed new aspects. (Pribram 1983:301-302) 
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The British economy throughout the 19th century is characterized by growth: 
"growth became the normal condition of the economy, despite cyclical fluctuations, 
whose crises moreover contributed in the end to growth by eliminating the less efficient 
producers" (Crouzet 1982:102). The GNP showed growth rates of2.2 to 3.3 per cent, 
the GNP per capita of 1. 0 to 1. 9 per cent throughout the century (Deane and Cole 
1967:283). Especially the 1850s and 1860s were a period of relative prosperity for the 
British economy. The British national wealth increased from £6.1 billions in 1865, to 
10 billions in 1885, and 13.5 billions in 1900 (Dietz 1949:483). Only at the end of the 
19th century British growth slowed down as result of declining trade, but it still was at 
about 1 per cent of GNP per annum (Floud 1994:4). "At the end of the nineteenth 
century Britain possessed the wealthiest and most powerful economy that the world 
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had ever known" (Floud 1994: 1 ). Also, the population still grew, from about 23 mil-
lion in 1831 to about 40 million in 1911. However, due to declining birth rates the 
population growth rates were significantly lower than in the first half of the 19th cen-
tury (Barnes 1994:29-30). 
As Crouzet (1982) shows, the Industrial Revolution's basic results were savings 
in labor and gains in productivity. The latter led to a rapid and enduring fall in costs 
and in selling prices, especially after the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815. This 
reduction in costs and prices had two consequences. First, 
it speeded up the progress and spread of technology by encouraging the 
discovery and adoption of improvements that would again reduce costs 
and safeguard profit margins menaced by competition. . . . It helped to 
give the Industrial Revolution its cumulative character and chain-reac-
tion aspect. (Crouzet 1982: 102) 
Second, the cheaper manufactured goods were available to a wider and wider 
range of consumers. In the 1870s there was a significant improvement of the situation 
of workers. 
In 1840, according to the calculations of Arnold Toynbee, the wage of 
an ordinary laborer came to eight shillings a week, while his family nec-
essaries of life cost him fourteen shillings; he made up the difference by 
begging, stealing, sending his children to the mills, or simply by drawing 
in his belt. But by 1875, although necessaries had gone to fifteen shil-
lings and a little over, his wages had nearly drawn abreast. For the first 
time he was making enough to keep body and soul together. 
(Heilbroner 1972[1953]: 165) 
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Also the hours people had to work were enormously diminished. For example, 
Heilbroner (1972(1953]:165) reports that the work week fell from sixty-one to fifty-
four hours in the shipbuilding and the chemical industry, and to fifty-seven hours in the 
textile industry. 
Partly this betterment of the worker's conditions was due to the imperial spirit 
that was sweeping Britain in the latter decades of the 19th century. Between 1870 and 
1898 Britain added four million square miles and 88 million people to its empire; "the 
colonies were now the proletariat's proletariat" (Heilbroner 1972(1953]: 184-185). 
According to Feinstein ( 1991 ), there was gradual progress in the standard of 
living from 1873 to 1900, when real incomes were going up significantly. During this 
period one can see a rise in money-wages; however, this contributed to only one-fifth 
to the increase in real wages of about 55 per cent. The other four-fifths came from a 
decrease in retail prices. 
The dominant influence on the progress of living standards . . . was not 
the rise in nominal incomes but the long-run movement in the cost of 
living. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century the principal 
source of the sustained rise in the general standard of living of the 
working class was the strong downward trend of the cost of food, fuel 
and other necessities. (Feinstein 1991: 151) 
The same rule is true for the following years from 1900 to 1914, the beginning 
of the Second World War. This period encountered a rise of money-wages and an even 
higher increase in prices. Subsequently the standard of living fell-real wages dropped 
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at a rate of about 7 per cent. Of course, the overall poverty in Great Britain was still 
enormously high, especially during depressions, when the declining profits led to mass 
unemployment. Dietz (1949:492) reports an average unemployment rate of 9.3 per 
cent in the period from 1873 to 1900, with the largest figures of 22.2 per cent among 
the boilermakers and iron shipbuilders, 14. 4 per cent among the blacksmiths, and 13. 9 
per cent among the ironfounders in 1886. It can be assumed that the (not available) 
figures for the non-unionized and unskilled laborers are higher. 
A whole series of studies at the end of the 19th century revealed the living 
situation of the vast majority of British people (Dietz 1949:505-510).27 In 1883 
Charles Booth investigated by going door-to-door the earnings, expenditures, and the 
conditions of life among the various classes in London. He showed that one-third of 
the population were on or below the line of poverty. The people in this group were the 
urban dwellers that shared one tiny room with one or more persons. The census of 
1901 showed that in London two-thirds of the population lived in houses of not more 
than four rooms, with 392,000 dwellings in which 2.67 million (8 per cent of the 
population) people lived. 
The conditions found in London were the same in all parts of England. 
Ninety per cent of the actual producers of wealth had no home which 
they could call their own beyond the end of the week, had no bit of soil 
or so much as a room that belonged them, had nothing of value of any 
27 Court (1965:283) reports that in the 1880s social surveys were administered for the first time in 
British history. They were focusing on the urban working class but examined workers in agriculture 
as well. These first social surveys were the "work of wealthy amateurs" and became eventually 
institutionalized. 
kind except so much old furniture as would go into a cart, had the pre-
carious chance of weekly wages which barely sufficed to keep them in 
health, were housed for the most part in places that no well-to-do man 
would think fit for his horse, were separated by so narrow a margin 
from destitution that a month of bad trade, sickness, or unexpected loss 
brought them face to face with pauperism. (Dietz 1949:508) 
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At the beginning of the century 27 per cent of the population is believed to have 
lived in a state of more or less acute poverty (Floud 1994: 11)). One can conclude with 
Floud (1994:9): 
Britain between 1860 and 1914 was . . . a rich country, growing richer 
year by year as its economy made ever more efficient use of the re-
sources which were available to it, although the growth in efficiency was 
slowing down. Economic growth brought with it improvements in 
welfare . . . but left behind a substantial residue of the population in 
poverty. 
3.2 The Marginal Revolution 
Neo-classical economics was effectively established from the 1890s onwards 
and replaced "the fragmented, often vaguely-defined, philosophically-oriented analysis 
of the classical school" (Deane 1978:107). Alfred Marshall was the new school's most 
influential proponent. Neo-classical economic thought was the heir of the marginal 
revolution.28 The term marginal revolution is used to refer to the nearly simultaneous 
28 The marginal "revolution" was a process rather than an event. It "went unrecognized by those who 
lived through it. ... [it] was first announced in the late 1880s and (despite Marshall's endorsement in 
1890) did not become a regular feature of histories of economic thought until well past the turn of the 
century" (Blaug 1973:8). See Stigler (1973) for a discussion of the adoption of marginal utility. 
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but completely independent discovery in the early 1870s by William Stanley Jevons 
(1835-1882), a British economist teaching in Manchester, Carl Menger (1840-1921), 
an Austrian economist who constituted the Austrian School of economics, and Leon 
Walras ( 1834-1910), a French economist who taught in Lausanne (Howey 1973: 15-
24). "Marginal utility emerged when these three men, from different countries, coupled 
their ideas of wants or utility with a basic concept of the differential calculus" (Howey 
1973:25).29 Based on the assumption that consumers and producers would naturally 
behave so as to maximize their satisfactions or profits in a competitive market, these 
economists discovered the principle of diminishing marginal utility or satiable wants. 
Marginal utility means that "the value of each unit out of a homogeneous stock 
of goods is determined by the least important use that can be made of it, in other 
words, by the diminution in want satisfaction caused by its loss" (Pribram 1983 :278). 
Marginal utility analysis became the basis of neo-classical economics. 
The basic logic of this approach gave to the analysis of political econ-
omy a degree of systematization unrivaled by the earlier classical writer. 
In so doing it marked the transition from 'political economy' to 'econom-
ics.' The suffix 'ics' is significant, for it decisively arrayed economics 
along with such subjects as mathematics and physics, as having a rigor 
equal to the formal and physical sciences. (Breit and Ransom 1971:8) 
The application of marginal utility as analyzing tool involved a wide-ranging 
transformation of the characteristic methodology in economics from a more theoretical, 
29 For a discussion of the reasons for the success of the new paradigm see Deane ( 197 5: 100-113). 
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historical approach toward the heavy use of mathematics. This methodological change 
was followed by an altered, i.e. reduced scope of economics. 
How can the capital stock be augmented and markets widened so as to increase 
the productivity of labor, physical output, and therefore, welfare? This was the essen-
tial macro-problem classical economists wanted to solve. The marginal paradigm 
emphasized subjective factors, demand, and economic consumption rather than classi-
cal questions of growth, supply, and distribution, which could not be dealt within mar-
ginal utility analysis. The neoclassical school saw the economic micro-problem as how 
to get an optimal result by allocating a given quantity of scarce resources among com-
peting uses. 
Briefly, the marginal analysis is designed to find the most efficient allo-
cation of competing resources, of scarce means with alternative ends. 
At the optimum position marginal values are equalised, i.e. the gains to 
be derived from putting unit of a resource to one use exactly equal the 
losses involved in withdrawing it from another .... Wherever diminish-
ing returns are obtainable from putting a given unit of income or time or 
productive resources to a particular use the optimum result is obtained 
when values are equalised at the margin. Within the conventional 
assumptions of the marginal analysis it can be logically shown that per-
fect competition leads to equimarginal allocation of expenditures and 
resources. (Deane 1978:98) 
The marginal revolution altered the problem orientation of orthodox economics 
significantly: 
The focus of the marginal analysis was the market and the neo-classical 
theorists accordingly narrowed the scope of their subject matter so as to 
be almost exclusively confined to a study of market processes. Conse-
quently, although individual neo-classical theorists may have been, and 
some certainly were, as strongly activated by political and social objec-
tives as any of their predecessors among the classical economists, they 
concentrated most of their attention qua economics on abstract theo-
retical issues which had no immediate connection with the urgent con-
temporary questions of practical policy. (Deane 1978: 99-100) 
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Prior to the 1870s political economy was oriented toward contemporary prob-
lems and institutions, and was "dominated by controversies over policy" (Stigler 
1965: 19). The neo-classical economists got rid of all the philosophical questions of 
Smith's kind. They acquired a stricter sense of what was logically, rather than politi-
cally or morally relevant to explain economic phenomena. As trained professionals 
they developed the science of economics as we know it today: "economic phenomena 
abstracted into mathematical equations, curves, and graphs" (Preston 1967:39). This 
development mirrored that economics, over a century in existence by then, became a 
more rigorous science. "Marginalism both reflected and contributed to the process of 
professionalization and internalization of economics as an organized discipline which 
took place after 1870" (Winch 1973 :60). 
Writing at a time when "the separation of the economic and political orders was 
greatest" (Preston 1967:39), neo-classical economists detached themselves from ques-
tions of welfare and income distribution. 
There was simply no longer any room in the official world of economics 
for those who wanted to take the whole burly gamut of human behavior 
for their forum, and there was little tolerance in the stuffy world of 
Victorian correctness for those whose diagnosis of society left room for 
moral doubtings or seemed to indicate the need for radical reform. 
(Heilbroner 1972[1953]: 172) 
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In accordance with positivist claims of scientific, ethical neutrality, nee-classical 
theorists withdrew themselves from the political sphere. "... after utility theory began 
to appear in the 1870's, it took no important part in any policy-oriented controversy up 
to World War I" (Stigler 1973:312). Mahoney (1985: 186-202) shows that marginal-
ism and the positivist claim of ethical neutrality were allies. 
On the one hand, economists cast in an increasingly scientific role, 
became both less interested in and more wary of a political one. . . . On 
the other hand there was some inclination to make a virtue out of 
necessity; the relative inapplicability of neoclassical theory was best 
defended by an aggressive hostility to policy prescription by any 
economist. (Mahoney 1985: 187) 
However, an ethically neutral statement can still be ideologically biased. The 
problem of distribution, which had preoccupied the classical economists, was solved in 
marginal terms. The nee-classical utility theory of the optimum allocation of economic 
resources implied that the closer the economic system conformed to the operations of a 
perfectly competitive market the nearer it would come to an optimal distribution of 
incomes. Adam Smith's optimistic view in regard to the general wealth of nations 
comes to mind. Indeed, marginal utility analysis retained the classical bias toward eco-
nomic individualism and laissez-faire and implicitly supported the political status quo. 
Breit and Ransom (1971: 10) give three "cornerstones" that supported the laissez-faire 
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policy-implications of neo-classical economic theory: the maximization of utility as the 
major economic problem, marginal calculations as analytical tool to solve this problem, 
and the concept of "economic man as the actor," a rational, calculating human being. 
Deane (1975:109-111) and Mahoney (1985:203-204) argue, that the ideological 
implications of neo-classical economics probably were the most important factor for the 
new school's triumph. 30 
British industry was faced with intensifying international competit10n 
abroad and increasing labour problems at home; the social and economic 
problems associated with an urbanised industrial economy seemed to 
call for a revision of traditional dogma concerning the role of govern-
ment in the economy; the process of constitutional reform was extend-
ing the vote to the working classes at a point in time when the income 
gap between rich and poor was becoming, if not wider, at least more 
obvious. In these difficult circumstances, a methodology which took as 
its central exemplar a demonstration of the optimal allocation of scarce 
resources in a perfect market and substituted a 'scientific' concept of 
equilibrium for the out-dated philosophical assumption of the 'natural 
law' . . . permitted economists to justify an ideological bias towards the 
status quo of income distribution on ostensibly non-political grounds. 
(Deane 1978: 111) 
Deane's and Mahoney's argument is the more convincing if one looks at the 
three possible alternatives in economic theory that were around in late-nineteenth cen-
30 Blaug (1968: 304-308) examined the origins of the marginal revolution. It would go to far for the 
context of this paper to describe his argument at length. But I want to point to one out of four 
historical explanations that has been used to explain the marginal paradigm's genesis and success-the 
argument that marginal-utility theory was "nothing but the bourgeois answer to Marxism" (Blaug 
1968:307). Blaug demonstrates that this position cannot stand up to close scrutiny. Instead, as far as 
Britain is concerned, the marginal utility doctrine can be seen as an autonomous intellectual 
development "under the impulse of a growing sense of dissatisfaction with older [i.e. classical] views" 
(Blaug 1968:304). 
For the related discussion of the fall of the classical economy in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century see Hutchison (1973). 
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tury Britain: radical Marxist economic thought-Karl Marx had published the first 
volume of Das Kapital in 1867-, the German-Austrian Historicist School that advo-
cated a state-directed economy, and classical Ricardian economics. 31 The latter was 
discredited as it contained "socialistic implications so close to the surface as to make 
even an unembellished statement of the doctrine dangerous" (Mahoney 1985:205). 
These implications, e.g. Ricardo's statement that the interests of the landlords are 
always at odds with the capitalists and the workers, and his labor theory of value 
"suggested the rationale for an inherent capital-labour conflict" (Deane 1978:111). 
They became obvious at least by 1867, when Marx had based his economic theorizing 
in Das Kapital on Ricardian assumptions. 
3.3 Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) 
The dominant influence on economic theory from the 1890s to the 
depression of the 1930s, especially in English-speaking nations, was 
undoubtedly Alfred Marshall, the Cambridge economist who reaffirmed 
and extended the classical traditions . . . His major work, Principles of 
Economics, published in 1890, ... seemed to many a definitive answer 
to the attacks against the classical writers that came from all sides-
from the historical economists, the socialists, and the new marginal-util-
ity theorists such as Jevons and the Austrians. (Burtt 1972:201) 
31 Deane (1978: 125-142) gives a good overview of Marx's contribution to economic thought and 
reasons for its low impact on orthodox economics. For a discussion of the Historicist school see Blaug 
(1968:501-573). 
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The emphasis on allocation with maximum effect is stronger in the economic 
theories of Walras, Menger, and Jevons than in Marshall's. He "never entirely aban-
doned the deep-rooted classical belief that economic welfare depends as much on 
capital accumulation and population growth as on efficiency in resource allocation" 
(Blaug 1968: 300). Instead of general equilibrium he preferred a more developmental 
and less static, partial equilibrium analysis of economic phenomena in particular sec-
tors. But overall Marshall "devoted more attention to the action of competition in 
tightening up the allocation of resources within a given market environment than to the 
expansion of the market area itself' (Blaug 1968:300). 
Marshall was convinced that economics could play a major role in fostering 
economic understanding and, henceforth, economic and social progress. By deriving 
from marginal utility theory the concepts of consumer's and producer's surplus, Mar-
shall hoped to make economics a basis for policy without compromising scientific stan-
dards and ideological neutrality. He thought that the possibility of ending poverty gave 
economic studies "their chief and their highest interest" (Marshall 1961(1890]:4). In 
fact, Marshall was coming from his morals and ethics to economics, "from his zeal to 
make a contribution to the social betterment of man" (Viner 1958:251). Marshall, a 
Cambridge scholar32, stated his motivation as follows: 
It will be my most cherished ambition, my highest endeavour, to do 
what with my poor ability and my limited strength I may, to increase the 
numbers of those, whom Cambridge, the great mother of strong men, 
32 Marshall received his degree in mathematics in Cambridge in 1865. From 1885 to 1908 he hold 
the chair of political economy at Cambridge. (Burtt 1972:203, 205) 
sends out into the world with cool hearts, willing to give some at least 
of their best powers to grappling with the social suffering around them; 
resolved not to rest content till they have done what in them lies to dis-
cover how far it is possible to open up to all the material means of a 
refined and noble life. (Marshall 1925[1885]: 174) 
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Viewing himself in the tradition of the classical economists, Marshall believed in 
a system of charity and goodwill, that could be enhanced by economics: 
. . . nearly all the founders of modem economics were men of gentle and 
sympathetic temper, touched with the enthusiasm of humanity. They 
cared little for wealth for themselves; they cared much for its wide dif-
fusion among the masses of the people. . . . They were without exception 
devoted to the doctrine that the wellbeing of the whole people should be 
the ultimate goal of all private effort and all public policy. (Marshall 
1890[196 l ]:47) 
Marshall stated that he "practically completed" his "main position as to the 
theory of value and distribution" already in the late 1860s (Marshall 1961[1890]:416). 
That means that he began "to graft marginal utility analysis on to the Ricardian system" 
(Deane 1978:95) as early as Jevons, Menger, and Walras did. However he published 
the Principles about 20 years later. ". . . but by then he had been teaching economics 
for twenty years in Cambridge, Bristol and Oxford, and he had indoctrinated the inhabi-
tants of half the economic chairs in England" (Deane 1978: 102). His delayed book, 
which became the bible of the nee-classical school, went through eight editions which 
did not differ significantly from each other-the final one appeared in 1920: " ... the 
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view of economics presented in Marshall's first edition of the Principles remained 
relatively unchanged in subsequent editions" (Burtt 1972:205). 
Burtt (1972:202-203) gives three reasons for the book's overwhelming success. 
First, it significantly contributed to the development of techniques of economic analysis 
in the marginal and the classical tradition. Even in his lifetime, contemporaries revered 
Marshall as the great reconciler of the deductive (marginal) and inductive (historical) 
methods. His bipartisan image rested on statements on induction and deduction like 
the following: 
Each study supplements the other; there is no rivalry of opposition 
between them; every genuine student of economics sometimes uses the 
inductive method and sometimes the analytical, and nearly always both 
of them together. There is a difference in proportion between different 
students; as one may eat more solid food and another may drink more 
fluid; but every one must both eat and drink under pain of starving or 
dying of thirst. (Marshall 1925:309) 
Second, not sharing his marginal utility colleagues's apoliticalness, Marshall 
applied his theories to everyday economic problems, especially the problem of poverty. 
Finally, Marshall explicitly wanted to develop an economic theory that supported the 
status quo by showing the relationship between a competitive economic structure and 
the economic and moral well-being of society. Viner (1958:246-261) supports this 
latter point. He makes the case that the British economist-even though he was sin-
cerely concerned about the improvement of the conditions of the poor-represented 
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the Victorian age of complacency, gentility, and optimism when looking at his stance 
toward people's general well-being.33 
Marshall saw the still widespread poverty in Britain as a major problem, and 
identified its reasons within the process of economic development. For example, he 
stated that the early "capitalist employer . . . was tempted to subordinate the wellbeing 
of his workpeople to his own desire for gain" (Marshall 1961(1890]:750). Marshall 
disapproved of the way the rich often tended to create envy by ostentatious displays. 
He noted that many of the "largest" fortunes were made by "speculation rather than by 
truly constructive work," by "anti-social" strategies, and even by "evil manipulation" 
(Marshall 1961[1890]:719). 
Marshall believed that differences in economic status of the different social 
classes were for the most part due to inequality of opportunity and not a lack of ability 
and character, as the Social Darwinists34 argued at that time: " ... the poverty of the 
poor [was] the chief cause of that weakness and inefficiency which are the cause of 
their poverty" (Marshall 1925/[1885]:155). Marshall attributed the "physical, mental, 
and moral ill-health" of the poor to their inadequate income, the type of work they did, 
and the squalid, overcrowded conditions in which they lived (Marshall 1961[1890]:2). 
One must ask, if this analysis of the origins of poverty led Marshall to advocate 
reforms in order to relief the poor. Burtt (1971 :210-211) aptly answers this question: 
33 The "Victorian age" is named after the reign of Queen Victoria from 1837 to 1901. 
34 For a good overview about social Darwinism and its spread see Hofstadter (1965(1944]). 
In short, there was nothing fundamentally wrong with the institutions of 
the capitalist and the free-market system. . .. Free enterprise, through an 
upward, evolutionary process, was substantially improving the material 
and moral well-being of the masses. Poverty and other social ills could 
be gradually eradicated by education and appeals to the chivalrous spirit 
of the rich, but the process required time and, above all, Marshall 
warned, no interference with the basic institutions of the system by the 
impatient with their collectivist schemes. 
69 
A paradox? Not to Marshall. He had a firm faith in the underlying benevolence 
of a system of free enterprise that he believed would gradually resolve the identified 
problems. In this regard, Marshall shared Smith's optimistic view about the enrichment 
of the people through economic progress. 
He was confident that if only there were sufficient goodwill ('economic 
chivalry') and economic understanding substantial progress would in fact 
occur ... The progress he sought, moreover, was not to be merely a 
matter of more goods, but of access to and liking for a more leisurely 
and more refined life for all the people, so that even hod-carriers could 
be gentlemen. (Viner 1958:251) 
Yet Marshall rejected restraints on the free-enterprise system, which he 
believed, would impair the rate of technological advance and investment essential to 
economic progress, as well as the free movement of resources necessary to achieve an 
optimum of allocation. "Natura non facit saltum" (Nature makes no sudden leaps) was 
the motto of the Principles, in other words, the betterment of the poor will come in a 
gradual, slow process, not eruptive and through reforms. 35 
35 This apparent inconsistency leads Maloney (1985: 169) to call Marshall's writings on welfare 
economics as "theoretically unsatisfactory and practically inconclusive. The overall picture is of a 
categorised list of exceptions to the optimising behavior of the market ... " 
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He voiced numerous objections to government ownership and operation of 
industry (Marshall 1925:323-335). His overriding objection to state interventions and 
restrictions was that it would choke off the inventiveness of the entrepreneur and hence 
impair economic growth: " ... every great step in the direction of collectivism is a grave 
menace to the maintenance even of our present moderate rate of progress" (Marshall 
1925:342). He decried arguments for "untried" social reforms on the grounds that the 
rights of private property . . . have been inseparable from solid progress; 
and that therefore it is the part of responsible men to proceed cautiously 
and tentatively in abrogating or modifying even such rights as may seem 
to be inappropriate to the ideal conditions of social life. (Marshall 
1961[1890]:48) 
Although Marshall was sympathetic to certain objectives of trade unions, he 
believed that they were harmful to the extent that they could impose wages different 
from the competitive market rate, place obstacles in the way of worker mobility, or 
limit technological innovation. In a letter dealing with an engineers strike in 1897, 
Marshall wrote: 
I have often said that T.U.'s [trade unions] are a greater glory to Eng-
land than her wealth. But I thought of T.U.'s in which the minority, 
who wanted to compete with others to put as little work as possible into 
the hour, were overruled. Latterly they have, I fear, completely domi-
nated the Engineers' Union. I want these people to be beaten at all 
costs: the complete destruction of Unionism would be as heavy a price 
as it is possible to conceive: but I think not too high a price. (Marshall 
1925:400) 
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Marshall did not share Ricardo's pessimism. He did not believe that economic 
development would end in a stationary state and would reduce the standard of living of 
the vast majority of people to the subsistence level. However, Ricardo's and Malthus's 
influence on Marshall can be traced back in his writings. Marshall was convinced that a 
system of poor relief can only do good insofar it is restrained by sound general prin-
ciples. He was searching for "means of reconciliation between advocacy of relief of 
distress on humanitarian grounds and adherence to the . . . principle that it was urgent to 
preserve unimpaired by excessive charity the capacity for and the will to practice self-
help on the part of the poor" (Viner 1958:254). 
Marshall's optimistic tum is closely related to the historical background of his 
time (Marshall analysed and described the course of economic development in Appen-
dix A of his Principles.). He argued that technological progress had made food so 
cheap that the pressure of population on food supplies had abated significantly. Tech-
nological changes in agriculture had reduced costs directly, and improvements in trans-
port had "enabled Englishmen of the present generation to obtain the products of the 
richest lands of the earth at comparatively small cost" (Marshall 1961[1890]:180).36 
Moreover, he recognized a tendency for those with higher incomes to have smaller 
families. 37 Therefore, the possibility of restraining future population growth seemed to 
36 This view is supported by Deane and Cole ( 1962: 170) who report thath agricultural output may 
have doubled between 1800 and 1860 and stayed at this level from then onwards. Also, they see a 
sharp decline in agricultural proces from 1862, and especially from 1878 onwards (1962:343-345). 
37 This was influenced by the possibility of family planning, as in the early part of the last quarter of 
the 19th century the first contraceptive methods were developed (Dietz 1949:483-484). 
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him to be greatly improved as the economy became more and more productive and as 
more income reached the working classes. 
Marshall saw the reasons for these positive changes in the growth of the free 
enterprise system that promoted technological change and an upward trend in real 
incomes. To him, three conditions were responsible for England's emergence as the 
world's leading industrial nation: first, the desire of the population for greater material 
comforts; second, the submission of "every action to the judgment of the reason", 
rather than custom in order to maximize income; and third, "complete political freedom 
and security" which enabled individuals to act in their own interest and "fearlessly" 
commit themselves and their property to "new and distant undertakings" (Marshall 
1961(1890]:744). This third factor he regarded as especially important: "[The] same 
qualities which gave political freedom gave them [England and its colonies] also free 
enterprise in industry and commerce" (Marshall 1961(1890]:744). These "qualities" 
were essentially the moral virtues of applying one's energies to the invention and pro-
duction of goods, of individualism and self-reliance, of forethought, and of the careful 
calculation of alternatives. 
Marshall approved of certain types of protective legislation for women and chil-
dren on the grounds that, since the nation seemed strong and wealthy enough to impose 
new restraints on free enterprise, it could absorb "some temporary material loss . . . for 
the sake of a higher and ultimate greater gain" (Marshall 1961 [ 18 90]: 7 51). He did not 
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carry this argument very far, however; e.g. he opposed all minimum-wage legislation 
(Marshall 1961 [1890):715-716). 
Marshall's answer to the problem of poverty was education and he encouraged 
a policy of "generous expenditure" for the education of the masses (Marshall 
1961(1890]:43). His argument was that since an individual's discounted lifetime earn-
ings equalled the cost of his training, poverty perpetuated itself through the failure of 
the poor to invest in the education of their male children. 38 
The worse fed are the children of one generation, the less will they earn 
when they grow up, and the less will be their power of providing ade-
quately for the material wants of their children; and so on to following 
generations. (Marshall 1961(1890):562). 
Thus he saw poverty as cumulative unless the chain of circumstances would be 
broken by public outlays to educate the children of the poor. Education would not only 
increase their skills; it should improve their tastes, their attitudes toward work, and 
their character: 
. . . the schoolmaster must learn that his main duty is not to impart 
knowledge .... It is to educate character, faculties and activities; so that 
the children even of those parents who are not thoughtful themselves, 
may have a better chance of being trained up to become thoughtful par-
ents of the next generation .... To this end must money flow freely. 
(Marshall 1961 [ 1890]: 178) 
38 Marshall did not believe in the emancipation of women, but felt strongly that a woman's place was 
in the home, raising her children: "The most valuable of all capital is that invested in human beings; 
and of that capital the most precious part is the result of the care and influence of the mother, so long 
as she ... has not been hardened by the strain and stress of unfeminine work" (Marshall 
1961[1890]:564). 
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Furthermore, improvement of the moral climate was important to Marshall. He 
urged that businesses adopt fairer and more benevolent attitudes toward their employ-
ees and others, as he saw businessmen too much attached to the motive of financial 
gain for this marked their excellence. "And so all the best businessmen want to get 
money . . . chiefly as the most convincing proof to themselves and others that they have 
succeeded" (Marshall 1925: 281). But the fact that many large incomes existed 
because of the desire to excel did not alter the waste and deprivation which accompa-
nied maldistribution of wealth, so Marshall wrote: 
Now there is general agreement among thoughtful people, and espe-
cially among economists, that if society could award ... honour, position 
and influence by methods less blind -and less wasteful; and if it could at 
the same time maintain all that stimulus which the free enterprise of the 
strongest businessmen derives from present conditions, then the 
resources thus set free would open out to the mass of people new pos-
sibilities of a higher life, and of larger and more varied intellectual 
activities. (Marshall 1925: 328) 
Marshall called this philanthropic approach, which emphasized the personal 
relationships between employers and their workers, and businessmen and the public 
"Economic Chivalry." This, he said, included not only public spirit, but also "a delight 
in doing noble and difficult things because they are noble and difficult _.. It includes a 
scorn for cheap victories and a delight in succouring those who need a helping hand," 
and a pride in achievements "only in the second degree for the value at which they are 
appraised in the money of the market" (Marshall 1925:330-331). Unless such a spirit is 
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developed, Marshall said, the "world under free enterprise will fall far short of the finest 
ideals" (Marshall 1925 :342). 
It can be summarized, that Marshall was a strong advocate of laissez-faire. He 
only ascribed few tasks, in particular education, to the state in regard of the welfare of 
the people. He did not oppose poor relief totally, however thought of it as being 
capable of reducing people's will to work hard and to help themselves out of their 
poverty. Hence, he did not see the necessity to extend existing laws. Additionally, he 
believed in "economic chivalry" that would help to alleviate widespread poverty. 
Overall, he was convinced that a free-market economy will eventually enrich people--if 
not all, at least the vast majority-and so clearly stands in Smith's tradition. The major 
difference between these two theorists is that Smith's optimism is based on his belief in 
a natural, harmonious order, whereas Marshall's laissez-faire approach is based on 
marginal utility analysis and historical demonstrations that showed a gradual improve-
ment of the living standards in Britain (see below). This difference might be the reason 
for their different view of how many people could share the wealth of the nation. 
While Smith explicitly included everybody in the idea of general abundance, Marshall 
takes a more cautious position and wants to "discover how far it is possible to open up 
all the material means of a refined and noble life." 
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3.4 The Introduction of Collective Modern Welfare 
As I have already shown for the classical period, the neo-classical period was 
characterized by a significant gap between the policy implications that economists 
deduce from their theories and the actual policies. In contrast to the laissez-faire 
approach of neo-classical economists that was based on an optimistic picture of a free 
enterprise economy that will lead to broad abundance, British politicians started to 
introduce a modem welfare system in the last decades of the 19th century. 
Court (1965:361-368) describes the path Britain took in the 19th century from 
an individualist society to one that supported concepts of collective welfare. Until the 
1870s the individualist doctrine was that "it was man's duty to provide for himself and 
all his dependents, both for the ordinary purposes and the contingent risks of life, 
including sickness and the want of work, old age and death" (Court 1965:361). Hol-
mes (1976: 199) supports this view: "... attitudes in the early nineteenth century 
towards poverty tended to be primitive and the assumption was that poverty arose from 
lack of will to work. Self-help was the answer to material afiliction." The individualist 
doctrine, which "extended deep into the nation" (Court 1965:362), reflected the beliefs 
of the political leadership of the Victorian age-the landowning classes in the country 
and the commercial and industrial middle and upper classes in the towns and cities. 
Except for some voluntary institutions of and for the working class such as 
mutual clubs, insurance societies, savings banks, and trade unions with a benefit plan, 
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and the above described Poor Laws of 1795/96 and 1834, there were no collective 
efforts to absorb the uncertainties of economic life. Instead many men "genuinely 
believed that in creating his family income a man had discharged all his obligations to 
the community, owing nothing more to it and the community nothing to him" (Court 
1965:363). 
In the 1880s this widely held view of economic individualism came to and end. 
Backed up by the social studies (see above) that revealed the scope of poverty "it was 
difficult to maintain that poverty was solely due to personal deficiencies, and attention 
was drawn to the social defects implicit in existing economic arrangements" (Holmes 
1976:200). So the individualist doctrine was replaced by a new idea that represented a 
further phase in the development of social welfare: 
This was the belief that somewhere or other existed a standard of what 
the basic elements of a civilised life ought to be, that standard could be 
found and than when found laws and custom should enforce it. . . . if 
individuals did not possess the income necessary to purchase these 
indispensable elements of a decent existence for themselves, then it 
would be right and proper for the community to use its authority (a) to 
see whether an adequate income could not somehow be found for them 
in the market, (b) to direct income, via taxation, from the more fortu-
nate citizens towards those who tended to fall below the minimum. 
(Court 1965 :366) 
The implied state interventions of the new belief went far beyond the still exist-
ing Poor Law from 1834, that was dealing en bloc with all the economic risks. Subse-
quently, this Poor Law was replaced by single-purpose social policies, each covering a 
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chief economic risk of workers and their families: the employer's liability laws (1894, 
1897) rendered the employer liable for work accidents of his workers, old age was 
dealt with non-contributory state pensions (1908), for cases of sickness a contributory 
national insurance was created in 1911, and legislation in 1905, 1909, and 1911 dealt 
with the problem of unemployment by creating a national insurance as well, which sup-
ported jobless workers with unemployment benefits from 1913 onwards. 39 Of course, 
this legislation was not revolutionary in its monetary output. " .. . the effects until 1914 
were small" (Holmes 1976:200) as few people were eligible for the benefits of the new 
laws. But the symbolical character was tremendous as it signalized the departure from 
laissez-faire and the recognition of the responsibility for the social welfare of its people 
of the state. 
Moreover, besides creating these social services, the state "recognized for the 
first time since 181340 a certain responsibility for the level of wages" (Court 1965:367) 
by passing the Trade Boards Act of 1909. In 1908 and 1911 laws were passed in the 
coalmining industry regulating the length of working hours and the wages for miners. 
These laws were "the first intervention of the state in the internal economy of a large 
industry" (Crouzet 1982:108). A housing act improving housing conditions passed 
Parliament in 1890, education acts (1870, 1876, 1891) forbade children under thirteen 
to work, introduced compulsory elementary education, and abolished fees in public 
39 For the detailed regulations of these new policies see Dietz (1949:527-528) and MacKinnan 
(1994:289-290). 
40 "The machinery for minimum wage regulation disappeared in 1813 with a repeal of the wages 
clauses of the Act of 1563" (Chambers 1961:193). 
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schools (Dietz 1949:509, MacK.innan 1994:289). The state seemed to recognize its 
responsibility to invest in human capital and manifested this with increasing expendi-
tures for education-in 1870 the government spent £1.62 million for this sector, in 
1910 £ 17. 9 million, in 193 8 £63. 1 million, local authorities contributed £2. 2 million in 
1875, £27.5 million in 1910, and £505.6 million in 1938 (Holmes 1976: 197). 
All these social policies cost money and the state reacted by imposing taxes on 
the more wealthy people, i.e. by redistributing wealth. At the beginning of the twenti-
eth century "the principles of graduated and progressive taxation" were developed for 
"earned" and "unearned" income, and new taxes "were laid on the land, machinery, 
mineral rights, motor cars ( ... ), and gasoline" (Dietz 1949:526-527). So the state 
doubled its income in only five years: in 1908 it made £100 billion, in 1913 already 
£200 billion. 
Court (1965:363-366) gives two causes for the decline of the doctrine of eco-
nomic individualism and its replacement by the beginnings of the modem welfare state. 
Both causes were direct consequences of the industrialization of the country. First, he 
argues, the continued decline of the older social ties of family and locality put a great 
strain on the doctrine. The condition of most workers in the urban industrial areas was 
characterized by a "lack of security" and a "dependence on their jobs in an unstable and 
fluctuating order" (Dietz 1949:493). For example, old people, who were not able to 
work any more and to make a living, and who did not have relatives or neighbors which 
could support them, as it was usual in the pre-industrial, traditional society, became a 
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major problem of towns and cities. In contrast to the apparent wealth of the country 
and of some of its citizens these inhuman features raised questions how to make the 
workings class's living situation more secure. 
The second cause for the dissolution of economic individualism was "the 
reverse and more positive side" of the former cause--"the emergence of new forms of 
community life and a new scale of social values" (Court 1965:364). Three institutions 
were the major force behind this transformation of social life: the cities, collective bar-
gaining between trade unions and employers in order to find minimum standards of 
wages, hours, and conditions of work, and changes in the national administration. The 
cities and towns at that time went through a period of expanding local governments 
that "began in the last thirty years of the nineteenth century the business of leveling up 
living standards" and "worked towards the recognition of a right to the provision of a 
minimum of welfare" (Court 1965:365). Also, public funding of services and utilities 
such as gas, water, local transportation, and harbors started in the 1880s, taking this 
tasks away from private enterprise (Holmes 1976:198). 
Treble (1991) and Court (1965:318-324) give a good overview of the emer-
gence and gain of bargaining power of the trade unions. 41 Toward the end of the 
nineteenth century they "reached a condition in which they could write a contract con-
cerning wages and conditions of employment and also have equal recourse with 
employers to the law in enforcing such a contract" (Treble 1991:218). Three acts 
41 The British labour unions became a common organization in 1868, when they formed the Trades 
Union Congress. From then onwards they achieved considerable political influence. (Holmes 
1976:56) 
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(1867, 1874, and 1875) granted trade unions full legal recognition and broad oppor-
tunities for industrial action (including strikes). Throughout the 19th century trade 
unions and their leaders fought for such a status, which was for the most part illegal 
due to Combination, Arbitration, and Master and Servants Acts that operated in the 
laissez-faire spirit of the age and in favor of the employers. In the long run, Treble and 
Court argue, these regulations could not be upheld, as the working class developed a 
social self-consciousness and strongly supported the trade unions and was sympathetic 
with socialist ideas. In 1842, trade unions had about 100,000 members, in the 1870's 
about one million, in 1900 over two million, and by 1914 over four million workers 
were registered, that was about 30 per cent of the male work force (Court 1965:320).42 
Socialist ideas began to play a role in British politics for the first time in the 1870's and 
the growth ofits influence on politics and public opinion was rapid (Court 1965:364). 
At the end of the 19th century, the British administration and the civil service 
encountered several changes in Max Weber's sense of "bureaucratization" that 
increased their efficiency and ability to impose and survey its laws and orders. A whole 
new system of social welfare, based on the belief in minimum standards of living, was 
created (see above). In 1867, with the establishment of the second Reform Act, almost 
every male adult became eligible to vote in Britain (Viner 1958:249). The general suf-
frage and the socialist danger are regarded as a major cause for the shift in social policy 
toward a social welfare state. 
42 The changes in legislation in regards to trade unions and the high membership figures resulted in a 
high coverage of collective agreements. Court (1965:322) reports about 2.4 million workers, i.e. about 
a quarter of the employed population, to be covered in 1910. 
. . . it became necessary for both the Aristocratic Conservative or Tory 
party and the by-now predominantly middle-class Liberal party, if either 
were to gain or retain power against the other, and if a third and 'sub-
versive' working-class party, as strong as or stronger than they, was not 
to come into being, to woo the working classes by support of a policy of 
wider governmental activity on relief of distress and poverty. Social 
reform through legislation thereafter became respectable political doc-
trine for both parties, and reform legislation in fact obtained active sup-
port alternately or simultaneously from both major parties during the 
remainder of the century. (Viner 1958:249) 
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The formation of a working-class party could not be avoided. In 1901 the 
Labour party, "compounded of trade unionist workers and the intellectual socialists" 
(Dietz 1949:482-483, 509-510), entered the political scene, and increased the pressure 
on the two established parties to introduce extensive programs of social reform. 
Further interpretations hint at fears of economic decline and military defeat as 
reasons for the introduction of social policies: 
Some of the interest of innovation arose from the perception that Brit-
ain's relative economic position was slipping. Fears that the working 
classes were suffering 'physical deterioation' were widespread . . . If the 
working classes were not strong enough to work (or to fight for their 
country), Britain's prospects were bleak. (MacKinnan 1994:289) 
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4. Keynesianism (1930s-1970s) 
4.1 Two World Wars and The Great Depression 
The British economic structure of the late 19th and early 20th century was a 
poor inheritance for the later 20th century. An increasing commitment to the world 
economy-according to Holmes (1976:37) Britain provided 29.9 per cent of world 
exports of manufactured goods in 1913 (in comparison the United States 12.6 per 
cent )-concentrated the British economy on the production in a few areas for which 
the market and technological prospects were not bright, such as textiles, agriculture, 
net property income from abroad, domestic service, and manufactured gas production 
and distribution. Industries with strong growth potential-chemicals, engineering, 
instrument production, paper and printing, electricity, telecommunications, construe-
tion and construction materials-were widely neglected (Holmes 1976:36-39). The 
British economy still did pretty well in the years until the First World War, with 1.1 per 
cent growth per year from 1899 to 1913 (Holmes 1976:38). But with the stagnation 
and collapse of the world economy in the years between the world wars, especially 
during the Great Depression between 1929 and 1933, the consequence of this over-
commitment to worldwide trade was persistent mass unemployment. 
Such unemployment symbolised in very real measure the difficulties 
which were being experienced in the 'older' industries of coal, textiles, 
iron and steel and shipbuilding. The common feature of those industries 
lay in their vulnerability to over-production or competition in world 
markets (Holmes 1976: 113). 
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In tum, unemployment cleared the ground for the acceptance of the ideology of 
the welfare state and Keynesian economics for a generation or more after the ending of 
the Second World War. Reforms were only halted by the advent of Mrs. Thatcher's 
economic policies in 1979. 
During the First World War unemployment was a negligible problem, but by 
1920, when nearly every European nation adopted mercantilist, self-sufficient policies, 
it became a dramatic issue with the highest unemployment rates since 1870, in particu-
lar in the coal, iron, steel, and cotton industries. Within four months the unemployment 
figure rose from 300,000 people (August) to 750,000 (December), and it reached its 
peak in 1922 with 2 million people (15 per cent of the work force); throughout the 
1920s the figure never went below 1 million, or 9.2 per cent (Dietz 1942:547, Holmes 
1976:113). However, the unemployed people "were being provided with at least a 
minimum standard of comfort" (Dietz 1929:554) by the unemployment insurance, 
which was extended in 1920 (see below). 
Despite the mass unemployment the 1920s were a period of prosperity for 
Britain. This view is supported by figures of the national income per head at prices 
from 1913 to 1914-even though the figures dropped somewhat from £50.27 in 1914 
to £4 7. 72 in 1920, to levels of about £43 in the following three years, from 1924 
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onwards there is a constant rising trend up to £51.46 in 1929 (Deane and Cole 
1967:330-331). 
There was no even distribution of income or of the increases in income. 
The rich in 1929 were richer than they ever were, even though some 
who had formerly been rich were now badly off The working classes 
were, however, generally speaking, better off than they had ever been. 
Wages were on a higher level than they had been in 1913; and as a result 
of the fall in wholesale prices by about 20 per cent between 1924 and 
1929 real wages were tending to go up. The rise was estimated at 
between 5 and 10 per cent between 1924 and 1929. The general picture 
was that of trade activity and velocity of turnover greater in 1929 than 
in 1913 or even in 1919. (Dietz 1942:555) 
By October 1929 excessive stock market speculation was followed by the Wall 
Street collapse and the capitalist world of America and Europe ran into the Great 
Depression, which abruptly ended the vision of general abundance until at least the end 
of the Second World War. "The vision of Every Man a Wealthy Man had been shown 
up as an hallucination" (Heilbroner 1972[1953]: 242). 
In the 1930s the problem that dominated the mature capitalist econo-
mies was the problem of intense, persistent, trade depression, associated 
with widespread, unprecedentedly heavy unemployment. The unem-
ployment problem was already chronic in Britain and some other West-
ern European countries in the 1920s. By the 1930s it was universal in 
capitalist economies; and it was aggravated rather than relieved by lais-
sez-faire economic policies. (Deane 1978: 175) 
British exports declined by 18.4 per cent between 1929 and 1930, and were 
exceeded by a fall of 23.5 per cent in the following year (Holmes 1976:126). In July 
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1929, 1.1 million British were unemployed-by January 1930 the number had risen to 2 
million, and it "mounted rapidly to 3,000,000" (Dietz 1942:569). However, in contrast 
to the American experience, the British managed to maintain of the unemployed (see 
4.3). Overall the impact of the depression was not as disastrous as in the United 
States. From 1933 to 1940 the British economy recovered from the crash in an aston-
ishing manner, measured by the level of productive activity. The net national income, 
at its lowest point in 1932 with £3.6 billion, shows a steady increase until 1940, when it 
amounted to £7.2 billion (Deane and Cole 1967:244). The old, trade-focused indus-
tries became more efficient and less important, as capital investments were turned 
toward the new industries (Holmes 1976:137). Via economic policies the British gov-
emment managed to transfer resources from production for export to production for 
the home market. 
The importance of foreign trade in the economy was declining, the ratio 
of net exports to national income falling from 17 per cent in 1929 to 11 
per cent in 193 7 while the ratio of retained imports to income fell from 
23 per cent to 18 per cent in the same years . . . The recovery in Britain 
after 1932 was thus a home market recovery par excellence. 
(Richardson 1967:44) 
However, the social defects prevailed. British unemployment rates began fal-
ling in 1933 and were down at 14.4 per cent in 1935, but still, "Average employment in 
Britain continued to run at levels of over 10 per cent except in 193 7 when the level was 
9.5" (Holmes 1976: 133). 
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The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 brought the Great Depression 
to a sudden end. During the war Britain was transformed from a predominantly free 
market economy into a centrally managed economy. National net expenditure on war-
related activities increased form a mere 7 per cent in 193 8 to a peak of 5 5 per cent in 
1943, governments expenditure rose dramatically from 16 per cent of all net expendi-
ture in 193 9 to a peak of 64 per cent in 194 3 (Howlett 1994: 1). There was a massive 
increase in real output in Britain by 31 per cent in four years from 1938 to 1942. Full 
employment was achieved almost over night. Employment increased by nearly 20 per 
cent from 1939 to 1943. "This represented a dramatic illustration of just how many 
additional resources could be mobilised under the influence of buoyant demand" 
(Bleaney 1985:81). Recognition of this fact influenced academic and policy-circles as 
well as public opinion about how to ensure the maintenance of high employment con-
ditions after the war (see 4.2). 
4.2 John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) 
The first three decades of the 20th century were the historical context in which 
John Maynard Keynes, son of the classical economist John Neville Keynes and student 
of Alfred Marshall, developed his economic theories. His major economic work, The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, which revolutionized orthodox 
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economics was first published in 1936.43 It "received more attention than Alfred Mar-
shall's Principles of Economics had received in over fifty years" (Pribram 1983 :496) in 
only the first decade after its appearance. The mass unemployment during the 1920s 
and 1930s revised the dominant neo-classical political and social attitudes and brought 
the problems of welfare economics back into the discussions of economic theory. 
It was the unemployment that was hardest to bear. The jobless millions 
were like an embolism in the nation's vital circulation; and while their 
indisputable existence argued more forcibly that any text that something 
was wrong with the system, the economists wrung their hands and 
racked their brains and called upon the spirit of Adam Smith, but could 
offer neither diagnosis nor remedy. Unemployment-this kind of 
unemployment-was simply not listed among the possible ills of the 
system; it was absurd, impossible, and paradoxical. But it was there. 
(Heilbroner 1972[1953]:244) 
Analyzing the ups and downs in the economy, or business cycles, Keynes real-
ized that the neo-classical equilibrium theory is far from reality and inadequate to 
describe the current economic situation. "With the Great Depression of the 193 Os ... 
the happy confidence in self-correction gave way to an embarrassing, then frightening 
realization that the self-regulating market ... had a flaw" (Preston 1967:40-41). He 
viewed the General Theory as necessary break with classical and neo-classical theory: 
. . . the postulates of classical theory are applicable to a special case only 
and not to the general case, the situation which it assumes being a limit-
43 The General Theory built on several earlier articles that already contained Keynes's critique of the 
classical and neo-classical school and alternative views how to analyze the economy. Among the most 
important are The End of Laissez-Faire (1972(1926]), A Treatise on Money (1971(1930]), Economic 
Possibilities of Our Children (1972(1930]), and The Means to Prosperity (1959(1933]). 
ing point of the possible positions of equilibrium. Moreover, the charac-
teristics of the special case assumed by the classical theory happen not 
to be those of the economic society in which we actually live, with the 
result that its teaching is misleading and disastrous if we attempt to 
apply it to the facts of experience. (Keynes 1965[1936]:3)44 
89 
According to Deane (1978: 182-185) there are three major differences between 
Keynes's economics and the classical and neo-classical schools that revolutionized 
orthodox economics-his central question, the model he uses, and his conclusions. 
Keynes's major concern was to find a diagnosis of and a remedy for the regularly 
occurring recessions that led to high unemployment rates. The general question 
Keynes addressed in his macroeconomics was what the determinants of the supply and 
demand were for aggregate output, or, more concretely, to "discover what determines 
at any time the national income of a given economic system and ( ... ) the amount of its 
employment" (Keynes 1965[1936]:247). In contrast, the neo-classical school focused 
on microeconomics and hence hardly considered the problem of unemployment: " ... 
almost no economist after 1870 considered the type of macroeconomic problem with 
which Keynes was concerned" (Blaug 1968: 662) and ". . . the striking characteristic of 
British economics in the l 920's was the lack of concern over unemployment and the 
failure to realize its extent" (Blaug 1968:661). 
Keynes analyzed national income and unemployment by creating an aggregative 
model of the economy as a whole. His findings were "the nub of the Keynesian heresy" 
44 Keynes attacked "classical" economic theory, by which he meant "the followers of Ricardo, those, 
that is to say, who adopted and perfected the theory of the Ricardian economics, including (for 
example) J. S. Mill, Marshall, Edgeworth and Prof. Pigou" (Keynes 1965[1936]:3). 
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(Deane 1978:182). Based on the economic reality of his day and his economic model 
he argued that there was no self-adjusting mechanism of the economic system, and that 
only state intervention in the economy could create a general equilibrium. He aban-
doned the still prevalent doctrine of laissez-faire. In his theory there was "no invisible 
hand translating private self-interest into social benefit" (Deane 1978:182). 
It is not true that individuals possess a prescriptive 'natural liberty' in 
their economic activities. There is no 'compact' conferring perpetual 
rights on those who have or on those who acquire. The world is not so 
governed from above that private and social interest always coincide. It 
is not so managed here below that in practice they coincide. It is not a 
correct deduction from the principles of economics that enlightened self-
interest always operates in the public interest. Nor is it true that self-
interest generally is enlightened, more often individuals acting separately 
to promote their own ends are too ignorant or too weak to attain even 
these. (Keynes 1972[1926]: 287-288) 
His analysis of economic processes gave a theoretical basis for state interven-
tion in order to fulfill the capitalist promise of wealth for everybody. 
According to Keynes, the major problem with nee-classical economics was its 
employment theory that believed that a free enterprise economy would tend toward full 
employment (Keynes 1965[1936]:2-22).45 Second, Keynes took issue with the law of 
markets by the French classical economist Say (Keynes 1965[1936]:26). Say's law, 
which ran "like a red thread through the entire body of classical and nee-classical the-
45 As shown above, the vast majority of neo-classical economists did not consider such 
macroeconomic questions at all, as the utility analysis did not provide the economists with a measure 
for such problems. However, there were a few economists that dealt with that question. Blaug 
( 1968 :657-661) gives an overview of the neo-classical views and Keynes's interpretation and critique 
of the "classical" unemployment theory. 
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ory" (Harris 1948: 105) and on which the neo-classical full employment assumption 
rested, stated that for the economy as a whole, supply necessarily created a demand of 
equivalent magnitude. In other words, it denied that there can ever be a shortage of 
demand in relation to production. The only cures for unemployment, in the view of the 
neo-classical model, were "wage-cutting and an easy-money policy" (Blaug 1968:653). 
The possibility that inadequate demand could be the cause of unemployment was 
brushed aside. Neo-classical theory indicated that persistent unemployment could only 
be a result of some barrier to the fall in the money wage, namely, the refusal of workers 
to accept cuts in their real wage. Such unemployment was interpreted as voluntary 
unemployment. All other unemployment was interpreted asfrictional, i.e., temporary 
unemployment due to the fact that it usually takes some time to find a new job or a new 
worker, even if both are available. Keynes dismissed this unemployment theory as 
unrealistic and introduced a new category of unemployment-involuntary 
unemployment, prevalent especially in periods of depression (Keynes 1965(1936]:22). 
In contrast to the neo-classical theory that cuts in real wage are followed by full 
employment, Keynes, in the light of his own theory, argued that wage cuts would lead 
to a fall in income, hence to a fall in aggregate demand, and finally to an even higher 
rate ofunemployment (Lekachman 1966:107-108). 
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In Keynes's theory (1965(1936):245-247) the level of employment and the 
national income depends on four criteria: the propensity to consume, the marginal effi-
ciency of capital, the quantity of money, and the level ofwages. 46 
The key factors in the system were (a) the 'principle of effective demand' 
which acted through the propensity to consume and the rate of new 
investment to set a ceiling to the level of economic activity, and (b) the 
role played by money as 'the link between the present and the future' in 
reflecting past and present uncertainties about the future of lenders and 
borrowers, and reflecting them on the rate of interest and hence of 
investment. The system was enriched by the introduction of a set of 
concepts ... viz the marginal propensity to save and its inverse the mul-
tiplier, liquidity preference ... and the marginal efficiency of capital .... 
(Deane 1978: 179-180) 
In short, the amount of employment and national income depend upon con-
sumer demand which, in tum, depends upon the disposable income or purchasing 
power people have. The kernel of Keynes's theory of effective demand rests on his 
notion of the consumption function (Keynes 1965(1936):23-34). That is, as income 
increases and consumption rises, the latter increases less than does the former, i.e., 
people save some of the higher income (Keynes 1965(1936):96). Thus, said Keynes, 
the volume of investment must be constantly increased in order to maintain a full 
employment level (Keynes 1965:248-253). Since Keynes believed that consumption 
patterns are largely fixed, the level of employment and the amount of national income, 
given the consumption function, depended upon investment. In the ideal case, so 
46 For another arrangement of the same factors or variables in Keynes's economic model see Pribrarn 
(1983:498), who points out that the propensity to consume, the liquidity preference, and the propensity 
to invest are fundamental psychological variables. 
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Keynes, the investment rate would be as high as the savings rate-this would be the 
equilibrium case of full employment. Further Keynes analyzed that the demand for 
investment goods was largely autonomous, in the sense that it was independent of pur-
chasing power of income (Keynes 1965[1936]:248). He saw that there were no insti-
tutional devices in use that could adjust the amounts actually invested to the amounts 
saved and available for investment. In light of his analysis that throughout economic 
history there has been a tendency to save more than to invest he viewed this lack as 
unfortunate (Keynes 1965[1936):347). 
Applying his economic model, Keynes analyzed that it was possible in a mod-
em, industrialized nation that the balancing and regulating mechanisms of the market 
were capable of achieving equilibrium at a level that would leave a large portion of the 
labor force unemployed permanently. ". . . the economy can be established at various 
levels of employment of the available resources and ... full-employment equilibrium is 
but a single case out of a wide variety of economic conditions" (Pribram 1982:497). 
Worse yet, these same mechanisms, if uncorrected, so Keynes, tended to bring to a halt 
any economic boom and to tum the economy downward. So he saw the self-regulating 
market as able to regulate itself into stagnation. Such a stagnation of indefinite dura-
tion could happen when reduced total income, caused by reduced investment would 
eventually lead to reduced savings. The decline of savings would continue to a point at 
which all savings were invested, and stable total expenditures would be adjusted to sta-
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tionary total incomes (Keynes 1965[1936]:313-332). This analysis is aptly described 
by Heilbroner (1972[1953]:262): 
Rather than a seesaw which would always right itself, the economy 
resembled an elevator: it could be going up or down, but it could also be 
standing perfectly still. And it was just as capable of standing still on 
the ground floor as at the top of the shaft. A depression, in other 
words, might not cure itself at all; the economy could lie prostate 
indefinitely, like a ship becalmed. 
To avoid such a scenario (as it was happening in the 1930s), Keynes saw state 
intervention in the form of monetary and fiscal policies, which would influence and 
manage the level of effective demand, as a necessity. 
If the forces operating in the exchange economy could not be relied 
upon to establish full-employment equilibrium, pursuance of an appro-
priate economic policy appeared to be indispensable in order to prevent 
the disintegration of a decaying economy. (Pribram 1983:498) 
Keynes insisted on the importance of effective demand for the maintenance and 
expansion of economic activity (Keynes 1965[1936]:32). As a long-term wage policy, 
he recommended a combination of rising wages and stable prices which, assisted by the 
effects of technological improvements, would secure participation of the workers in the 
fruits of enhanced productivity and lead to the transfer of workers from less productive 
to more productive processes. As very concrete governmental tasks he demanded 
three interventions: in order to offset the decline in the propensity to consume, Keynes 
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proposed the imposition of steeply progressive income taxes that would redistribute 
wealth; he recommended the maintenance of low interest rates as monetary policy; and 
finally he regarded issuance of public loans and execution of public works programs as 
important elements of a "socialization" of investment activities (Keynes 
1965[1936]:374-378). This last measure is a cornerstone of Keynes's theory, as he 
proposed this policy especially during depressions when the government should prac-
tice deficit finance by spending on public works (Keynes 1959[1933]:128-131).47 He 
stated the positive effects of public works already in The Means to Prosperity 
(1959[1933]). Imagine, he suggested, the government spent £500 extra and this sum 
sufficed to afford employment for one more person for one year in the construction of 
public works. Beyond the primary benefit of employing one more person, Keynes 
anticipated additional employment: ". . . the increase of employment does not stop 
there. The additional wages and other incomes paid out are spent on additional pur-
chases, which in turn lead to further employment" (Keynes 1933[1959]:13). More yet 
could be expected: "The newly employed who supply the increased purchases of those 
employed on the new capital works will, in their turn, spend more, thus adding to the 
employment of others; and so on" (Keynes 1933[1959]:14). Keynes guessed this mul-
tiplier effect to 1.5, that is, for every two men directly employed in consequence of 
increased government spending, a third man would be additionally employed. Further-
47 Keynes was not the first British theorist that advocated public works. According to Blaug 
(1968:654-656) there was only one economist in the 1920s that opposed this policy. What was new 
and made Keynes to an outstanding economist was that his policy recommendations "emerged out of a 
consistent macroeconomic model of the economy" (Blaug 1968:662), which the others did not provide. 
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more, there were several budgetary and fiscal benefits from public works expenditures, 
argued Keynes. 
Keynesian macroeconomics does not explicitly argue for welfare state meas-
ures, but Keynes's advocacy for redistribution of income and wealth in order to enhance 
demand of the poorer classes implies a welfare state. 
Keynes's policy prescriptions are regarded as the principal reason for the Gen-
era/ Theory's overwhelming international success among economists and politicians of 
all colors. According to Pribram (1983:496) the book's impact on Anglo-Saxon eco-
nomic thought and on policies can only be compared with Adam Smith's Wealth of 
Nations. Deane (1978: 184-185) writes: 
. . . the time was ripe. Its abstractions seemed more relevant to the 
conditions of the 1930s than the competing theories. Its analysis gave a 
theoretical basis for policy-prescriptions that were more in tune with 
existing political trends in a world that was already in massive retreat 
from a laissez-faire ideology. 
In light of the apparent failure of neo-classical economics to analyze the econ-
omy and socialist threats of a totally state-directed economy, Keynes moderate policy-
prescriptions were willingly embraced. Keynes was not advocating state intervention 
to a degree that they would abolish the free enterprise system in favor of a socialist 
economy (Keynes 1965[1936]:379). He envisioned a government that would play "a 
very large and useful role in the economic order and still preserve the freedom of indi-
vidual decisions on investment, production, and consumption that a capitalistic order 
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requires" (Preston 1967 :40). Still relying on the classical and neoclassical tradition, 
Keynes's theory promoted an economy that was "ruled by the principles of free com-
petition and profit maximation" (Pribram 1983 :498). 
In the last chapter of the General Theory with the title Concluding Notes on the 
Social Philosophy Towards Which the General Theory Might Lead, Keynes 
(1965[1936]:372-384) summarized his central concerns that, he believed, could be 
solved with his theory: economic efficiency, social justice, and individual liberty. As far 
as economic efficiency was concerned, he argued that decentralized market processes 
did an adequate job in determining what and how something was produced: "I see no 
reason to suppose that the existing system seriously misemploys the factors of produc-
tion which are in use. . . . It is in determining the volume, not the direction, of actual 
employment that the existing system has broken down" (Keynes 1965[1936]:379). 
However, so Keynes, the market mechanisms did fail in that they led to a socially 
inequitable distribution of income and wealth. "The outstanding faults of the economic 
society in which we live are its failure to provide full employment and its arbitrary and 
inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes" (Keynes 1965[1936]:372). Therefore, 
he thought that social justice would be best served by state intervention that would 
guarantee an adequate volume of employment and a more fitting distribution of wealth. 
As far as individual liberty is concerned, Keynes retained a strong belief in individual-
ism, by which he meant a decentralized relative autonomous market: 
But, above all, individualism, if it can be purged of its defects and its 
abuses, is the best safeguard of personal liberty in the sense that, com-
pared with any other system, it greatly widens the field for the exercise 
of personal choice. It is also the best safeguard of the variety of life, 
which emerges precisely from this extended field of personal choice, and 
the loss of which is the greatest of all losses of the homogeneous or 
totalitarian state. For this variety preserves the traditions which embody 
the most secure and successful choices of former generations; it colours 
the present with the diversification of its fancy; and, being the handmaid 
of experiment as well as of tradition and of fancy, it is the most power-
ful instrument to better the future. (Keynes 1965[1936]:380) 
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However, he went on to defend his argument for governmental intervention as 
necessity despite its seemingly negative effects on individualism: 
Whilst, therefore, the enlargement of the functions of government, 
involved in the task of adjusting to one another the propensity to con-
sume and the inducement to invest, would seem . . . to be a terrific 
encroachment of individualism. I defend it, on the contrary, both as the 
only practicable means of avoiding the destruction of the existing eco-
nomic forms in their entirety and as the condition of the successful 
functioning of individual initiative. (Keynes 1965[1936]:380) 
Putting himself in the classical tradition that advocated a free economy and the 
calming effects of acquisitiveness, Keynes believed that there were "valuable human 
activities which require the motive of money-making and the environment of private 
wealth-ownership for their full fruition" and that "dangerous human proclivities can be 
canalized into comparatively harmless channels by the existence of opportunities for 
money-making and private wealth" (Keynes 1965[1936]: 374). On the other hand, "it 
is not necessary for the stimulation of these activities and the satisfaction of these pro-
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clivities that the game should be played for such high stakes as at present" (Keynes 
1965(1936):374). Thus, he held that "it may still be wise and prudent statesmanship to 
allow the game to be played, subject to rules and limitations" (Keynes 
1965[1936]:374). 
Keynes saw capitalism as an appropriate system to provide general abundance, 
though not without considerable doubt as to its virtues, and with the proviso that 
meaningful reforms and controls be undertaken that influence the aggregate propensity 
to consume and invest, i.e. effective demand. That Keynes actually was very optimistic 
about the future becomes clear in his essay, Economic Possibilities for Our Grand-
children (1972[1930]). Herein he stated that by the year 2030 the economic problem 
of scarcity would have been solved due to an ever-increasing productivity. If the econ-
omy would develop at the same pace as in the last 100 years, Keynes calculated, Eng-
land's real productive wealth would multiply by seven and one half times in the next 
100. With help of his policy recommendations the result would be general abundance. 
4. 3 Keynesian ism applied 
In the neo-classical period one of the new social policies which were based on a 
changed view of collective responsibility for economic risks was the introduction of 
unemployment insurance in 1911. In accordance with the neo-classical economists 
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who had only voluntary and frictional unemployment in mind when talking about this 
social issue, the kind of unemployment the legislators wanted to cover with this policy 
was seasonal and cyclical. It was not the unemployment proceeding 
from structural change in industry and its markets which became the 
unemployment problem of the 1920's and 1930's. Nor was there for 
another generation after 1911 any question of the State assuming a 
general responsibility for the level of employment and the use of national 
resources. (Court 1965:367) 
As shown above, as the ". . . ideological bias associated with the neo-classical 
paradigm was becoming an anachronism" (Deane 1978: 175-176) the economico-
structural changes in the early twentieth century led to a new economic doctrine-
Keynesianism. In tum, the new economic theory influenced policies and hence the 
economic structure. "Keynes's ideas gradually found their way into policy proposals of 
governments" (Breit and Ransom 1971 :82). 
Keynes was promoting state intervention that would raise the propensity to 
consume and the inducement to invest, as he saw both factors as necessary to achieve 
full employment and a just distribution of wealth. The question is, how far and when 
the governments adopted Keynes's policy prescriptions. This is the task of the follow-
ing inquiry into British policy in the 20th century, beginning with the period between 
the two world wars, when policies in Keynes's sense were already partly applied. One 
event certainly had its impact on these policies-the further extension of the suffrage. 
The widespread extension of the franchise in 1918, which made virtually 
every man over twenty-one a voter and extended the ballot to many 
women over thirty, made unemployment and the related problem of the 
maintenance of the new wage scales matters of greater political impor-
tance than such things had been in the past. Unemployed voters could 
not be left to shift for themselves. (Dietz 1942:547) 
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In light of this, the government extended its intervention in the economy in 
order to relieve the trade recession and mass unemployment in the 1920s. The 
National Insurance Act of 1911, which introduced the unemployment insurance, was 
extended in 1920 "to cover all workers earning under £250 a year" (Dietz 1942:548). 
This new law insured about 12 million people. Other devices for handling the problem 
of unemployment in the 1920s were grants to local authorities of 60 per cent of the 
wages bill on approved public works, and Exchequer loans for roads, sewers, parks, 
water, gas, and electric maintenance, and tramway undertakings (Dietz 1920:549). 
However, "public works were looked upon with disfavor as a more expensive and a 
more wasteful form ofreliefthan direct maintenance" (Dietz 1942:549). 
Moreover, the British government issued loans and credits to enhance trade and 
hence to increase employment (Dietz 1920:549-550). Three Housing Acts (1919, 
1923, 1924) led to a steady improvement of housing in the 1920s and early 1930s, 
when, encouraged and supported by governmental loans and subsidies almost 1.2 mil-
lion new houses were built by local authorities and private enterprises (Dietz 1942:555-
557). Additionally, about the same number of units was built by private enterprises 
without financial assistance from the government, so that 
Great Britain, with over two million new houses, was far and away bet-
ter off, from the point of view of the dwellings of people, than she had 
been at any time in her history. Much remained to be done before Eng-
lishmen lived in a decent house; but the back of one of the toughest 
British social problems had been broken. (Dietz 1942:557) 
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All the measures above either enlarged the propensity to consume or the 
inducement to invest, as Keynes would call it. So as early as the 1920s and early 1930s 
the British government did not follow nee-classical policy recommendations but 
pursued the policies that Keynes would recommend in the General Theory in 1936.48 
However, this deviation from nee-classical theories was more a reaction to the pressure 
from the actual economic conditions than based on convictions. As mentioned, the 
public works program was not regarded as an appropriate cure for unemployment, and 
during and after the Great Depression the British government did not seem consistently 
to follow any theoretical considerations. " . . . the economy policies pursued . . . in the 
course of the Great Depression were not influenced by consistent lines of theoretical 
consideration" (Pribram 1983:513). 
Despite the common view among economists after the First World War that 
public works could reduce the unemployment rate, "the Treasury . . . remained hostile 
to the idea of planned countercycle public works, with or without budgetary deficits", 
48 However, Weir (1989:55) points out, that Keynes's influence on British politics was given already 
at this time: " ... Keynes himself had urged a 'Keynesian-style' policy of deficit spending on public 
works even before he had worked out the theoretical apparatus in The General Theory. As co-author 
of the Liberal pamphlet Can Lloyd George Do It?, Keynes and like-minded members of the Liberal 
party laid out a clear alternative to economic orthodoxy during the 1929 election." Further, he 
published his view in the above mentioned essays and also got support from a majority of economists 
in regard to public works (see above). What distinguished Keynes's work before the publication of the 
General Theory is not a different perspective of the economy but the lack of an economic model that 
scientifically supports his views. 
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whether the party in power were the Tories or Labour (Blaug 1968:655-656). The 
average expenditures of the first five years of the depression from 1929 to 1934 were 
the same as in the preceding years, the budget was always balanced (Dietz 1942:569). 
This also becomes clear when looking at the percentage of the GNP that accounted for 
government expenditures (Deane and Cole 1967:332-333). Throughout the 1920s the 
figures were around 8 or 9 per cent, and only from 1936 onwards there is an increase 
from 9.5 to 10.3 per cent, to 11.3 in 1937, and 13.3 per cent in 1938. According to 
Blaug (1968:656, 663) by 1939 there was only one country-Sweden-that followed 
Keynes's policy recommendations of having unbalanced budgets to counterbalance the 
depression by a public works program. 
Instead of employing people in public works programs, the British government 
prefered to "maintain" the unemployed, which was managed by adjusting the unem-
ployment insurance to the depression years. An Act of 1934 on unemployment insur-
ance "abolished nineteenth-century conceptions of poverty and defined various catego-
ries of assistance from short-term unemployment to long-term disabled and infirm" 
(Holmes 1976:201-202). Dietz reports that, although the unemployment benefits of 
the insurance were soon exhausted, unemployed workers and their families received 
repeated extensions and uncovenanted benefits. "Thus the unemployment insurance 
scheme ceased to be an insurance arrangement and became a system of relief supported 
by workers who still had jobs, employers whose factories still ran, and the state, with 
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the deficits covered by loans" (Dietz 1942:570). Speaking in Keynes's terms, the gov-
ernment supported the consumption function. 
However, government did little to induce investment or invest itself during the 
depression years: "... there was little new recourse of this method of providing men 
with work or of stimulating industrial activity by pump-priming" (Dietz 1942:571). 
Except for the promotion of "cheap money" via low interest rates, all measures to 
restore prosperity, such as the adoption of protective tariffs, guaranteed prices for agri-
cultural products, and industrial and economic planning largely in cooperation with 
employers-"state intervention in Britain could hardly be imposed from above but 
rather was effective within the limits of employer's willingness to cooperate" (Holmes 
197 6: 162 )-were directed to retain production, secure incomes, and avoid inflation, 
rather than to induce investment. 49 
Despite the inconsistency in regard to economic theories, one tendency can be 
recognized when looking at economic policies in the 1930s-the disbelief in free trade 
and laissez-faire, and, hence, the decline of the neo-classical doctrine. 
It was no longer fashionable to believe that buying in the cheapest, and 
selling in the dearest market would bring maximal social advantages. 
Laissez-faire might bring the greatest wealth to certain individuals, but it 
was now seen that the unrestrained operation of the forces of com-
petition had the effect of exposing the masses of those who were less 
well endowed physically and mentally, or less well trained, or who lived 
on poorer soils, to the certainty of poverty and unemployment in times 
of strain. (Dietz 1942:567) 
49 For a detailed discussion of the specific state interventions in agriculture and industry see Holmes 
(1976: 146-164). Weir (1989:60-63) explains the rejection of deficit-financed public works as caused 
by the hierarchical character of the British bureaucracy and the dominant role of the Treasury. 
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This trend was continued and accelerated during the Second World War. The 
intervention of the state in economic life had grown to an unprecedented degree during 
the war. The principal means of governmental war organization were to maintain low 
interest rates, deficit-spending, and direct quantitative controls over production, alloca-
tion of materials and labor, and consumption (Eatwell 1985:66-67). "World War II 
came and overnight removed the inhibitions that had limited government spending and 
the worries and suspicions it aroused in the minds of businessmen" (Heilbroner 
1972[1953]:283). Hence, during the Second World War "a rapid acceptance of 
Keynesian budgetary principles broke with long-standing patterns of national economic 
policy and proved the first step toward the broad acceptance of Keynesian policy" 
(Weir 1989:54).50 
There was a widespread sense that, unless governments were actively commit-
ted to preventing it, large-scale unemployment would once again characterize the dee-
ades after peace turned. The experience of successful state intervention during the war 
led to a different perception of the role the state should play in economic and social 
questions. 
But if the state could sort out the problems of wartime planning, surely 
it could also plan the peace. The prestige of state intervention and the 
belief that it could be used to prevent the return of economic disasters in 
50 After the outbreak of hostilities Keynes was directly involved in this opinion change as he "was 
given office in the Treasury from which to pursue the many aspects of wartime economic 
administration" (Weir 1989:55). Furthermore, the economic section of the war cabinet which 
consisted of several dedicated Keynesian economist "used its central position to keep issues of 
Keynesian economic policy on the national agenda throughout the war" (Weir 1989:66). 
peacetime were enormously encouraged by this experience. (Bleaney 
1985:82) 
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People remembered that the end of the first World War had been accompanied 
by a very severe slump in the 1920s and a whole decade of depression in the 1930s, and 
they were wondering and discussing how this could be avoided. The answers they 
found were a more state-directed economy and the establishment of a modem social 
security system. In December 1942 the Beveridge Report was published by the gov-
emment, "a plan to establish social security for all from the cradle to the grave" 
(Bleaney 1985:81). The report rested upon three assumptions-that family allowances 
would be paid for all children, that a National Health service would be set up, and that 
full employment would be guaranteed by the state (Howlett 1994:27). Beveridge's 
report received widespread support-86 per cent of the British people were in favor of 
its adoption, only 6 per cent were against it (Addison 1977:217). A series of legislation 
laid down the foundations of the British post-war welfare state by 1948 "which has 
remained fundamentally the same since that date": in 1944 the Education Act, in 1945 
the Family Allowance Act, in 1948 the National Assistance and Children's Acts, and in 
1949 the Housing Act (Johnson 1994:287). According to Johnson (1994:287), there 
were two broad types of benefits-directly provided services and cash transfers. The 
first, tax-financed group included public housing, public education, and national health 
service. The cash transfers were themselves of two types, some being provided 
through the contributory system of National Insurances (in cases of retirement, sick-
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ness, disability, and unemployment), and others (national assistance and family allow-
ance) being paid on a non-contributory basis from general tax revenue. 
As shown, Britain had established a public welfare system with many of the 
characteristics found in the post-1945 welfare state as soon as the eve of the First 
World War. However, most social expenditure before 1914 "was based on the concept 
of a residual welfare state, a system of physical and financial safety nets which pre-
vented absolute destitution" (Johnson 1994:285). Pre-war welfare was pretty limited in 
scope, whereas by 1948 
the welfare state was pretty different in size and character. It accounted 
for IO per cent of GNP [before 1914 it was less than 6 per cent], and 
was more centralised and much more comprehensive in terms of the 
proportion of the population and the type of social contingencies cov-
ered. It had changed from being a residual to an institutional welfare 
system, integral to the structures of modem industrial society. (Johnson 
1994:285) 
In the four decades since 1948 government social expenditure rose from less 
than a third to over a half of total government expenditure and to 20 per cent of GNP. 
This steady rise was stopped only in 197 4 when first cuts took place in expenditures for 
education, housing, and health benefits, and especially from the early 1980s onwards, 
when deep cuts in the social security system decreased social state expenditures 
(Johnson 1994:298). 
Given the post-war atmosphere that supported a welfare state, and the apparent 
failure ofneo-classical economics to analyze the problems of the 1920s and 1930s, not 
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only a welfare system was created, but also Keynesian monetary and fiscal policies 
were created in accordance with his recommendations after the war: 
During the war its influence grew steadily in both academic and policy-
making circles to the point where one could say that, in 1945, it had 
more or less established itself as the new orthodoxy .... Keynesian eco-
nomics was beginning to be conceived not just as an emergency 
weapon, which might be kept in the government's policy cupboard until 
a depression threatened, but as a tool for stabilisation of the economic 
system by continuous, even though possibly quite minor, adjustments of 
the budgetary stance. (Bleaney 1985:83) 
Toward the end of the war, Keynesian ideas were fully established by the Brit-
ish Treasury and "were at the centre of discussions about the future conduct of macro-
economic policy in peacetime" (Bleaney 1985:84). A White Paper, published in 1944 
and supported by all parties, declared: "The Government accepts as one of their pri-
mary aims and responsibilities the maintenance of a high and stable level of employment 
after the war" (Lekachman 1966: 177). 51 The Paper outlined the policies the govern-
ment intended to pursue to achieve this ambitious goal: monetary policies as measure 
to influence investment expenditures via the level of interest rates, counter-cyclical 
expenditures of the public sector, including budget deficits, and manipulation of con-
sumption via tax rates and social insurance contributions (Bleaney 1985:85). These 
were exactly the policy recommendations derived from Keynes's analysis of the econ-
51 Weir (1989:79-81) discusses why the Labour Party as well as the Conservative Party advocated full 
employment and demand management. 
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omy which the British government fully embraced. 52 From the end of the Second 
World War until the 1970s 
the broad lines of budgetary policy, and indeed of monetary policy, had 
been formed on Keynesian lines. The role of the budget and of mone-
tary policy was to ensure that the level of effective demand was appro-
priate to the full utilization of resources, with due regard for the rate of 
inflation and the foreign balance. (Eatwell 1985 :69-70) 
52 For a more detailed discussion of the policies after 1945 until the 1970s see Eatwell (1985:66-70), 
Caimcross (1994a, 1994b), and Tomlinson (1994). 
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Zwischenbetrachtung-lnterim Reflection 
With Keynes's economic theory all possible views of the idea of general abun-
dance are stated. The proceeding chapter covering the final period of economic 
thought does not develop the idea further, but merely revitalizes it by drawing upon the 
first three periods. 
On the one hand, we have the economists that share the view that the economic 
development will lead to general (Smith, Keynes), or at least broad (Marshall), abun-
dance. On the other hand, there is Ricardo who constitutes the only exception in 
orthodox theory in regard to the possibility and probability of general abundance. 
Based on his experience of tremendous population growth, and the ability of the land-
owners to keep their rents up due to the Com Laws, he was very pessimistic about 
wealth for everybody. If this were possible at all it would only occur through strict 
laissez-faire that excluded any poor relief or welfare legislation, thought Ricardo. 
The question of state intervention separated the classical, neo-classical and 
Keynesian school in regard to how they thought general abundance could come into 
existence. Classical and neo-classical scholars believed in a self-regulating free 
enterprise system and advocated laissez-faire. This belief was either based on philo-
sophical deductions as in Smith's case, who saw a benevolent deity directing self-inter-
est so as to promote the wealth of the nation, or on more scientifico-mathematical rea-
soning as exemplified by Alfred Marshall who used marginal utility analysis to prove his 
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assumptions. Keynes revolutionized orthodox economics by mathematically showing 
that the self-regulating mechanisms usually do not work. So he abandoned laissez-faire 
and advocated state intervention in the economy. 
The following developments in economic thought-Monetarism, New Classical 
Macroeconomics, and New Keynesianism-integrate more elements in their theories, 
for example rational expectations, but their prospect of general abundance is not influ-
enced by these changes. The new schools merely repeat the views of their predeces-
sors. Monetarism and New Classical Macroeconomics advocate laissez-faire, New 
Keynesianism promotes state intervention in the economy. What did change, however, 
was, as already seen with Marshall, that there is no longer talk about general 
abundance. What the economists since the late 1960s are looking for are the best 
conditions for the economy to grow, or at least, to maintain its desired level of output. 
It is implied that this will serve not only the economy, but the wealth of the people. 
However, there are no promises of general, not even broad abundance any more. If 
notions in this respect can be found, they simply deal with the question of full employ-
ment. Keynes's notion of a redistribution of wealth is not of importance for economists 
any more. 
5. Monetarism, New Classical Economics, 
Keynesianism (mid-l 960s until today) 
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and New 
5.1 Much Ado about Old Ideas 
Until the mid-1970s Keynesianism was the orthodox economic theory. 
Keynes's followers adapted his teachings to current phenomena and methodological 
developments, without abandoning the principles of Keynesian macroeconomic the-
ory.53 
A Keynesian school formed itself, . . . a genuine one which is a socio-
logical entity, namely, a group that professes allegiance to one master 
and one doctrine, and has its inner circle, its propagandist, its watch-
words, its esoteric and its popular doctrine. Nor is this all. Beyond the 
pale of orthodox Keynesianism there is a broad fringe of sympathizers, 
and beyond this again are the many who have absorbed, in one form or 
another, readily or grudgingly, some of the spirit or some individual 
items ofKeynesian analysis. (Harris 1948:97) 
One of the changes the school undertook was to incorporate the "Phillips 
curve" into Keynes's theory. While Keynes himself had little to say about inflation, 
Keynesian economists integrated this curve that shows an inverse empirical relationship 
between inflation and unemployment into their analysis. "The 'Phillips curve" was 
53 For overviews of the development of Keynesian economics see Pribram (1983:503-515) and Deane 
(1978: 185-189). 
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taken to indicate that unemployment could be lowered simply by allowing a somewhat 
higher rate of inflation" (Hoover 1988:4). 
However, from the mid- l 960s onwards Keynesianism began to fall out of fash-
ion in academia. After decades of unchallenged dominance a powerful theoretical 
counterrevolution occurred. 
In the mid- l 960s the theoretical Keynesian revolution began sputtering 
and by the mid- l 970s it came to a complete halt; Keynesians under 
thirty-five became the endangered species; only those economists over 
fifty remained Keynesians and many went into the closet. (Colander 
1988:92) 
Economists resurrected pre-Keynesian economic theories, namely classical and 
neo-classical notions of how to analyze the economy. 54 The "counterrevolution ... 
reinstated the pre-Keynesian orthodoxy in a modem guise" (Dow 1988:101). The first 
theoretical movement against Keynesian economics acquired the name "Monetarism" 
and was "associated to a quite exceptional degree ( ... ) with the thinking of one man, 
Milton Friedman" (Bleaney 1985: 132). 55 Friedman regarded the quantity of money as 
the key element influencing effective demand, whereas he regarded the Keynesian 
54 Hoover (1988:3-6) argues that the Keynesian dominance in economics ended because of two 
reasons: first, there was a desire to integrate micro-foundations for aggregate economic relationships 
in economic theory, second, in the early 1970s, both the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment 
rose dramatically (known as stagflation), which was not possible in Keynesian terms. Hence, both 
new schools (monetarism and new classical) are examples that show the influence of the economic 
structure on economic theory. However, the initial theorizing in this direction began in the mid-1960s 
when the economy was still booming. Therefore, it seems that dissatisfaction with Keynes's theory 
was the primary force for the development of the new schools, especially in the case of monetarism. 
Their acceptance as new orthodoxy, however, was surely enhanced in light of the economic situation 
in the 1970s. 
55 Laider (1981) summarizes the positions taken by monetarists. 
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measures of low interest rates and fiscal policies as ineffective. He concluded that 
"time lags in the effect of policy measures are fairly long and variable, so that it is diffi-
cult for the authorities to exert any consistent stabilising influence on the natural flue-
tuations of the private sector" (Bleaney 198 5: 141). Therefore, monetarists recom-
mended as a leading policy principle to pursue a "target rate of growth of the stock of 
money ... irrespective of the current state of the economy" (Bleaney 1985:139). Any 
other state interventions were seen as not necessary, as Friedman believed in self-sta-
bilising tendencies inherent in a free enterprise economy. "We are back in a completely 
neoclassical world, where it is assumed that if the real wage is such as to equalise the 
demand and supply of labour, full employment follows automatically" (Bleaney 
1985:140). 
In the 1970s monetarism was theoretically exhausted, but another school, 
known as "New Classical Economics" or "New Classical Macroeconomics," took over 
to further demolish Keynesian thought, based "on the groundwork that has been done 
by Friedman" (Bleaney 1985: 142). Its main proponents were Robert Barro, Robert 
Lucas, Thomas Sargent, and Neil Wallace. The new classical school became the 
mainstream economic view in the early 1980s (Colander 1988:92-93). Its analysis 
blended assumptions of rational expectations and market-clearing within a general 
equilibrium framework. The essential novelty was the treatment of expectations. 
"Rational Expectations assumes that economic agents are completely aware of the true 
structure of the economy ( ... ) and make full use of this knowledge in forming their 
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expectations" (Bleaney 1985:143). By introducing the expectations assumption new 
classicists turned their attention to a more individualistic level of economic behavior 
and so repeated a neo-classical pattern by "denying that economics can say anything 
about unemployment at the macrolevel, i.e. by defining the problem away" 
(Dow 1988: 107). The market clearing assumption resurrected Say's Law of markets 
(see 4.2). It postulated that "prices are sufficiently flexible to clear all markets in each 
time period. Whatever is produced is sold, though of course maybe not at a price 
which satisfies the producers" (Bleaney 1985: 146). The general equilibrium came in as 
an aggregate supply curve which assumed that the economy naturally tended toward 
stability, i.e. full employment (Bleaney 1985: 146-148). With these three assumptions 
new classical economists were able to "show that any systematic government policy is 
ineffective" (Bleaney 1985:151).56 
Monetarism and new classical economics have in common their underlying 
motivation-to revolt against Keynesianism-, their renewed advocacy of the free 
market, and in tum their antipathy to almost all forms of state intervention in the econ-
omy. 57 What distinguishes the two schools from notions of classical and neo-classical 
56 Bleaney ( 1985: 154) points out that neither the monetarist nor the new classical school proved its 
policy recommendations: "No attempt has been made by Monetarists or New Classicists to justify their 
summary rejection of Keynes's theoretical arguments; they simply choose to dismiss them by 
assumption." 
57 In fact, new classical economics was hardly concerned with practical issues, it was a "theoretical 
revolution. To the degree that it was concerned with practice, it simply borrowed monetarist policy 
prescriptions" (Colander 1988:99). 
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economics is not a far-reaching development of Ricardian and Marshallian ideas, but 
rather a different methodology, namely the application of econometrics. 58 
The same principle is true for the third development in economic theory since 
the l 970s-the evolution of Keynesian economics to "New Keynesian Economics" 
which was provoked by the new classicists's success. The new Keynesians-among the 
leading economists are John Taylor, Joseph Stiglity, George Akerlof, Meir Kohn, and 
Peter Howitt-embraced old (Keynesian) ideas but applied more advanced, economet-
ric methods to prove their views. This most recent development occurred in the mid-
1980s. What the theorists of this school did, was essentially to "develop alternative 
Keynesian models, written in the style of New Classical models and including rational 
expectations, but which came to Keynesian conclusions" (Colander 1988:97). New 
Keynesians followed Keynes's tradition of attributing to the government certain roles in 
regulating the economy. 
New Keynesian theory uses the same formal general equilibrium meth-
odological framework as New Classical theory uses, but it does not use 
the market clearing assumption. A New Keynesian article looks similar 
in form to a New Classical article, but because it does not assume mar-
ket clearing, the conclusion New Keynesians come to is that there is a 
potential role for government policy .... individual decisions do not lead 
to socially optimal results. (Colander 1988:93) 
58 Pribram (1983:513-515) discusses the post-war "trend to give advanced mathematical methods 
exclusive predominance" in economics, which finally gave way to the transformation of what was once 
called "Political Economy" into "Econometrics"-a science of applied mathematics. 
117 
With this last theoretical tum economics became divided between two compet-
ing blocs that try to arise as the mainstream theory of their profession. 59 Hoover 
(1988: 12) points out that the differences between new classicists and new Keynesians 
"revolve around empirical questions rather than matters of theoretical principle. . .. The 
remaining theoretical differences between them are principally questions about how 
self-correcting the economic system is." In light of the new "Beliebigkeit" or wide 
variety of policy-recommendations, politicians have the postmodern choice between 
"anything goes" or "rien ne va plus." What Peden (1985:223) already sees happening in 
the 1970s-"the growing split in the economics profession in the 1970s made it possi-
ble for politicians to choose whichever economic advice suited them"-accelerated in 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
5.2 The Comeback of Laissez-Faire 
As shown above, the experience of the Great Depression influenced perceptions 
of the state and the role it ought to play in the post-war period. "Live memory of the 
Great Depression created a broad consensus that the state must assume responsibility 
for maintaining prosperity, as well as for protecting individual citizens against the 
inevitable insecurities of life in a market economy" (Tobin 1987:89-90). The British 
governments of various political color reacted by embracing Keynesian economics. 
59 Colander (1988:98) sees a great chance that new Keynesianism will make a comeback as orthodx 
economics, however, "the current state of Keynesian macroeconomics is one of confusion." 
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Since the end of the Second World War the broad lines of British fiscal and monetary 
policy had been formed on Keynesian lines. The role of these policies was to ensure 
that the level of effective demand was appropriate to the full utilization of resources, 
with due regard to the rate of inflation and the foreign balance. Furthermore, the social 
welfare system was expanded. The existence of the welfare state "was commonly 
regarded as the test of a caring, civilised society" (Bleaney 1985:185). Until the early 
1970s the new policies seemed to work well. The post-war period until 1973 was one 
of unparalleled prosperity, growth, expansion of world trade, and stability. The busi-
ness cycle was tamed. "Under the continuing impetus of public and private spending, 
all capitalist nations began to evidence steady growth" (Heilbroner 1972[1953]:286). 
The British economy had growth rates of 2.6 per cent from 1950-60, and 2.8 per cent 
from 1960-70 (Eatwell 1985: 63). Unemployment was low-from 1950-60 the aver-
age unemployment rate was 2.5 per cent, from 1962 to 1973 3.1 per cent (Bleaney 
1985 :94). Consumer prices were pretty stable until the early 1970s (Cairncross 
1994a:51, Cairncross 1994b:62). 
The embracement of Keynes's policy recommendations ended in 1976. James 
Callaghan, the Labour Prime Minister, told his party at a national meeting in September 
that the Keynesian option of spending one's way out of a recession had failed: 
We used to think that you could just spend your way out of a recession 
and increase employment by cutting taxes and boosting government 
spending. I tell you in all candour, that option no longer exists, and that 
in so far as it ever did exist, it worked by injecting inflation into the 
economy. And each time that happened the average level ofunemploy-
ment has risen. Higher inflation followed by higher unemployment. 
That is the history of the last 20 years. (Callaghan as quoted in Peden 
1985:221) 
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From 1976 and especially from 1979 onwards, when the Conservative Party 
with Margaret Thatcher as new Prime Minister gained power, the mechanisms of 
Keynesian economic theory were decisively abandoned in favor of monetary probity. 
In the 1970s the "key element in British economic policy has been a desire to reduce 
intervention by the state" (Eatwell 1985:65). The governmental withdrawal from 
active economic as well as social policies in Britain 
... manifests a conservative counter-revolution in the theory, ideology, 
and practice of economic policy. The aim of the counter-revolution is 
to shrink the economic influence of government, especially central gov-
ernment, relative to that of private enterprise and free markets. (Tobin 
1987:89) 
The background of the abandonment of Keynesian policy recommendations and 
the embracement of monetarism and later new classical economics is the economic 
development of the 1970s. "The disappointments of the 1970s-inflation, stagflation, 
recessions and unemployment resulting from anti-inflationary politicies-discredited 
Keynesian policies" (Tobin 1987:5). 
What had happened? The long-lasting post-war boom had broken down. "The 
year 1973 marked the end of the 'golden age' of sustained economic growth, full 
employment and reasonable stable prices" (Peden 1985: 206). This was symbolised by 
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the "energy crisis" and world-wide recession which followed a decision of the Organi-
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to massively increase (four-fold) the 
prices for oil in 1973. 60 "Since that date, the economic performance of the advanced 
capitalist countries has clearly deteriorated. Growth rates have fallen. The rate of 
unemployment has increased and stayed high" (Bleaney 1985:155). Again in 1979 the 
OPEC increased the oil prices 21!4 times and initiated a second worldwide economic 
CTISlS. 
A few data, given by Johnson (1991 :265, 315) and Peden (1985:206-208) show 
clearly the extent of the depression Britain went through in the 1970s (see Table 1). 
Following the oil crisis, the gross domestic product (GDP) fell in 1974 by 1.5 per cent 
for the first time since 1946 and by 0.8 per cent in 1975; the level of output was not 
exceeded until 1977. Between 1980 and 1981 it fell again (2 and 1.2 per cent), and the 
1979 level of output was not reached until 1983. The unemployment rates constantly 
rose from 2.6 per cent in 1973, reached the two-digit number with 10.5 per cent in 
1981, and continued rising until they reached a peak of 13.1 per cent in 1985. In 1988 
they dropped below 10 per cent for the first time since seven years. The rate of infla-
tion dramatically increased to a peak of 24.1 per cent increase in 1975 and stayed in the 
two-digit range until 1982, except for 1978 when it dropped to 8.2 per cent. 
6° For an overview of the oil crisis and its effects see Issawi (1978). 
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Table 1. The Recessions of 1974/75 and 1979-81 in Great Britain 
Year Unemploy- Inflation Economic 
ment (percentage Growth 
(annual average 
. . 
(percentage mcrease m 
in per cent) retail price changes in 
index) GDP) 
1973 2.6 9.1 2.4 
1974 2.6 15.9 -1.5 
1975 4.0 24.1 -0.8 
1976 5.4 16.6 2.6 
1977 5.8 15.9 2.6 
1978 5.8 8.2 2.9 
1979 5.4 13.4 2.8 
1980 6.8 18.0 -2.0 
1981 10.5 11.9 -1.2 
1982 12.0 8.6 1.7 
1983 12.4 4.5 3.8 
1984 12.6 5.0 1.8 
1985 13.1 6.0 3.8 
1986 11.5 3.4 3.6 
1987 10.3 4.2 4.4 
1988 8.1 4.9 4.7 
Source: Johnson (1991:265, 280, 315) 
Besides the breakdown of the post-war boom one has to recognize another fact 
that might have contributed to the abandoning of Keynesianism. By 1948 Britain had 
established a modem welfare system that increasingly used public social expenditure to 
change and improve society, or, in other words, to fulfill the capitalist metanarrative's 
promise of wealth for everybody. The question is, if the welfare state succeeded in dis-
tributing wealth more equally or, at least, in reducing poverty. Neither seems to be the 
case. 
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Data given by Johnson (1994:303), measuring the distribution of personal 
income from 1949 to 1976 (see Table 2) show that the income tax system consistently 
worked to reduce the share of after-tax income received by the top 1 per cent of earn-
ers and also the group that earns 2 to 10 per cent of the national personal income. 
Indeed, a redistribution of income took place during this period, however, "nearly all 
this equalisation occurred within the top half of the distribution, with transfers over 
time going from the top 10 per cent (and especially the top 1 per cent) of income units 
to those in the next 40 per cent" (Johnson 1994:304). Despite gains the income of the 
poorest half of the distribution accounts for less than 1/3 of the income share through-
out the post-war period. 
Table 2. Distribution of personal income, 1949-1976/77 
(in per cent) 
Income ~roup 1949 1959 1967 1976/77 
beforeinco111etax 
top 1 per cent 11.2 8.4 7.4 5.6 
2-10 per cent 22.0 21.0 20.6 20.4 
11-20 per cent 14.1 15.1 15.2 16.1 
21-30 per cent 11.2 12.6 12.6 13.3 
31-40 per cent 9.6 10.7 11.1 11.1 
41-50 per cent 8.2 9.1 9.1 9.2 
51-100 per cent 23.7 23.1 24.1 24.5 
after inco111e tax 
top 1 per cent 6.4 5.3 4.9 3.5 
2-10 per cent 20.7 19.9 19.4 18.9 
11-20 per cent 14.5 15.7 15.2 15.9 
21-30 per cent 11.9 12.9 13.0 13.4 
31-40 per cent 10.5 11.2 11.0 11.3 
41-50 per cent 9.5 9.9 9.7 9.4 
51-100 per cent 26.5 . 25.0 26.8 27.6 
Source: Johnson (1994:303) 
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Furthermore, according to Johnson (1994:301) poverty could not be abolished 
during this period either: 
In the mid- l 960s social researchers discovered widespread poverty in 
many families with dependent children and among pensioner house-
holds, two groups who were specifically supported by the welfare state 
through the payment of family allowances and old age pensions ( ... ). 
Subsequent studies ( ... ) found that poverty continued to be a major 
problem throughout the 1960s and 1970s, despite the rapid growth of 
social expenditure, and a survey of evidence in 1987 concluded 'that the 
burden of poverty has increased grotesquely over the last eight years' 
( ... ). The number of means-tested benefits because of poverty doubled 
from 1 to 2 million between 1948 and 1966, and doubled again to reach 
over 4 million in the deep recession of the early 1980s, with many more 
living on incomes only marginally above this poverty threshold. . . . in 
1983, 16. 3 million people in the UK lived in households on or just above 
the poverty line-almost one in three of the population.61 
That means that despite the overall rise in average income and the great growth 
of social expenditures poverty was a major problem throughout the post-war decades 
in Britain. There might have occurred some improvements in the 1990s due to an eco-
nomic boom (see below), but the overall situation has not been changed. In regard to 
the promise of general abundance, therefore, it can clearly be stated that this was not 
fulfilled. "The enormous growth of social expenditure since the Second World War 
does not appear to have reduced relative poverty or promoted greater income equality" 
(Johnson 1994:305). Moreover, in light of the Keynesian-led governmental efforts, 
61 These data are based on relative poverty measures, i.e., they are related to average living standards 
and hence lead to the situation that "in a wealthy society people can be considered poor long before 
they are destitute" (Johnson 1994:301). This kind of definition of poverty is justified because a full 
participation in the average style of living requires resources that are not necessary to survive, 
however, necessary in order to be acknowleged as a member of society. 
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especially in the 1960s and 1970s, which permitted an optimistic outlook on the pos-
sibility of broad welfare, and the apparent failure to significantly reduce poverty, it can 
be stated that a decline of the metanarrative in the economic structure is occurred. 
There are many reasons for the breakdown of the post-war boom in the 
l 970s-fundamental changes in international economic relations, errors of macro-
economic policies, supply-side contraints, inflationary expectations, distribution con-
flicts, the growth of the public sector, and commodity price increases, especially of oil 
prices.62 However, according to Bleaney (1985) only a few factors-rising aspirations, 
followed by a distributional conflict, combined with the rise in commodity prices-were 
of crucial importance. 
The historical experience of the depression and the two world wars depressed 
popular aspirations and kept distributional conflicts pretty low. 63 This changed in the 
last quarter of the 20th century. Political stability, a buoyant labor market, and rising 
living standards in the 1950s and 1960s meant a great improvement for society. "The 
insecurity which had been a characteristic of working-class experience in earlier phases 
of capitalism largely disappeared" (Bleaney 1985:201). The sense of security of 
employment combined with the prospect of a steady rise of real wages was a novelty 
for Britain and the European countries overall. High rates of investment brought forth 
high productivity rates, while strong demand conditions held profits up, and in tum the 
62 For a detailed discussion of the causes of the recessions in the 1970s see Bleaney (1987: 157-196). 
63 There is a term-"post-war settlement"-that symbolizes a consensus between trade unions, 
industry, and the governments in the post-war period until the early 1970s. In simple terms the basis 
of this consensus was the willingness of the trade unions to restrain real wage growth in exchange for 
a full employment pledge by the government. (Broadberry 1994:211-214) 
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high rates of investment as well. In fact, because productivity growth was so fast, real 
wages rose at rates which had not been matched in any sustained period of previous 
history. 
Popular aspirations have risen with the apparent stability of the new 
regime of full employment, prosperity and growth and the fading from 
memory of the earlier era of insecurity. People have come to expect 
that work will be readily available for those who are seriously looking 
for it, and that economic development will make their lives steadily 
easier and materially better. In the 1960s expectations adapted to the 
historical realities of the post-war period. The route of growth of real 
wages set up in the 1950s, and then historically unprecedented . . . came 
to be built into people's aspirations. (Bleaney 1985:183) 
The very solidity and stability of the post-war environment encouraged people 
to take its achievements for granted, and this accelerated the process of rising aspira-
tions. Popular perceptions of social wealth and private expectations began to catch up 
with what the economic system could easily offer. 
The expectations of full employment and general abundance increasingly came 
into conflict with the stability of prices and the maintenance of social consensus from 
the 1960s onwards. "In the 1960s these expectations, based on the spectacular growth 
of the 1950s, began to come into conflict with what the economic system could deliver 
without significant distributional shifts" (Bleaney 1985:202). As result of the higher 
expectations and increased state expenditures through higher taxation for the social 
welfare state, a wage-price-spiral was set in motion. Workers and unions fought for 
steadily increasing real wages and this led to an upward pressure in production costs. 
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This in tum has been met by employers by raising prices for commodities. Finally, this 
was followed by a tremendous inflation, which accelerated after a commodity price 
boom in 1972 and 1973. The final consequences of these developments were deep 
recessions in 1974-75 and in 1979 to 1982. 
In order to deal with the severe slump of 1974-75 the Labour government, in 
power since February 1974, reacted in the way prescribed by Keynes-it increased 
public expenditures, financed by loans. In 197 5 the rate of public expenditure increased 
40.4 per cent, in 1976 45.5 per cent (Peden 1985:218).64 The money was spent for 
improved welfare benefits, subsidies intended to hold down the prices, increased sup-
port for industry, funding for industrial innovation, and increased local subsidies (Peden 
1985:216, 218). However, the problems of inflation and unemployment could not be 
solved-unemployment rates continued to increase, inflation was still at about 16 per 
cent. In addition, the Pound sterling rapidly declined in 1976 from an exchange rate of 
$2 at the beginning of the year to $1.56 in October (Peden 1985:219). This sharp 
decline raised import costs and made the inflation even harder to control. Subsequently 
the sterling crisis forced the government to abandon its costly Keynesian policies: 
Even if most Labour ministers held to Keynesian doctrines of stimulat-
ing demand by loan-financed public expenditure, their room for 
manoeuvre was limited by the need to sustain confidence in sterling in a 
world which was coming increasingly to believe in monetarist doctrines . 
. . . The Labour government had to announce monetary targets accept-
able to those from whom it wished to borrow, and for that reason had to 
eschew reflation. (Peden 1985 :221) 
64 Bleaney (1985:210) points out that the worldwide embracement of Keynesian policies as first 
reaction to the oil crisis "prevented a repetition of the 1930s collapse." 
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The sterling crisis of 1976 marked the end of Keynesian economic policies in 
Britain. The government introduced targets for monetary aggregate growth (12 per 
cent in 1977), and targets for credit expansion (£9 billion in 1977, £7.7 billion in 1978, 
£6 billion in 1979) (Peden 1985:219). It met these targets by cutting expenditures and 
increasing national insurance contributions. Despite efforts which were made "to help 
the poorest members of society", for example by excluding social security from major 
cuts and the creation of job programs for young people, the growth of the British wel-
fare state ended in 1976 (Peden 1985: 216-217, 220-221). 
With the gain of power by the Conservative Party in 1979 this withdrawal from 
Keynesian economic policies was reinforced and settled the matter until today. 
Whereas Labour embraced monetarist econonomic policies out of external pressures, 
and still was convinced of Keynesianism, "Thatcherism" dropped Keynes like a hot 
potato. 
If 1976 marked the end of the 'Keynesian' era, the election of the Con-
servatives under Margaret Thatcher in the general election of 1979 saw 
the beginning of a determined attempt to reverse the trend towards 
greater state intervention in the economy. . .. The priority given to 
counterinflation policy over employment policy had begun under Cal-
laghan; the difference under Thatcher was that Keynesian reflation was 
echewed indefinitely, and not merely until such time as the balance of 
payments and foreign confidence in sterling had improved. (Peden 
1985 :222-223) 
The Conservative Party "had avoided any commitment to full employment in 
1979, the first government to do so since the war" (Peden 1985:228). Thatcher's eco-
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nomic policy aimed at stimulating growth and bringing the rates of inflation down, not 
at full employment. The policies created to meet these aims were all directed by the 
conviction that the free market instead of government intervention will do the best job 
in bringing prosperity back to the island. In practice this meant that demand-side poli-
cies were abandoned in favor of supply-side policies. "Margaret Thatcher has put her 
countrymen and women on notice that the only way they can restore the jobs and pros-
perity lost in the current slump is to disinflate. Her Majesty's Government will do 
nothing about it except for "providing a stable monetary and fiscal framework within 
which private enterprise and free markets will restore prosperity and non-inflationary 
growth" (Tobin 1987:94). 
Monetary growth was limited to fight inflation. 65 State expenditures and state 
borrowing were reduced; the latter to balance the budget. "At the level of free-market 
ideology Mrs Thatcher . . . saw the public sector as an enemy country to be conquered, 
deprived of much of its territory and put under the yoke of the Treasury" (Johnson 
1991 : 7 6). This emphasis led to reduced subsidies for industry and the regions, the sale 
of state enterprises, and cuts in social security benefits, local-housing programs, and 
educational programs. 66 
Tax cuts for enterprises and individuals were introduced that were intended to 
encourage investment (Peden 1985 :226-227). In June 1979 the top rate of income tax 
was cut from 83 per cent to 60 per cent as well as the standard rate from 33 to 30 per 
65 For a detailed discussion of monetary policies since 1979 see Johnson (1991:27-75). 
66 For a detailed discussion of budgetary measures since 1979 see Johnson (1991:76-106). 
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cent. At the same time the value added tax was raised from 8 to 15 per cent, putting 
overall more tax strain on lower incomes: " ... only people who had been paying top tax 
rates in 1979 had benefited substantially from tax cuts" (Peden 1985:227). 
The problems ofthis supply-side approach are stated by Tobin: 
Fed money supply policies will not allow for real economic growth 
unless wage and price inflation melts by a point or two a year. Given 
the stubbornness of built-in wage and cost inflation, there is likely to be 
considerable economic pain and damage during a transition of several 
years. . .. In their absence [of wage and price policies], the only 
mechanism by which monetary deceleration produces disinflation is by 
creating sufficient economic distress that workers and employers, des-
perate to protect jobs and solvency, settle for lower wage and price 
increases than those currently prevailing. (Tobin 1987:95-96) 
This is exactly what happened in Great Britain-the economy recovered 
gradually, the inflation rates were only declining slowly, the unemployment rates were 
at two-digit numbers until 1987 (see Table 1 ). So why did the government react that 
way? The answer is that the high inflation rates could not be accepted for they would 
endanger the political and social stability of the country. 
The purely economic disadvantages of inflation for capitalist develop-
ment do not seem great. The political effects are, however, potentially 
very damaging. Inflation creates an enormous degree of insecurity. In 
between pay settlements, wage and salary earners experience a continu-
ous fall in their living standards with no guarantee that their next pay 
increase will be sufficient to compensate. Everyone feels that they have 
to run very fast in order to stand still; if they stop they will suddenly find 
their living standards cut by 10 or 20 per cent. Inflation is therefore 
experienced as very threatening, and liable to create quite arbitrary and 
sudden changes in income distribution. (Bleaney 1985:187) 
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The long-term result of the above described economic and social policies which 
were pursued under Margaret Thatcher and John Major, the new conservative Prime 
Minister after Thatcher resigned in 1990, was indeed the recovery of the economy, but 
at the expense of the lower third of society. Since 1979 "income for the poor has been 
flat or fallen, while income for the rich has soared 62 percent" (Ibrahim 1997:C4). The 
British economy has been growing steadily since the mid-1980s, with a 2.6% gain in 
GDP in 1996, low inflation of about 2 to 3 per cent, and an unemployment rate of 6.1 
per cent in March 1997 (Ibrahim 1997).67 However, despite the new prosperity, Brit-
ain currently faces growing problems of poverty, unemployment, and social exclusion. 
For while the national averages portray a booming economy best seen in 
London, they obscure two other worlds within Britain where the pace of 
change has varied widely. There is the world of shuttered factories, 
chronic unemployment and unsolved welfare problems. And there is the 
world of slow but steady adjustment to new jobs that pay less. (Ibrahim 
1997:Al). 
In May 1997 the Labour Party regained political power after sitting on the 
opposition banks for 18 years. This political change, however, does not indicate sig-
nificant policy changes. Tony Blair, the leader of the party since 1994 and new Prime 
Minister, promised in the election campaign not to raise personal income taxes for the 
next five years and not to exceed the current spending limits for two years (Hoge 
67 A recent study by the Sheffield Hallam University Center for Regional Economic and Social 
Research shows that "Britain's unemployment statistics vastly understate the scope of the problem by 
leaving out people who claim benefits under a category known as 'permanently sick"' (Hoge 
l 997a:A6). According to the study the unemployment rate is actually about double the amount than 
claimed by the governmental statistics. 
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1997a). "Under Mr. Blair, 43, the Labor Party has been profoundly transformed, aban-
doning its trade union, statist past and becoming a champion of entrepreneurship and 
individual enterprise" (Hoge 1997c:A6). There is no return to Keynesian policies in 
sight, except that "New Labour," the term Blair uses to call his party, promises "a 
kinder, gentler approach to the down-and-out", for example by reinstating a minimum 
wage and the adoption of a series of modest worker and job protection measures 
(Ibrahim 1997:C4). Overall, the free-market principles introduced by the Conservative 
Party from 1979 onwards will probably not be reversed. 
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Ill Conclusion 
This last chapter is intended to briefly summarize the findings of this thesis, and 
to bring them back to Lyotard's statement that the capitalist, and metanarratives in 
general, are in decline. First, however, I would like to discuss the indications of this 
thesis for further research, and the applicability of the findings. 
Within this thesis, I restricted the inquiry regarding the relationship between 
semantics and structure of the capitalist metanarrative to three complexes-the devel-
opment of the idea of general abundance within economic theory, the policies in regard 
to this idea, and the economic structure. In some cases I went beyond this limited 
scope. For example, I looked at how pressures within the political and social structure 
related to the extension of suffrage, trade unions, the Labour Party, socialist ideas, and 
the international environment affected the political sphere and politicians' willingness to 
intervene in the economy. These few instances imply the complexity of the relationship 
between the idea of general abundance and the social base in which it is produced and 
received. 
There are two areas at which, I think, would be important to look to further 
examine Lyotard's thesis of the decline of the capitalist metanarrative. First, the per-
ception of and the belief in the promise of wealth for everybody in public opinion 
would be a further structural component that could support the findings of this thesis. 
How much did the public ever believe in the promise of wealth for everybody? Is the 
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decline of the idea recognizable? Second, and related to the first area, it would be 
interesting to investigate what role politicians and parties played in actually promising 
general abundance. This would examine the semantics of the capitalist metanarrative 
further. For instance, an inquiry into party programs, election campaigns, and speeches 
of politicians could reveal answers to this question. Also, it would be worthwhile to 
look more closely at the actual economic theories now current. In this thesis I gave 
only a brief overview of the theoretical developments in the 1970s. 
Overall, in regard to the long period of time that I attempted to cover, the 
inquiries concerning economic and political development, and the economic theories, 
could not be very deep. I intentionally abandoned depth in order to cover the long run 
of the general development of the capitalist metanarrative. Therefore, much further, 
more detailed research can be done. Also, it would be interesting to compare the 
political and social developments of Great Britain with those of other capitalist coun-
tries. Despite very different developments in other countries in this regard, I assume 
that my findings are broadly applicable, especially for the time after the second World 
War. However, I cannot prove this and an investigation of the economic development 
and the policies in, for example, the United State, France, Japan, and Germany could 
reveal interesting similarities and differences. 
Now, let us come back to the findings. The idea of general abundance emerged 
m classical political economic thought as justification for the reinterpretation of 
acquisitive behavior. Adam Smith, the first economist to state the idea, was part of a 
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group of social thinkers that helped de-moralize acquisitiveness. Pre-capitalist, tradi-
tional societies regarded striving for gain and money as a harmful and disruptive pas-
sion. However, a positive stance toward making money and amassing wealth in form 
of capital is the prerequisite of a capitalist society. In light of an already changing 
economic, political, religious, and social structure, a broad range of European philoso-
phers argued that acquisitive behavior has a calming influence and civilizing effects on 
society. People pursuing their economic self-interest were believed to promote the 
welfare of the whole society, and, hence, to alleviate other disruptive passions, such as 
ambition, power, pleasure, and sex. So acquisitiveness gained the status of a harmoni-
ous interest. 
The political economists of the classical period were strongly influenced by the 
development of the natural sciences of their time. Accordingly, they aimed at describ-
ing the economy in terms of natural laws, which, if followed by society, would lead to 
the most desirable ends, namely economic growth and material progress. Except for 
some tasks that they ascribed to the state, they envisioned a government that would not 
intervene in the economic order-a state of laissez-faire. The outstanding and most 
influential classical theorists were Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Smith, who is 
regarded as the founder of political economy, perfectly represented the optimism of the 
late 18th century. He saw society as a sublime machine, created by a benevolent deity 
so as to maximize everybody's wealth. This benevolent power, often called "invisible 
hand" by Smith, endowed people with three moral sentiments-justice, prudence, and 
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benevolence-that would lead their behavior to better their own and society's condi-
tion. Smith analyzed in the Wealth of Nations (1776) numerous flaws in this harmoni-
ous natural order. He blamed the incompetent, corrupt, mercantilist state, which he 
believed caused these flaws by intervening in the economy, for the deviations of the 
natural order. Consequently, he wanted the state to withdraw from almost all activi-
ties, except for three-the defense of the country, judicial administration, and some 
public works and institutions which he thought individuals could not erect and main-
tain, such as highways, bridges, harbors, postal service, and public education. 
Smith was writing just before the economic take-off in the 1780s. David 
Ricardo, writing three decades after Smith, experienced a time of rapid transforma-
tions. In the first decades of the 19th century the Industrial Revolution was at its 
height with unprecedented growth rates of output, prices, incomes, and population. 
Social and economic distress were normal for the vast majority of people. The emer-
gence of the bourgeoisie as an economic power was followed by a struggle for a 
political say, which, so far, the landed gentry inhibited. Ricardo's work reflects these 
changes. In particular, two political issues of his time are visible his Principles, pub-
lished in 1817: the Com Law dispute and population growth. Also the introduction 
and fight over the Speenhamland system is reflected in his theory. Ricardo, therefore, 
is the only theorist besides Keynes for whom it was possible to show a direct relation 
between the economic structure and the idea of general abundance. 
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Ricardo's aim was to develop a law to regulate the distribution of income 
among landowners, capitalists, and workers. Integrating Malthus's principle of popula-
tion, he drew a very pessimistic picture of the future of society. In contrast to Smith, 
he did not predict general abundance, but the emergence of a stationary state where 
economic growth would be eaten up by an ever-expanding population. The only rem-
edy he saw for this was abandoning any kind of state intervention in the economy, 
including poor relief. 
Despite the classical economists' advocacy of laissez-faire, the British govern-
ment extended its power in the 19th century. It is true that many restrictions and 
regulations were swept away, but they were replaced by new ones which were more 
efficient and which the state actually could enforce. In particular, in regard to the 
condition of the working class and the poor, the government did not follow the classi-
cal economists' policy recommendations. The passing of a liberal Poor Law in 1796, 
and numerous legislation in the first decades of the 19th century, aimed at improving 
working and housing conditions, showed that the government obviously deviated from 
Smith's and Ricardo's policy bias. 
The same pattern can be shown for the nee-classical school of economics that 
emerged in the last decades of the 19th century. It drew upon a method that was dis-
covered during the marginal revolution by Jevons, Menger, and Walras in the 1870s. 
Marginal utility analysis mathematically analyzed the economy. Using this analytical 
tool changed not only the methodology but also the scope of economic theory. The 
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major concern of nee-classical economics, established as new orthodox theory from the 
1890s onward, was how to get an optimal result by allocating scarce resources among 
competing uses. Nee-classical economists studied market processes and withdrew 
themselves from political questions of welfare and income distribution, claiming to 
practice ethically neutral science. However, their statements were still ideologically 
biased. Nee-classical economics implicitly supported the political status quo by 
claiming that perfect competition will lead to an equimarginal allocation of expenditures 
and resources. In other words, the closer the economy conforms to a free market, the 
closer it comes to a optimal distribution of wealth. In the light of the social problems, 
revealed in social surveys of the urban working classes at the end of the 19th century, 
this scientific justification of laissez-faire contributed to the new paradigm's success as 
it supported the status quo on non-political grounds. Despite steady growth, increases 
in real incomes from 1873-1900, and social policies which somewhat relieved the 
conditions of the working class and the poor, poverty among the producers of the 
country's wealth was still incredible. 
The outstanding nee-classicist, Alfred Marshall, deviated somewhat from his 
contemporary colleagues because he used marginal utility analysis in his economic 
works only to a certain degree, and did not withdraw himself from political issues. He 
explicitly saw widespread poverty as a major problem, which he believed could be 
solved with the help of sound economics. In this effort he reaffirmed and extended the 
classical tradition of Adam Smith by showing a relationship between a free enterprise 
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economy and the economic well-being of society. Even though he identified the cur-
rent poverty within the unjust economic structure, he concluded that reforms of the 
economic system and state interventions would not alleviate poverty but make the 
problem worse. Only a free enterprise system, supported by economic chivalry and 
public education, would gradually bring wealth to more people. He derived his opti-
mistic view from marginal utility analysis as well historical studies that supported his 
view of the slow but gradual betterment of the condition of the working class and the 
poor. Marshall clearly stood in Smith's tradition as he shared the classical theorist's 
view of the positive effects of an unregulated economy. However, whereas Smith 
explicitly stated the idea of general abundance, Marshall was more cautious in making 
such a broad judgment. He did not promise general abundance but wanted to help with 
his economic theory "to discover how far it is possible to open up to all the material 
means of a refined and noble life." Thus, the scope of the idea of general abundance 
became limited with the neo-classical school, even though it was revitalized after 
Ricardo's pessimism. 
As shown for the classical period, neo-classical economics failed to transform 
into policy its idea of how abundance for the majority of the people could be 
achieved-by not intervening in the free market. Caused by the breakdown of social 
ties which, in particular, put strain on cities, and the gain of political power of the 
working class through trade unions and the Labour Party, the British governments 
passed legislation that introduced a collective welfare system and improved the work-
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ing and housing conditions of the working class and the poor at the end of the 19th and 
the beginning of the 20th century. This legislation, despite its first small effects, 
marked the final break with laissez-faire policies in regard to social welfare. The state 
recognized its responsibility for the well-being of its people, and, subsequently, aban-
doned the nee-classicists' belief in the benevolent powers of free enterprise. This trend 
was enforced and accelerated in the inter-war period. 
During the 1920s and the 1930s the British economy encountered unprece-
dented mass unemployment as result of trade depressions after the First World War and 
during the Great Depression. The nee-classical assumption of general equilibrium and 
full employment in a free enterprise system "seemed blatantly to disregard the crucial 
problem of economic policy" (Deane 1978: 177). So the unemployment problem gave 
way to a new paradigm in orthodox economics-Keynesianism. 
After Ricardo, Keynes is the second theorist for whom it was possible to show 
a direct influence of the economic structure on the economist's theorizing. In all the 
other cases such an influence certainly exists, too. However, it is less obvious and 
specific. Smith shared the widely held optimism of his time and saw an optimistic 
future for the nation and its people. This optimism and structural changes that endan-
gered the social order led him to reinterpret acquisitive behavior as harmonious inter-
est. Marshall, in light of the poverty problem at his time declared that his major aim 
was to solve this problem. He backed his mathematical analysis with historical inquiries 
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and concluded that a free-enterprise system would gradually work toward the better-
ment of people's living conditions. 
Keynes brought the focus of economics back to macroeconomic questions by 
developing a model which showed that effective demand determines the national 
income and the amount of unemployment. He demonstrated that the neo-classical 
general equilibrium assumptions are only applicable for boom years during the business 
cycles, and, hence, that the state had to intervene in the economy in order to promote 
economic growth and prosperity by enhancing the propensity to consume and the 
inducement to invest. His concrete policy prescriptions were countercyclical budgets 
including deficit spending, a progressive income tax, low interest rates, the issuance of 
public loans, and public work programs. As Keynes's theories became the dominant 
paradigm in orthodox economics in the 1940s, the belief in laissez-faire was abandoned 
for the first time. General abundance would not come automatically but was only 
possible with governmental help, so went the new conviction. 
Keynes's policy prescriptions gradually became the policies of British govern-
ments. While the economic and social policies during the 1920s and 1930s were 
inconsistent in regard to economic theories, Keynes's ideas were fully embraced after 
the Second World War. " ... the myth of laissez-faire died hard in Britain ... " (Holmes 
1976:201). Keynes was the first economist whose policy recommendations in regard 
to general abundance were actually followed by governments. 
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In the mid- l 970s the Keynesian embrace came to an end. After almost three 
decades of unprecedented growth the economic boom broke down in the mid- l 970s 
and again in the late 1970s after decisions of the OPEC to drastically increase oil 
prices. This was followed by tremendous inflation rates for which Keynes and his fol-
lowers did not have answers. Keynesianism, already in decline in economics since the 
mid- l 960s, subsequently lost its status as dominant orthodoxy, and became discredited 
in political practice as well. Two new schools of economic thought took over: mone-
tarism, which became dominant from the mid- l 970s until the early 1980s, and new 
classical macroeconomics, which gained dominant status in the early 1980s. Both 
schools were warm-ups of neo-classical economic thought rather than radical innova-
tions. As had their neo-classical predecessors, they praised laissez-faire and the self-
correcting mechanisms of the market. 
In light of stagflation, the British government embraced these new, pre-
Keynesian ideas and dropped Keynes's policy recommendations. Of course, a radical 
U-tum from a strongly regulated economy to complete laissez-faire was not possible, 
but governments, especially from 1979 onward, reduced state interventions and state 
spending drastically, and explicitly put their policies on monetarist grounds. 
In the mid-l 980s the Keynesian school re-emerged as "New Keynesianism" and 
integrated some further assumptions and models in its economic thought. By and large 
the school followed old Keynesian ideas. With the emergence of new Keynesianism, 
orthodox economics became split in the mid- l 980s. Politicians had the choice between 
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two competing schools and clearly followed the non-Keynesian policy prescriptions 
until now. Despite the recent victory of the traditionally pro-Keynesian Labour Party, 
Keynesianism does not seem likely to become the fashion again in the next few years. 
The above analysis of the idea of general abundance in its socio-historical set-
ting supports Lyotard's thesis that the capitalist metanarrative is in decline; in economic 
thought, in social and economic policies, and in economic reality. As I have shown, 
Adam Smith explicitly promised that a free enterprise system would enrich the nation 
and its people. He was the only one of the examined theorists that was so bold. All his 
successors were much more cautious. Besides Ricardo, who more or less denied the 
possibility of general abundance and the first for whom a decline of the idea of general 
abundance can be seen, the economic schools after Smith only implicitly stated the idea 
by examining the ways in which the economy works best and how full employment can 
be achieved. For the nee-classicists and Marshall as for the monetarists and the new 
classicists, a general equilibrium, i.e. economic growth and full employment, will be the 
result of a market left to itself Whereas Marshall surely intended to enrich all people 
with the help of economic theory, he was not sure to what extent this would be 
possible. His new classical school successors followed the apolitical stance of the neo-
classical school. Beyond the statement that free competition will automatically lead to 
full employment, they did not seem to be concerned about questions of general welfare 
but with developing sound economic theory. The monetarists took a more political 
stance and at least seemed to be concerned to provide a theory that would be applicable 
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in politics. However, statements of general abundance cannot be found. Keynes had 
rejected the laissez-faire approach and saw state interventions as necessary in order to 
achieve full employment and a more equitable distribution of incomes and wealth. He 
seemed to have a firm belief in the possibility of general abundance if government 
would just follow his recommendations. Therefore, he probably came close to Smith in 
his conviction that general abundance was possible. The new Keynesians followed 
Keynes in demanding state interventions as means of economic growth and justice; 
however, so far they have not come up with a generally accepted theory. In contrast to 
Keynes and in light of the failure of Keynesian thought in the 1970s they seem rather 
confused about what kind of policies to recommend. They appear to have lost any 
conviction of the possibility of sustained economic growth and full employment. 
Applying the same models as the new classical school, these two groups are hard to 
distinguish, and only the new Keynesians' pledge for social justice shows the roots 
underlying their theory. It can be concluded that after Smith, and with the exception of 
Keynes, who constituted the last stronghold believing that wealth for everybody would 
be possible, the idea of general abundance in economics is in decline. Currently neither 
laissez-faire nor state intervention seems to be remedies to enrich the people. 
The strong downward trend of the idea since the 1970s is striking. If one were 
to rank the different schools and theorists in regard to their belief in the possibility of 
general abundance, I would suggest an order as follows: Smith is clearly at the top as 
he believed and stated that wealth for everybody will certainly come. Keynes, who was 
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convinced of his own theory, follows him closely. The next theorist would be Marshall, 
who wanted to eliminate poverty but was not convinced to what degree this would be 
possible. These are the only theorists that believed in the possibility of general abun-
dance, all the others just created theories intended to create the best situation for 
growth and full employment. I think that Ricardo, despite his pessimistic outlook, was 
still more convinced of the possibility of general abundance than the three schools that 
emerged since the 1970s. I would argue that the new classicals are at the bottom of the 
ranking list, as they were not really concerned about political and social issues. 
Between Ricardo and this school are the monetarists and the new Keynesians, located 
at about the same level. Both schools are concerned with growth and the Keynesians 
also about social issues, and both seem to be disillusioned about the possibility of 
steady growth, full employment, and social justice. 
One can only speculate about the reasons for the not outspoken, however, clear 
abandonment of the promise of wealth for everybody in economic theory. The inquiry 
above indicates some arguments. The best hunch is that the economists dropped the 
promise in light of economic realities. Ricardo witnessed population growth that did 
not allow economic progress. Marshall had to realize that the social distress in his 
country was so widespread that it was not certain to what extent a free market system 
would enrich people despite steady growth. The three schools that emerged in the 
1970s and 1980s had witnessed three decades of enormous economic growth plus far-
reaching governmental interventions that were intended to eliminate poverty and to 
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redistribute wealth. The data showed these ideals could not be reached, despite prom-
ising political and economic conditions. 
From this background, I think, it is justified to conclude that economic develop-
ment and the development of social and economic policies supported the decline of the 
capitalist metanarrative in economic theory. This finding shows the fiuitfulness of 
examining Lyotard's thesis within the sociology of knowledge. This approach enabled 
me to look beyond the mere development of the idea of general abundance in economic 
theory, and to locate its decline within the economic and political environment. 
As I have shown, from 1796 onward, the British government abandoned lais-
sez-faire and gradually introduced policies that regulated the economy in relation to the 
welfare of its people. Especially in the last decades of the 19th and the beginning of the 
20th century, much social legislation was introduced. After the Second World War, 
laissez-faire was officially given up by introducing a social welfare system and fully 
embracing Keynesian policy recommendations. Thus, since the late 18th century, there 
had been a constant growth of economic and social policies intended to alleviate 
poverty and improve the living and working situation, and to come closer to the prom-
ise of wealth for everybody. However, poverty kept its level despite the increasing 
efforts to eliminate it. Overall, rising living standards, and an enrichment of the upper 
two thirds of the population cannot be denied, but the lower third of the population 
constantly was left out of material progress. Especially disappointing in this regard was 
the failure of Keynesianism after laissez-faire was officially dropped after 1945. This 
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situation, the failure of both laissez-faire and Keynesian economics to create general 
abundance, Lyotard seemed to have had in mind when he said: "the 'crises of 1911 and 
1929' refute the doctrine of economic liberalism, and the 'crisis of 1974-79' refutes the 
post-Keynesian modification of that doctrine." In contrast to Lyotard, this thesis sug-
gests that it was not the economic crises that refuted the doctrines, but the history of 
long-term economic development coupled with social and economic policies. The 
recurrent crises in capitalism only reinforced and accelerated the overall patterns and 
tendencies and so led to a break with, until then, prevalent policies. 
British governments always deviated from the laissez-faire recommendations of 
the classical and nee-classical economists. Widespread economic and social distress of 
the people challenged the notion of a self-regulating market and promoted state inter-
vention in the economy. The recessions of the 1920s and 1930s were the final events 
that put the lid on laissez-faire. This doctrine was abandoned in economic theory as 
well as in politics since the Second World War. Keynesian state intervention took its 
place and promised to fulfill the capitalist metanarrative. However, Keynes's recom-
mendations did not succeed in enriching everybody. In light of the already recognizable 
failure ofKeynes in the 1960s, the economic recessions of the 1970s led to a comeback 
of laissez-faire. State interventions in the economy that were steadily increasing since 
the late 18th century until the mid-1970s were reduced for the first time. As the gen-
eral economic development and the economic situation of the people apparently did not 
seem to differ significantly with or without state interventions, this was the logical step. 
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As shown, Keynes was optimistic. He believed in the positive effects of his 
policy recommendations. It is important that he not only demanded policies that would 
lead to full employment, but beyond this he argued that income and wealth needed to 
be redistributed from rich to poor. This did not happen to the necessary extent. The 
question is why? 
In the 1970s distributional conflicts were a major factor that caused the reces-
sion of 1973-74, and hence, the conservative reversion to pre-Keynesian economic and 
social policies. Apparently, richer people were not willing to pay for the abundance of 
everyone. Peden (1985:232-233) supports this view: 
The fundamental stumbling block is an unwillingness on the part of the 
taxpayers to vote for the kind of transfer of incomes which would 
confer significant increases in social security benefits. Survey evidence 
. . . has suggested that 7 4 per cent of the electorate would be prepared to 
pay an extra penny in the pound in income tax to help the poorest 
members of society. However, only 34 per cent would definitely be 
prepared to pay an extra Sp in the pound ( ... ) . There is, therefore, some 
support for increase measures to help the poorest members of society, 
but not to a degree which would interfere significantly with the personal 
consumption of the majority. 
Redistribution is the crucial issue in regard to general abundance. In light of the 
analysis above, it seems that what happened in the 1970s and after was that the Labour 
Party and Keynesian economists became disillusioned about the possibilities of general 
welfare, which did not seem possible without serious redistributional efforts. 
Recognizing that this could not be realized, the conservatives stepped into the ideo-
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logical vacuum of the Left. Despite the apparent social distress that was followed by 
laissez-faire policies, these actions were justified as the conservatives argued that they 
had applied Keynes for over two decades, but that these ideas apparently failed. 
Therefore, the only possibility would be to go back to the old policies. Until now the 
Left has not found satisfying answers to this predicament. That the recent Labour vie-
tory that does not seem to presage a return to Keynesian policies emphasizes this. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, the function of metanarratives is to 
legitimize social and political institutions and practices. As Lyotard (1993a[1979]) 
pointed out, science especially relied upon metanarratives. Given Lyotard is right, with 
the decline of, especially, the metanarrative of emancipation and the speculative, 
Hegelian metanarrative, science lost its legitimation. Lyotard argued that this delegiti-
mation of science had two effects: performativity and paralogy. Both are seen as new 
sources of legitimation. Performativity is "the optimization ... between input and out-
put" (Lyotard 1993a[1979]:11). That means that science is not searching for truth any 
more but for the optimal performance of systems. Paralogy refers to a science that is 
not unified under one paradigm any more, but is characterized by dissent and a multi-
tude of paradigms. Consensus is not possible as it "does violence to the heterogeneity 
of language games" which are the prevalent mode of postmodern scientific discourses 
(Lyotard 1993a[1979]:XXV): 
Postmodern science-by concerning itself with such things as undeci-
dables, the limits of precise control, conflicts characterized by incom-
plete information, 'fracta', catastrophes, and pragmatic paradoxes-is 
theorizing its own evolution as discontinuous, catastrophic, nonrectifi-
able, and paradoxical. . . . It is producing not the known, but the 
unknown. (Lyotard 1993a[1979]:60) 
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The examination of the state of economics since the 1970s fits into this analysis. 
As I have shown, the idea of general abundance is in decline in economic theory. That 
means that economists withdrew themselves from the metanarrative that legitimated 
their profession. Performativity and paralogy stepped in as new legitimating mecha-
nisms. By abandoning the promise of wealth for everybody, economists gave up their 
search for truth of how to fulfill this promise. Nowadays they merely try to determine 
how one can maximize economic output and minimize input at the same time, in other 
words, they are trying to determine optimal performance of the economic system. 
Furthermore, there is no consensus any more on how to reach this optimal perform-
ance. The contemporaneous existence of the new classical school and the new 
Keynesian school stand for what Lyotard calls paralogy. In this respect the develop-
ments in economics since the 1970s are logical consequences of the decline of 
metanarratives. 
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